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ACCG3030 TUTORIAL ASSIGNMENTS

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ACCG3030 TUTORIAL ASSIGNMENTS
Session 1 2020
(Assignments are due in the respective tutorials in the week designated)
Due Date TOPIC
Week 2 Introduction to Strategic Management Accounting…………………. page 2
Case: Wal-Mart
Week 3 Strategic process and strategic analysis ……………………………………page 5
Case: Baldwin Bicycles
Week 4 Strategy and management control. ……………………………………..page 8
Case: Lincoln Electric
Week 5 Strategic change and strategic flexibility
This week’s assignment will be provided in Week 4’s lecture
Week 6 Activity based costing ……………………………………………………………….page 10
Case: Society Bonlieu
Week 7 Assessing and managing performance over the value chain ………..page 16
Case: Mercedes-Benz
Week 8 No tutorials will be held this week.
Week 9 Financial measures of performance…………………………………………….page 18
Case: The Kinkead Equipment Company Ltd
Week 10 Non-financial measures of performance …………………………………….page 21
Case: Chadwick Inc: The Balanced Scorecard
Week 11 Strategic and behavioural aspects of capital expenditure evaluations
Case: Mavis Machine Shop…………………………………………………………..page 26
Week 12 Group report presentations
Week 13 No tutorials will be held this week
2
Week 2 Tutorial
INTRODUCTION TO STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING
Read the Case ‘Wal-Mart’ and answer the questions given at the end of the case.
WAL-MART STORES, INC.
Founded by Sam Walton, the first Wal-Mart store opened in Rogers, Arkansas, in 1962.
Seventeen years later, annual sales topped $1billion. By the end of January 2005, Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. (Wal-Mart) was the world’s largest retailer, with $288 billion in sales (see Exhibit 1 for
comparative financial data). In 1995, Wal-Mart sold no grocery; by 2005, the company was the
market leader among supermarkets in the U.S. Wal-Mart was the largest private-sector employer
in the world. The information technology that powered Wal-Mart’s supply chain and logistics was
the most powerful, next only to the computer capability of the Pentagon. The company owned over
20 aircrafts – which were used by managers to travel to its stores in far-flung locations. The
number of miles flown by Wal-Mart managers in the company-owned aircrafts would place WalMart on par with a medium sized commercial airline. Wal-Mart had the largest privately owned
satellite communication network in the U.S. and broadcasted more television than any network TV.
Wal-Mart’s winning strategy in the U.S. was based on selling branded products at low cost. Each
week, about 138 million customers visited a Wal-Mart store somewhere in the world. The company
employed more than 1.6 million associates (Wal-Mart’s term for employees) worldwide through
more than 3,700 stores in the United States and more than 1,600 units in Mexico, Puerto Rico,
Canada, Argentina, Brazil, China, Korea, Germany, and the United Kingdom. (The first
international store opened in Mexico City in 1991.) Wal-Mart also obtained a 38% controlling share
in the Japanese retail chain Seiyu in order to capture a slice of the world’s second largest market
estimated at $1.3 trillion.
In 2002, Wal-Mart was presented with the Ron Brown award for corporate leadership, a
presidential award that recognizes companies for outstanding achievement in employee and
community relations. In 2004, Fortune magazine placed Wal-Mart in the top spot on its “Most
Admired Companies” list for the second year in a row.
By 2005, Wal-Mart held an 8.9% retail store market share in the United States. Put simply, of
every $100 that Americans spent in retail stores, $8.90 was spent in Wal-Mart. Procter & Gamble,
Clorox, and Johnson & Johnson were among its nearly 3,000 suppliers. Though Wal-Mart may
have been the top customer for consumer product manufacturers, it deliberately ensured it did not
become too dependent on any one supplier; no single vendor constituted more than 4% of its
overall purchase volume. In order to drive up supply chain efficiencies, Wal-Mart had also
persuaded its suppliers to have electronic ‘hook-ups’ with its stores and adapt to the latest supply
chain technologies like RFID which could increase monitoring and management of the inventory.
Wal-Mart used a ‘saturation’ strategy for store expansion. The standard was to be able to drive
from a distribution centre to a store within a day. A distribution centre was strategically placed so
that it could eventually serve 150-200 stores within a day. Stores were built as far as way as
possible but still within a day’s drive of the distribution centre; the area was then filled back (or
saturated back) to the distribution centre. Each distribution centre operated 24 hours a day using
laser-guided conveyor belts and cross-docking techniques that received goods on one side while
simultaneously filling orders on the other. Wal-Mart’s distribution system was so efficient that they
incurred only 1.3% of sales as distribution costs compared to 3.5% for their nearest competitor.
The company owned a fleet of more than 6,100 trailer trucks and employed over 7,600 truck
drivers making it one of the largest trucking companies in the United States. (Most competitors
outsourced trucking.) Wal-Mart had implemented a satellite network system that allowed
3
information to be shared between the company’s wide network of stores, distribution centres, and
suppliers. The system consolidated orders for goods, enabling the company to buy full truckload
quantities without incurring the inventory costs.
In its early years, Wal-Mart’s strategy was to build large discount stores in small rural towns. By
contrast, competitors such as K-Mart focused on large towns with populations greater than 50,000.
Wal-Mart’s marketing strategy was to guarantee ‘everyday low prices’ as a way to pull in
customers. Traditional discount retailers relied on advertised ‘sales’.
Management Systems
Each store constituted an investment centre and was evaluated on its profits relative to its
inventory investments. Data from over 5,300 individual stores on items such as sales, expenses,
and profit and loss were collected, analyzed, and transmitted electronically on a real-time basis,
rapidly revealing how a particular region, district, store, department within a store, or item within a
department was performing. The information enabled the company to reduce the likelihood of
stock-outs and the need for markdowns on slow moving stock, and to maximize inventory
turnover. The data from outstanding performers among 5,300 stores were used to improve
operations in ‘problem’ stores.
One of the significant costs for retailers was shoplifting, or pilferage. Wal-Mart addressed this
issue by instituting a policy that shared 50% of the savings from decreases in a store’s pilferage in
a particular store, as compared to the industry standard, among that store’s employees through
store incentive plans.
Early in Wal-Mart’s history, Sam Walton implemented a process requiring store managers to fillout “Best Yesterday” ledgers. These relatively straightforward forms tracked daily sales
performance against the numbers from one year prior. Recalled Walton, “We were really trying to
become the very best operators – the most professional managers – that we could ……. I have
always had the soul of an operator, someone who wants to make things work well, then better,
then the best they possibly can.” His organization was really a “store within a store”, encouraging
department managers to be accountable and giving them an incentive to be creative. Succesful
experiments were recognized and applied to other stores. One example was the “people greeter”,
an associate who welcomed shoppers as they entered the store. Theses greeters not only
provided a personal service, their presence served to reduce pilferage. The “10-foot attitude” was
another customer service approach Walton encouraged. When the founder visited his stores, he
asked associated to make a pledge, telling them “I want you to promise that whenever you come
within 10 feet of a customer, you will look him in the eye, greet him, and ask him if you can help
him”.
In return for employees’ loyalty and dedication, Walton began offering profit sharing in 1971.
“Every associate that had been with us for at least one year, and who worked at least 1,000 hours
a year, was eligible for it”, he explained. “Using a formula based on profit growth, we contribute a
percentage of every eligible associate’s wages to his or her plan, which the associate can take
when they leave the company, either in cash or in Wal-Mart stock”. In fiscal 2005, Wal-Mart’s
annual company contribution totaled $756 million.
Wal-Mart also constituted several other policies and programs for its associates: incentive
bonuses, a discount stock purchase plan, promotion from within, pay raises based on performance
not seniority, and an open-door policy.
Sam Walton, the founder of Wal-Mart, believed in being frugal. He drove an old beat-up truck and
flew economy class, despite being a billionaire. He instilled frugality as part of Wal-Mart’s DNA.
4
Exhibit 1 Comparative financial data on selected companies

Five year average:1999-2004
Wal-Mart Home Depot Kroger Costco Target
Return on equity (%) 21.2 19.7 20.1 13.4 17.3
Sales growth (%) 11.6 13.7 4.5 11.9 6.8
Operating income
growth (%)
11.1 15.9 (13.8) 10.0 13.3
2004 data
Sales ($B) 288.2 73.1 56.4 48.1 46.8
As percentage of
sales:
Cost of goods sold 76.3 66.6 74.7 87.5 68.7
Gross margin 22.7 33.4 25.3 12.5 31.3
Selling and admin 17.8 22.6 20.0 9.6 20.9
Operating income 5.9 10.8 1.5 2.9 7.7
Net income 3.6 6.8 (0.2) 1.8 6.8
Inventory turnover 7.5 4.8 9.8 11.3 5.9
Return on equity (%) 23.2 22.1 (2.5) 12.8 15.6

REQUIRED:
a) What is Wal-Mart’s corporate level strategy? Discuss. [10%]
b) Use the BCG model to determine the overall mission of Wal-Mart. Also discuss the mission
of a particular type of business unit of Wal-Mart (e.g. a division, segment, or particular
store).
a. NB You might like to refer to the following website http://walmartstores.com/ [20%]
c) What is the basis upon which Wal-Mart builds its competitive advantage? How does this
differ from retailers such as K-Mart, Big W, Myer, David Jones? Describe specific feature of
Wal-Mart’s operations that allow it to achieve competitive advantage. [40%]
d) How do Wal-Mart’s control systems help execute the firm’s strategy? [30%]
5
Week 3 Tutorial
STRATEGIC PROCESS AND STRATEGIC ANALYSIS
Read the case “Baldwin Company” and answer the questions given at the end of the case.
BALDWIN BICYCLE COMPANY
In May 1983, Suzanne Leister, marketing director of Baldwin Bicycle Company, was mulling over
the discussion she had had the previous day with Karl Knott, a buyer from Hi-Valu Stores. Hi-Valu
operated a chain of discount department stores in the North West. Hi-Valu’s sales volume had
grown to the extent that it was beginning to add its “own-brand” (also called “private-label”)
merchandise to the product lines of several of its departments. Mr. Knott, Hi-Valu’s buyer for
sporting goods, had approached Ms. Leister about the possibility of Baldwin producing bicycles for
Hi-Valu under its own-brand name of “Challenger”.
Baldwin had been making bicycles for almost 40 years. In 1983, the company’s line included 10
models, ranging from a small beginner’s model with training wheels to a deluxe 12 speed adult’s
model. Sales were currently at an annual rate of about $10 million and Baldwin’s 1982 financial
statements appear in Exhibit 1. Most of Baldwin’s sales were through speciality bicycle shops.
Baldwin had never before distributed its products through department store chains of any type
(e.g. Rebel Sports, K-Mart etc). Ms. Leister felt that Baldwin bicycles had the image of being above
average in quality and price, but not a “top of the line” product.
Hi-Valu’s proposal to Baldwin had features that made it quite different from Baldwin’s normal way
of doing business. First, Hi-Valu wanted to sell its Challenger bicycles at lower prices than the
well-known brand-name bicycles it carried (e.g. Trek), and yet still earn approximately the same
dollar gross margin on each bicycle sold – the rationale being that Challenger bike sales would
take away from the sales of the brand-name bikes. Thus, Hi-Valu wanted to purchase bikes from
Baldwin at lower prices than the wholesale prices of comparable bikes sold to Baldwin’s speciality
bicycle shops.
Second, Hi-Valu wanted the Challenger bike to be somewhat different in appearance from
Baldwin’s other bikes. While the frame and mechanical components could be the same as used on
current Baldwin models, the mud-guards, seats, and handlebars would need to be somewhat
different, and the tyres would have to have the name “Challenger” moulded onto them. Also, the
bicycles would have to be packed in boxes printed with the Hi-Valu and Challenger names. These
requirements were expected by Ms. Leister to increase Baldwin’s purchasing, inventorying, and
production costs over and above the added costs that would be incurred for a comparable
increase in volume for Baldwin’s regular products.
On the positive side, Ms. Leister was acutely aware that the “bicycle boom” had flattened out, and
this plus a poor economy had caused Baldwin’s sales volume to fall in the past two years.1 As a
result, Baldwin currently was operating its plant at about 75% of a one-shift capacity. Thus, the
added volume from Hi-Valu’s purchases could possibly be very attractive. If agreement could be
reached on prices, Hi-Valu would sign a contract guaranteeing to Baldwin that Hi-Valu would buy
its own-brand bicycles only from Baldwin for a three-year period. The contract would then be
automatically extended on a year-to-year basis, unless one party gave the other at least three
months notice that it did not wish to extend the contract.
Suzanne Leister realized she needed to do some preliminary financial analysis of this proposal
before having any further discussions with Karl Knott. She had written on a pad the information
she had gathered to use in her initial analysis; this information is shown in Exhibit 2.
1
The American bicycle industry is very volatile. From 1967 to 1970 sales average about 7 million units a year; in 1973
sales were 15 million units; in 1975 sales were back down to 7.5 million units and in 1982 sales were 10 million units.
6
EXHIBIT 1: FINANCIAL STATEMENTS ($000s)
Balance Sheet (as of December 31, 1982)
Assets Liabilities and Owners Equity
Cash

$ 342
1,359
Accounts payable
Accrued expenses
$ 512
340
2,756 Short-term bank loans 2,626
3,635 Long-term Note payable 1,512
4,990
Shareholders’ equity 3,102

Accounts receivable Inventories Plant and equipment (net) Total assets $ 8,092Total liabilities $ 8,092
Income Statement ($’000) (for the Year Ended December 31, 1982)
Sales revenues …………$ 10,872
Cost of Goods Sold ………..8,045
Gross margin ……………………….. 2,827
Selling and Administrative expenses 2,354
Income before taxes …………473
Income tax expense ………….218
Net income …………………………… $ 255
EXHIBIT 2
DATA PERTINENT TO HI-VALU PROPOSAL
(Notes taken by Suzanne Leister)
1. Estimated costs of producing a Challenger bicycle (average unit cost, assuming a constant mix of
models):

Materials $39.80 *
Labour
Overhead (@ 125% of labour)
19.60
24.50**
$83.90
*
**
Includes items specific to models for Hi-Valu, not used in our standard models.
Accountant says about 40% of total overhead cost is variable; 125% of DL$ rate is based on volume of

100,000 bicycles per year. From this information, fixed manufacturing overhead can be calculated at about
$1.5m per year.
2. One-time added costs of preparing drawings and arranging sources for mud-guards, seats,
handlebars, tyres, and shipping boxes that differ from those used in our standard models: approximately
$5,000.
3. Unit price and annual volume: Hi-Valu estimates it will need 25,000 bikes a year and proposes to
pay Baldwin (based on the assumed mix of models) an average of $92.29 per bike for the first year. Knott
indicated that there was very little, if any, negotiating leeway in the $92.29 proposed initial price.
4. Impact on our regular sales
Some customers compare bikes from shop to shop, and many of them are likely to recognize a Challenger
bike as good value when compared with a similar bike (either ours or a competitor’s) at a higher price in a
specialist bicycle shop. In 1982, we sold 98,791 bikes. My best guess is that our sales over the next three
years will be about 100,000 bikes a year if we forego the Hi-Valu deal. If we accept it, I think we’ll lose about
3,000 units of our regular sales volume a year, since our retail distribution is quite strong in Hi Valu’s market
regions. These estimates do not include the possibility that a few of our current dealers might drop our
product line if they find out we’re making bikes for Hi-Valu.
Adapted from Shank, J. (2001) Cases in Cost Management: A Strategic Emphasis.pp.21-24 (SouthWestern).
7
REQUIRED:
a) On the basis of Michael Porter’s (1980) competitive strategies, how does Baldwin
currently compete? Justify your answer. [25%]
b) If Baldwin took up Hi-Valu’s offer, how might this change the way Baldwin competes?
In particular, think about the effect on Baldwin’s costs and distribution channels (i.e.
the retailers). [35%]
c) Using Miles and Snow typology, speculate on Baldwin Bicycle Company’s strategic
positioning. [20%]
d) Use Porter’s five forces model to analyse the competitive forces associated with the
airline industry [20%]
8
Week 4 Tutorial
STRATEGY AND MANAGEMENT CONTROL
1. “Different controls for different strategies”. Explain this statement using three examples.
[20%]
2. Read the case “Lincoln Electric” (presented separately under the “Assessed Weekly
Tutorial Assignments” tab in ilearn ) [80%]
a) How would you characterize Lincoln Electric’s strategy? In this context, what is the nature
of Lincoln’s business and upon what bases does this company compete? [10%]
b) What are the most important elements of Lincoln’s overall approach to organization and
control that help explain why this company is so successful? How well do Lincoln’s
organization and control mechanisms fit the company’s strategic requirements? [30%]
c) What is the corporate culture like at Lincoln Electric? What type of employees would be
happy working at Lincoln Electric? [10%]
d) What is the applicability of Lincoln’s approach to organization and control to other
companies? Why don’t more companies operate like Lincoln? [10%]
e) What could cause Lincoln’s strategy implementation approach to break down? What are
the threats to Lincoln’s continued success? [10%]
f) Would you like to work in an environment like that at Lincoln Electric? Why or Why not?
[10%]
9
Week 5 Tutorial
STRATEGIC CHANGE AND STRATEGIC FLEXIBILITY
This week’s assignment will be provided in Week 4’s lecture
10
Week 6 Tutorial
ACTIVITY BASED COSTING
Read the case Societe Bonlieu, and answer the questions given at the end of the case.
SOCIETE BONLIEU
Mr. Bonlieu, owner of a small carpentry business, was concerned about his accounting system.
He felt he was in danger of losing sales of desks, which made up nearly half of his business,
because his prices were too high. Yet, according to his accounting figures, his margin on these
desks was very low. At the same time, competitors were accusing him of selling staircases,
another of his products, below cost. Yet his margin on staircases was apparently good.
Mr. Bonlieu was a sub-contractor for furniture dealers and manufacturers, who supplied him with
the wood for each order. In October 19XX, the plant consisted of a warehouse for the wood, a kiln
(drying oven), a drafting room, a machine shop, and an assembly shop. He had acquired the
drying oven two years earlier to enable him to offer his customers the option of supplying him with
‘green’ or undried wood if they preferred (wood needs to be dried before it can be manufactured
into furniture).
The accounting system then in use was a simple job order system. Direct labour was charged on
the basis of actual labour costs incurred on each job in the drafting. Machine, and assembly
shops. Supplies, such as screws and varnish, were similarly charged to each job on the basis of
actual consumption. All other expenses or overhead was allocated to jobs as a percentage of the
direct labour cost charged to the job. Selling expense was charged in proportion to the sales value
of each job.
In the quarter ended September 19XX, five jobs had been started, completed, and delivered. No
other jobs had been worked on. Although this mix of jobs was not unusual, the actual mix
changed substantially, quarter by quarter. Costs for the quarter are shown in Exhibit 1 and the
assignment of costs to jobs is shown in Exhibit 2.
One thing which struck Mr.Bonlieu about the cost calculations was the magnitude of overhead
costs in relation to direct labour costs. Great care was taken in recording and assigning labour, yet
overhead expenses, which were much large in total, were allocated with very basic and simple
rules. He suspected that this caused distortions in the costs charged to various jobs and was the
explanation for the apparent discrepancies in prices. Accordingly, he sought the advice of a
consultant.
The consultant’s report advised setting up eight cost centres – two overhead centres
(administration and indirect labour), five production centres (warehouse, drying oven, drafting
shop, machine shop, and assembly shop) and a selling expense centre.
Where possible, costs would be assigned directly to the centre in which they were incurred. Thus
coal costs were charged entirely to the oven, power entirely to the machine shop and truck
expenses entirely to selling. Building expenses were to be allocated on the basis of floor space
used, as follows: 20% to the warehouse, 30% to the drying oven, 10% to drafting, 15% to
machining, and 25% to assembly. Office expense was to be allocated on the basis of wage and
salary costs.
Depreciation of equipment was to be charged on the basis of the cost centre in which the
equipment was used. Thus the oven was to carry 300,000Euros and the machine shop 430,000
11
Euros for each quarter. Interest expense was to be allocated to the items which had been
purchased with the borrowed funds. The machine shop was responsible for 8.6m Euros of the
debt, the drying oven for 4.8m Euros, and the delivery truck for 600,000Euros.
After all costs had been assigned to cost centres, the administrative and indirect labour centres
were to be closed out and the costs allocated to the five production centres and to the selling
centre. Administrative expense was to be allocated 25% to selling expense, and the remaining
75% to the production departments on the basis of direct labour (in the five production centres).
Indirect labour was to be allocated to the five production departments, also on the basis of direct
labour (in the five production centres), although the warehouseman and the oven attendant were
to be reclassified as direct labour to their respective cost centres.
The next step was to assign costs in the remaining 6 cost centres to jobs on the basis of activity
measures in each centre, as follows:
Cost centre Activity measures

Warehouse m3 of lumber used
Oven m3 of lumber dried
Drafting Direct labour hours
Machinery Direct labour hours
Assembly Direct labour hours
Selling Sales value

Exhibit 3 is a worksheet for assigning costs for the third quarter on the above basis to generate
the cost centre rates which this accounting system uses. In order to apply these rates to specific
jobs, Mr. Bonlieu gather the information shown in Exhibit 4.
12
Exhibit 1: Cost data for the quarter ending September 30 19XX (in Euro $)
DIRECT COSTS
Direct Labour

Drafting room 270,000
Machine shop 740,000
Assembly shop 256,000

1,266,000
Direct supplies 144,000
TOTAL FACTORY DIRECT COSTS 1,410,000
INDIRECT OVERHEAD COSTS
Factory indirect costs
Foreman and indirect workers 450,000
Warehouseman 90,000
Oven attendant 90,000
Administrative and management personnel 978,000
Indirect factory labour 1,608,000
Coal for the oven 80,000
Power 36,000
Building expense (rent, insurance, & taxes) 330,000
Office expense (postage, telephone, etc.) 198,000
Interest on equipment loans (14,000,000 @6% p.a) 210,000
Depreciation of equipment 730,000
Other indirect factory costs 1,584,000
TOTAL FACTORY INDIRECT COSTS 3,192,000
Selling indirect costs
Sales commissions 154,000
Delivery driver 126,000
Truck expense (depreciation, garage) 50,000
TOTAL SELLING INDIRECT COSTS 330,000
Allocation rates
Factory cost rate: 3,192,000 / 1,266,000 = 252%
Selling cost rate: 330,000 / 5,472,000 = 6.03%
13
Exhibit 2: Cost data for quarter ending September, 19XX (000s Euros $)

Order 27:
50
windows
Order 28:
4
staircases
Order 32:
172 desks
Order 35:
130m2
floors
Order 36:
20,000
woodsoles*
TOTAL
Supplies 60.0 48.0 30.0 6.0 – 144
Drafting at
180 per
hour
16.2 18.0 100.8 9.0 126.0 270
Machining
at 185 per
hour
64.7 101.8 370.0 18.5 185.0 740
Assembly
at 160 per
hour
64.0 48.0 112.0 32.0 0 256
TOTAL
LABOUR
144.9 167.8 582.8 59.5 311.0 1,266
Overhead
(@252%
labour)
365.3 423.2 1,469.4 150.0 784.1 3,192
Sub-total 570.2 639.0 2.082.2 215.5 1,095.1 4,602
Selling
expense
(@ 6.03%
of sales)
40.1 61.9 136.3 14.9 76.8 330
TOTAL
COST
610.3 700.9 2,218.5 230.4 1,171.9 4,932
Selling
price
665.0 1,026.0 2,261.0 247.0 1,273.0 5,472
Profit 54.7 325.1 42.5 16.6 101.1 540
% profit
margin
8.2% 31.7% 1.8% 7.0% 7.9% 9.8%

*Woodsoles are the pieces at the bottom of door and window frames. They are often made
from pieces of scrap wood left from other orders. A typical wood sole is about 1m long by 2.5cm
thick and 7.5cm wide.
14
Exhibit 3: Assignment of costs to cost centres ($000s Euros)

Costs to allocate Admin
expense
Indirect
labour
Warehouse Oven Drafting Machinery Assembly Selling
Wages and
salaries $3000
978 450 90 90 270 740 256 126
Coal $80 80
Power $36 36
Commissions
$154
154
Building expense
$330
66 99 33 49 83
Office expense
$198
65 30 6 6 18 48 17 8
Depreciation
equipment $730
300 430
Truck expense
$50
50
Interest on
expense $210
72 129 9
TOTAL $4,788 1,043 480 162 647 321 1,432 356 347
Admin expense (1,043) 49 49 147 400 137 261
Indirect labour (480) 30 30 90 245 85
TOTAL
ASSIGNED
241 726 558 2,077 578 608
Activity
measures
m3 m3 DLhrs DLhrs DLhrs Sales
value
Activity units 140 140 1,500 4,000 1,600 5,472,000
Cost per activity
unit (000s Euros)
1.72 5.18 0.372 0.519 0.361 0.111

Exhibit 4: Supplementary cost data resource usage across the September quarter
job mix

Cost
centres
Activity
units
Order
27:
50
windows
Order 28:
4
staircases
Order 32:
172
desks
Order
35:
130m2
floors
Order 36:
20,000
woodsoles*
TOTAL
Warehouse m3 10 80 25 5 20 140
Oven m3 10 80 25 5 20 140
Drafting DLhrs 90 100 560 50 700 1,500
Machining DLhrs 350 550 2,000 100 1000 4,000
Assembly DLhrs 400 300 700 200 – 1,600
Selling Actual
sales
665,000 1,026,000 2,261,000 247,000 1,273,000 5,472,000
Supplies Actual
use
60,000 48,000 30,000 6,000 144,000

15
REQUIRED:
a. Recalculate the cost of the five orders using activity-based costing. Comment on the
difference in cost for order 28 (staircases) and order 32 (desks) before and after using
ABC. Are the costs derived using ABC likely to be more or less accurate? Why? [20%]
b. How does Societe Bonlieu compete? What is the likely source of its competitive
advantage? How does buying the kiln affect its competitive advantage? Is it a strategic
resource that fits the company’s operations? Was it worthwhile buying the kiln? Explain
why or why not? [35%]
c. Assume that the kiln (or drying oven) is operating at only about 25% capacity (whereas
other departments are close to capacity). Are staircases as a product a good fit in terms
of utilizing the company’s assets and resources? [20%]
d. Societe Bonlieu is considering an offer to sell a further 12 staircases at the same price as
before. Discuss the issues Societe Bonlieu needs to consider in costing this order
(explain each cost and pay particular attention to the cost of the kiln allocated to the job).
[25%]
16
Week 7 Tutorial
ASSESSING AND MANAGING PERFORMANCE OVER THE VALUE CHAIN
Read the case Mercedes-Benz – All activity Vehicle and answer the questions given at the end of
the case.
MERCEDES-BENZ- ALL ACTIVITY VEHICLE2
INTRODUCTION
During the recession beginning in the early 1990s, Mercedes-Benz (MB) struggled with product
development, cost efficiency, material purchasing, and problems in adapting to changing markets.
In 1993, these problems caused the worst sales slump in decades, and the luxury carmaker lost
money for the first time in history. Since then, MB has streamlined the core business, reduced
parts and system complexity, and established simultaneous engineering programs with suppliers.
In their search for additional market share, new segments, and new niches, MB started developing
a range of new products. New product introductions included the C-Class in 1993, the E-Class in
1995, the new sportster SLK in 1996, and the A-Class and M-Class All Activity Vehicle (AAV) in
1997. Perhaps the largest and most radical of MB’S new projects was the AAV. IN April 1993 MB
announced it would build its first passenger vehicle-manufacturing facility in the United States.
The decision emphasized the company’s globalization strategy and desire to move closer to its
customers and markets.
Mercedes-Benz United States International used functions groups with representatives from every
area of the company (marketing, development, engineering, purchasing, production, and
controlling to design the vehicle and production systems. A modular construction process was
used to produce the AAV. First-tier suppliers provide systems rather than individual parts or
components for production of approximately 65,000 vehicles annually.
THE AAV PROJECT PHASES
The AAV moved from concept to production in a relatively short period of time. The first phase,
the concept phase was initiated in 1992. The concept phase resulted in a feasibility study that was
approved by the board. Following board approval, the project realization phase began in 1993,
with production commencing in 1997. Key elements of the various phases are described next.
Concept Phase, 1992-1993
Team members compared the existing production line with various markets segments to discover
opportunities for new vehicle introductions. The analysis revealed opportunities in the rapidly
expanding sports utility vehicle market that was dominated by Jeep, Ford, and GM. Market
research was conducted to estimate potential world wide sales opportunities for a high-end AAV
with the characteristics of a Mercedes-Benz. A rough cost estimate was developed that included
materials, labour, overhead, and one-time development and project costs. Projected cash flows
were analysed over a 10-year period using net present value (NPV) analysis to acquire project
approval from the board of directors. The sensitivity of the NPV was analysed by calculating
“what-if” scenarios involving risks and opportunities. For example, risk factors included monetary
exchange rate fluctuations, different sales levels due to consumer substitution of the AAV for
another MB product, and product and manufacturing costs that differed from projections.
On the basis of the economic feasibility study of the concept phase, the board approved the
project and initiated a search for potential manufacturing locations. Sites located in Germany,
2 Adapted from Atkinson, A. A., Kaplan, R. S., Matsumura, E. A. & Young, M (2007) Management Accounting , 7.64
(Prentice Hall, Pearson)
17
other European countries, and the United Sates were evaluated. Consistent with the company’s
globalization strategy, the decisive factor that brought the plant to the United States was the desire to be
close to the major market for sport utility vehicles.
Project Realization Phase, 1993-1996
Regular customer clinics were held to view the prototype and to explain the new vehicle concept.
These clinics produced important information about how the proposed vehicle would be received
by potential customers and the press. Customers were asked to rank the importance of various
characteristics, including safety, comfort, economy, and styling. Engineers organized in function
groups designed systems to deliver these essential characteristics. However, MB would not lower
its internal standards for components, even if initial customer expectations might be lower than the
MB standard. For example, many automotive experts believed that the superior handling of MB
products resulted from manufacturing the best automobile chassis in the world. Thus, each class
within the MB line met strict standards for handling, even though these standards might exceed
customer expectations for some classes. MB did not use target costing to produce the lowestprice vehicle in an automotive class. The company’s strategic objective was to deliver products
that were slightly more expensive than competitive models. However, the additional cost would
have to translate into greater perceived value on the part of the customer.
Throughout the project realization phase, the vehicle (and the vehicle target cost) remained alive
because of changing dynamics. For example, the market moved toward the luxury end of the
spectrum while the AAV was under development. In addition, crash test results were incorporated
into the evolving AAV design. For these reasons, MB found it beneficial to place the design and
testing team members in close physical proximity to other functions within the project to promote
fast communication and decision making. Sometimes new technical features, such as side air
bags, were developed by MB. The decision to include the new feature on all MB lines was made
at the corporate level because experience had shown that customers’ reactions to a vehicle class
can affect the entire brand.
Productions Phase, 1997
The project was monitored by annual updates of the NPV analysis. In addition, a 3-year plan
(including income statements) was prepared annually and reported to the headquarters in
Germany. Monthly departmental meetings were held to discuss actual cost performance
compared with standards developed during the cost estimation process. Thus, the accounting
system served as a control mechanism to ensure that actual production cost would conform to
target (or standard) costs.
TARGET COSTING AND THE AAV
The process of achieving target cost for the AAV began with an estimate of the existing cost for
each function group. Next, components of each function group were identified with their
associated costs. Cost reductions targets were set by comparing the estimated existing cost with
the target cost for each function group. These function groups included the following: doors,
sidewall and roof, electrical system, bumpers, power train, seats, heating system, cockpit, and
front end. Next cost reduction targets were established for each component. As part of the
competitive benchmark process, MB bought and tore down competitors’ vehicles to help
understand their costs and manufacturing processes.
The AAV manufacturing process relied on high-value-added system suppliers. For example the
entire cockpit was purchase as a unit from a systems supplier. Thus, systems suppliers were part
of the development process from the beginning of the project. MB expected suppliers to meet
established cost targets. To enhance function group effectives, suppliers were brought into the
discussion at an early stage in the process. Decisions had to be made quickly in the early stags of
development.
18
The target costing process was led by cost planners who were engineers, not accountants.
Because the cost planners were engineers with manufacturing and design experience, they could
make reasonable estimates of costs that suppliers would incur in providing various systems. Also,
MB owned much of the tooling, such as dies to form sheet metal, used by suppliers to produce
components. Tooling costs are a substantial part of the one-time costs in the project phase.
Index Development to Support Target Costing Activities
During the concept development phase, MB team members used various indexes to help them
determine critical performance, design, and cost relationships for the AAV.14 To construct the
indexes, various forms of information were gathered from customers, suppliers, and their own
design team. Although the actual number of categories used by MB was much greater, Table 1
illustrates the calculations used to quantify customer responses to the AAV concept. For example,
values shown in the “importance column” resulted from asking a sample of potential customers
whether they consider each category extremely important when considering the purchase of a new
MB product. Respondents could respond affirmatively to all categories that applied.
To gain a better understanding of the various sources of costs, function groups were identified
together with target cost estimates. (MB also organizes teams called function groups whose role
is to develop specifications and cost projections.) As shown in Table 2, the relative target cost
percentage of each function group was computed.
TABLE 1
Relative Importance
Ranking by Category
i
Table 3 summarizes how each function group contributes to the consumer requirements identified
in Table 1. For example, safety was identified by potential customers as an important
characteristic of the AAV; some function groups contributed more to the safety category than
others. MB engineers determined that chassis quality was an important element of safety (50% of
the total function group contribution).
Table 4 combines the category weighting percentages from Table 1 with the function group
contribution from Table 3. The result is an importance index that measures the relative importance
of each function group across all categories. For example, potential customers weighted the
categories of safety, comfort, economy, and styling as.41, .32, .18, and .09, respectively. The
rows in Table 4 represent the contribution of each function group to the various categories. The
importance index for the chassis is calculated by multiplying each row value by its corresponding
category value and summing the results: (.50 x .41) + (.30 x .32) + (.10 x .09) = .33.
As shown in Table 5, the target cost index is calculated by dividing the importance index by the
target cost percentage by function group. Managers at MB used indexes such as theses during
the concept design phase to understand the relationship of the importance of a function to the
target cost of a function group. Indexes less than 1 may indicate a cost in excess of the perceived
value of the function group. Thus, opportunities for cost reduction consistent with customer
demands may be identified and managed during the early stages of product development.
Choices made during the project realization phase were largely irreversible during the production
phase because approximately 80% of the production cost of the AAV was for materials and
systems provided by external suppliers.
The AAV project used a streamlined management structure to facilitate efficient and rapid
development. The streamlined MB organization produced an entirely new vehicle from concept to

CATEGORY IMPORTANCE RELATIVE PERCENTAGE
Safety 32 41%
Comfort 25 32
Economy 15 18
Styling 7 9
Total 79 100%

19
production in 4 years. Using the target costing process as a key management element, MB
manufactured the first production in 1997.
Table 2
Target Cost and
Percentage by
Function Group
Table 3
Function Group
Contribution to
Customer
Requirements
Table 4
Importance
Index of
Various
Function
Groups
Table 5
Target Cost Index

Function Group Target Cost Percentage of Total
Chassis $x,xxx 20%
Transmission x,xxx 25
Air conditioner xxx 5
Electrical system xxx 7
Other functions groups x,xxx 43
Total $x,xxx 100%
CATEGORY
FUNCTION GROUP SAFETY COMFORT ECONOMY STYLING
Chassis 50% 30% 10% 10%
Transmission 20 20 30
Air conditioner 20 5
Electrical system 5 20
Other function groups 25 30 40 65
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
CATEGORY
FUNCTION GROUP SAFETY
.41
COMFORT
.32
ECONOMY
.18
STYLING
.09
Importance
Index
Chassis .50 .30 .10 .10 .33
Transmission .20 .20 .30 .20
Air conditioner .20 .05 .07
Electrical system .05 .20 .06
Other function groups .25 .30 .40 .85 .35
Total 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
INDEX (A) (B) (C) A/B
FUNCTION GROUP IMPORTANCE INDEX %OF TARGET COST TARGET COST INDEX
Chassis .33 .20 1.65
Transmission .20 .25 .80
Air conditioner .07 .05 1.40
Electrical system .06 .07 .86
Other functions group .35 .43 .81
Total 1.00

20
Required:
a) What is the competitive environment faced by MB as it considers launching the AAV? [10%]
b) How has MB reacted to the changing world of luxury automobiles? [10%]
c) How does the AAV Project link with MB’s strategy in terms of market coverage? [20%]
d) How does MB approach cost reduction to achieve target costs? [20%]
e) How do suppliers factor into the target costing process? Why are they so critically important to
the success of the MB AAV? [20%]
f) What role does the accounting department play in the target costing process? [20%]
21
Week 8 Tutorial
No tutorials this week
Week 9 Tutorial
FINANCIAL MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE
Read the case The Kinkead Equipment Company Ltd and answer the questions given at the end
of the case.
KINKEAD LTD
Kinkead has been a leading Australian firm since World War II in specialty instruments for
measuring electric current characteristics (voltmeters, ohmmeters and ammeters). Kinkead’s
products are grouped into two main product lines of business for internal reporting purposes
(electric meters and electronic instruments). Each line includes many separate products, which are
averaged together for the purposes of this case. The electric meters (EM) and electronic
instrument (EI) products perform the same basic function for the customer (both are industrial
measuring instruments) but they represent two different technologies. EM is the older, but still
dominant technology. The EI technology is new and still experimental. An analogy is the
mechanical wrist-watch versus the digital watch.
Results for the year
Andrew Macgregor, Managing Director of Kinkead, glanced at the summary profit and loss
statement for 19XX (Exhibit A) then tossed it to Doug Lee and looked out the window of his office
overlooking the industrial skyline of western Sydney.
“As you can see Doug, we beat our overall turnover goal for the year, improved our trading margin
a bit, and earned more profit than we had planned. Although our selling costs did seem to grow
faster than our turnover, all things considered, I would say 1978 was a good year for the firm.”
Doug Lee, a recent graduate of a well-known business school, was serving a training period as
executive assistant to Mr. Macgregor. He looked over the figures and nodded his agreement.
“Doug, I’d like you to prepare a short report for the managing committee meeting next week
summarizing the key factors which account for the favourable overall profit variance of $51,000.
That might not be much for a firm like ours, but it would still pay your salary for a while, wouldn’t it”
he laughed. “I think your about ready to make a presentation to the committee if you can pull
together a good report”.
“Check with the financial director’s staff for any additional data you may need or want. Just
remember to keep it on a commonsense level – no high powered financial double talk. How about
giving me a draft to look at in a day or so?”
Doug smiled somewhat meekly as he rose to return to his office. “I’ll give it a try” he said. His first
step was to gather the additional information shown in Exhibit B.
22
Exhibit A Kinkead Ltd
Preliminary operating results 15 January 19XX ($000s)

Budget
19XX
6,150
% of
turnover
100
Actual
19XX
6,322
% of
turnover
100
Turnover
Contribution
Less other fixed
Expenses:
Manufacturing
3,495 56.8 3,564 56.4
1,388 22.6 1,399 22.1
Selling 250 4.1 245 3.9
Administrative 320 5.2 325 5.1
Research 318 5.2 325 5.1

PROFIT 1,219 19.8 1,270 20.1
Summary for 19XX

Budget Actual Variance
Turnover 6,150 6,322 172F
Expenses 4,931 5,052 121U
Profit before tax 1,219 1,270 51F

Remarks
Good sales performance with some minor variances on selling, administration and R&D
but overall performance was essentially on target with profit $51K above budget.
Exhibit B: Additional Information
Electric Meters (EM) Electronic Instruments (EI)
Selling prices per unit

Average standard price
Average actual prices
$30
$29

$150
$153
Product costs per unit
Average standard variable m/f cost $15 $40.00
Average actual variable m/f cost $16 $42.10
Average standard selling commission $ 1 $15.00
Average actual selling commission $ 1 $14.90
Volume information

Units produced and sold – actual 65,000
Units produced and sold – planned 80,000

29,000
25,000
Total industry turnover – actual $26m $36m
Kinkead’s share of the market (% of physical units)

Planned 10%
Actual 10%

10%
8%
23
Fixed expenses at Kinkead ($000s)
Planned Actual
Fixed manufacturing expenses $1,388 $1,399
Fixed selling expenses 250 245
Fixed administrative expenses 320 325
Fixed research expenses 318 325
Source: Adapted from Shank, J. and Govindarajan (1998) Strategic Cost Analysis, pp.96-98 (Irwin).
REQUIRED:
a) Refer to the Kinkead templates provided on the unit website. Template (A) calculates the
market size, market share, sales mix, sales price and variable cost variances for each
product and, Template (B) calculates the market size, market share, sales price, and
variable cost variances for each product. Which analysis is most appropriate for Kinkead?
A or B? Give reasons. [20%]
b) What strategy is electric meters and electric instruments pursuing? ‘Dog’, ‘Cash cow’,
‘Star’, or ‘Question mark’. [20%]
c) What aspects of performance are important for a product pursuing each of those strategies
and which variances reflect those aspects of performance? [20%]
d) Critically evaluate the performance of the two divisions. [40%]
24
Week 10 Tutorial
NON-FINANCIAL MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE
Read the case “Chadwick Inc: The Balanced Scorecard” and answer the questions given at the
end of the case.
CHADWICK INC: THE BALANCED SCORECARD3
Company Background
Chadwick, Inc. was a diversified producer of personal consumer products and pharmaceuticals.
The Norwalk Division of Chadwick developed, manufactured and sold ethical drugs for human
and animal use. It was one of five or six sizable companies competing in these markets and,
while it did not dominate the industry, the company was considered well-managed and was
respected for the high quality of its products. Norwalk did not compete by supplying a full range
of products. It specialized in several niches and attempted to leverage its product line by
continually searching for new applications for existing compounds.
Norwalk sold its products through several key distributors who supplied local markets, such as
retail stores, hospitals and health service organizations, and veterinary practices. Norwalk
depended on its excellent relations with the distributors who served to promote Norwalk’s
products to end users and also received feedback from the end users about new products
desired by their customers.
Chadwick knew that its long-term success depended on how much money distributors could
make by promoting and selling Norwalk’s products. If the profit from selling Norwalk products
was high, then these products were promoted heavily by the distributors and Norwalk received
extensive communication back about future customer needs. Norwalk had historically provided
many highly profitable products to the marketplace, but recent inroads by generic manufacturers
had been eroding distributors’ sales and profit margins. Norwalk had been successful in the past
because of its track record of generating a steady stream of attractive, popular products. During
the second half of the 1980’s however, the approval process for new products had lengthened
and fewer big winners had emerged from Norwalk’s R & D laboratories.
Research and Development
The development of ethical drugs was a lengthy, costly, and unpredictable process.
Development cycles now averaged about 12 years. The process started by screening a large
number of compounds for potential benefits and use. For every drug that finally emerged as
approved for use, up to 30,000 compounds had to be tested at the beginning of a new product
development cycle. The development and testing processes had many stages. The
development cycle started with the discovery of compounds that possessed the desirable
properties and ended many years later with extensive and tedious testing and documentation to
demonstrate that the new drug could meet government regulations for promised benefits,
reliability in production, and absence of deleterious side effects.
Approved and patented drugs could generate enormous revenues for Norwalk and its
distributors. Norwalk’s profitability during the 1980s was sustained by one key drug that had
been discovered in the late 1960s. No blockbuster drug had emerged during the 1980s,
however, and the existing pipeline of compounds going through development, evaluation and test
was not as healthy as Norwalk management desired. Management was placing pressure on
scientists in the R & D lab to increase the yield of promising new products and to reduce the time
3 Adapted from Simons, R. (2000) Performance Measurement and Control Systems for Implementing Strategy, pp. 539-
543 (Prentice Hall)
25
and costs of the product development cycle. Scientists were currently exploring new bioengineering techniques to create compounds that had the specific active properties desired
rather than depending on an almost random search through thousands of possible compounds.
The new techniques started with a detailed specification of the chemical properties that a new
drug should have and then attempted to synthesize candidate compounds that could be tested
for these properties. The bio-engineering procedures were costly, requiring extensive investment
in new equipment and computer-based analysis.
A less expensive approach to increase the financial yield from R & D investments was to identify
new applications for existing compounds that had already been approved for use. While some
validation still had to be submitted for government approval to demonstrate the effectiveness of
the drug in the new applications, the cost of extending an existing product to a new application
was much, much less expensive than developing and creating an entirely new compound.
Several valuable suggestions for possible new applications from existing products had come from
Norwalk salesmen in the field. The salesmen were now being trained not only to sell existing
products for approved applications, but also to listen to end users who frequently had novel and
interesting ideas about how Norwalk’s products could be used for new applications.
Manufacturing
Norwalk’s manufacturing processes were considered among the best in the industry.
Management took pride in the ability of the manufacturing operation to quickly and efficiently
ramp up to produce drugs once they had clear governmental regulatory processes. Norwalk’s
manufacturing capabilities also had to produce the small batches of new products that were
required during testing and evaluation stages.
Performance Measurement
Chadwick allowed its several divisions to operate in a decentralized fashion. Division managers
had almost complete discretion in managing all the critical processes: R&D, Production,
Marketing and Sales, and administrative functions such as finance, human resources, and legal.
Chadwick set challenging financial targets for divisions to meet. The targets were usually
expressed as Return on Capital Employed (ROCE). As a diversified company, Chadwick wanted
to be able to deploy the returns from the most profitable divisions to those divisions that held out
the highest promise for profitable growth. Monthly financial summaries were submitted by each
division to corporate headquarters. The Chadwick executive committee, consisting of the chief
executive officer, the chief operating officer, two executive vice presidents and the chief financial
officer met monthly with each division manager to review ROCE performance and back up
financial information for the preceding month.
The Balanced Scorecard Project
Bill Baron, Comptroller of Chadwick, had been searching for improved methods for evaluating the
performance of the various divisions. Division managers complained about the continual
pressure to meet short-term financial objectives in businesses that required extensive
investments in risky projects to yield long-term returns. The idea of a Balanced Scorecard
appealed to him as a constructive way to balance short-run financial objectives with the long-term
performance of the company.
Baron brought the article and concept to Dan Daniels the President and Chief Operation Officer
of Chadwick. Daniels shared Baron’s enthusiasm for the concept, feeling that a Balanced
Scorecard would allow Chadwick divisional managers more flexibility in how they measured and
presented their results of operations to corporate management. He also liked the idea of holding
managers accountable for improving the long-term performance of their division.
After several days of reflection, Daniels issued a memorandum to Chadwick division managers.
The memo had a simple and direct message. Read the Balanced Scorecard article, develop a
26
scorecard for your division, and be prepared to come to corporate headquarters in 90 days to
present and defend the divisional scorecard to Chadwick’s Executive Committee.
John Greenfield, the Division Manager at Norwalk, received Daniel’s memorandum with some
concern and apprehension. In principle, Greenfield liked the idea of developing a scorecard that
would be more responsive to his operations, but he was distrustful of how much freedom he had
to develop and use such a scorecard. Greenfield recalled: This seemed like just another way for
corporate to claim that they have decentralized decision making and authority while still retaining
ultimate control at headquarters.
Greenfield knew that he would have to develop a plan of action to meet corporate’ request but
lacking a clear sense of how committed Chadwick was to the concept, he was not prepared to
take much time from his or his subordinates’ existing responsibilities for the project.
The next day, at the weekly meeting of the Divisional Operating Committee, Greenfield
distributed the Daniels memo and appointed a three-man committee, headed by Divisional
Controller, Wil Wagner, to facilitate the process for creating the Norwalk Balanced Scorecard.
Wagner approached Greenfield that day:
I read the Balanced Scorecard article. Based on my understanding of the concept, we must start
with a clearly defined business vision. I’m not sure I have a clear understanding of the vision and
business strategy for Norwalk. How can I start to build the scorecard without this understanding?
Greenfield admitted: “That’s a valid point. Let me see what I can do to get you started.”
Greenfield picked up a pad of paper and started to write. Several minutes later he had produced
a short business strategy statement for Norwalk. Wagner and his group took Greenfield’s
strategy statement and started to formulate scorecard measures for the division.
Several days later, Greenfield sent Wagner a copy of a memo that he had just received from Dan
Daniels. The President had decided that he wanted all the divisions to follow some guiding
principles as they developed their scorecards. The memo reiterated Daniels’ initial principle that
each division should develop the scorecard “that was right for the division.” But he wanted all
scorecards to use quantitative, objective data; Daniels had heard that several divisions wanted to
include measures on customer satisfaction that would be collected from surveys and interviews.
Daniels wanted only “hard data” on the scorecard. Opinions measured in surveys may be
collected for internal divisional purposes, but such information was not to be sent up to corporate
headquarters or discussed in Executive Committee reviews of divisional operations. Wagner was
not surprised by this restriction. He recalled hearing Executive Committee members, on several
occasions, declaring that only “hard data” counted. Wagner thought, as he re-read Daniels’
memo, “I guess tough-minded managers at Chadwick don’t use ‘soft data’.”
Creating Norwalk’s Balance Scorecard
The Scorecard project arrived at a time when Wil Wagner and the two other members of his team
already had heavily booked calendars. Several weeks passed before the team could really start
to meet and focus on the project. Several more weeks passed before the team could schedule a
meeting with the top divisional management of Norwalk. Such a meeting was thought necessary
to solicit more information about divisional strategy and key success factors, and to get feedback
on the tentative set of measures the project team had formulated.
After many postponements, a one-day meeting was schedule with senior divisional management
to comment on the Wagner team’s proposed scorecard. This meeting took place only ten days
before Greenfield would present the scorecard to the Chadwick Executive Committee at corporate
headquarters. Wagner felt that a full day meeting would be necessary to achieve the final
consensus, so he scheduled the meeting off-site at a hotel, one block from Norwalk’s offices. By
27
staying away from office distractions, Wagner hoped that division management could focus on the
details of the scorecard design.
Wagner arrived early at the hotel meeting site. He received a message from Greenfield’s
secretary that the division general manager would be delayed in arriving at the meeting, but that
the meeting should start without him. Wagner opened the meeting with 10 top managers (other
than Greenfield). He outline the ground rules established by President Daniels, reviewed
Greenfield’s strategy statement for Norwalk, and suggested a process to develop and review
measures for each of the four perspectives of the Balanced Scorecard.2 As Wagner finished his
opening statement, he was distressed to discover that Mike Hassler, the VP of Marketing, was not
present in the room. Wagner learned that Hassler was negotiating a contract with Norwalk’s
largest distributor and could not join the meeting until 3.00P.M.
The group of 10 managers started to discuss financial and customer-based measures and Wagner
was pleased with the enthusiasm the group was bringing to the Task. But after about 25 minutes,
the phone in the hotel meeting room rang. Hassler needed to speak with the Sales vice president.
Wagner attempted to maintain the momentum of the discussion with the other nine managers, but
the telephone conversations going on in the background was clearly distracting the group.
By the end of the day, the phone had rung seven more times to pull managers out of the
discussion to take care of company business. Greenfield never showed up. Wagner, however,
persisted under the difficult conditions and was able to mobilize the managers in attendance to
produce a Balance Scorecard for the Norwalk Division (see Exhibit 2). Wagner briefed Greenfield
on the scorecard at a breakfast meeting several days later, prior to Greenfield’s appearance at
Chadwick Corporate Headquarters.

EXHIBIT 1: Norwalk Pharmaceutical Division –Business Strategy
1. Manage Norwalk portfolio of investments.
• Minimize cost to executing our existing business base
• Maximize return/yield on all development spending
• Invest in discovery of new compounds.
2. Satisfy customer needs
3. Drive responsibility to the lowest level
• Minimize centralized staff overhead.
4. People development
• Industry training
• Unique mix of technical and commercial skills.

28
EXHIBIT 2 Norwalk Pharmaceutical Division
FINANCIAL CUSTOMER INTERNAL INNOVATION
MEASURES MEASURES MEASURES MEASURES
Net Contribution Market Share for Key Markets Price index for “basket” $Revenue from
of formulation New Products
introduced
in last 3 years
Working Capital Customer Complaint Rate Cost index for
Technical compounds

Operating Profit Capital Turnover

After Taxes Inventory turns by
product class.
Gross Margin $
SG&A $
Source: Simons (2000). Performance measurement and control systems for implementing
strategy, Pearson Education Inc., Upper Saddle River NJ.
REQUIRED:
a) Develop the balanced scorecard for the Norwalk Pharmaceutical Division of Chadwick, Inc.
What parts of the business strategy that John Greenfield sketched out should be included?
Are there any parts that should be excluded or cannot be made operational? What are the
scorecard measures you should use to implement your scorecard in the Norwalk
Pharmaceutical Division? What are the new measures that need to be developed, and how
would you go about developing them? [50%]
b) How would a Balanced Scorecard for Chadwick Inc differ from ones developed in its
divisions, such as the Norwalk Pharmaceutical Division? Do you anticipate that there might
be major conflicts between divisional scorecards and those of the corporation? If so, should
those conflicts be resolved, and if so, how should they be resolved? [30%]
c) Critically evaluate the process used to formulate the strategy of the Norwalk Pharmaceutical
Division and the Balanced Scorecard. [20%]
29
Week 11 Tutorial
STRATEGIC AND BEHAVIOURAL ASPECTS OF CAPITAL EXPENDITURE
EVALUATIONS
Read the case Mavis Machine Shop case (presented separately under the “Assessed
Weekly Tutorial Assignments” tab in ilearn) and answer the following questions.
REQUIRED:
a) What evidence is there for Mavis’ strategy to be based on product differentiation and what
aspects of Mavis’s product and service are likely to be the basis of its differentiation? What
is the likely source of Mavis’s differentiation? [35%]
b) Assume that the NPV for the new automated lathe is profitable (in fact its IRR is about
30%), what non-financial arguments are there against buying the new lathe? [35%]
c) What decision should Mavis take? (Hint: examine the balance sheet numbers as to
whether they can afford the investment)? [30%]
Week 12 Tutorial
GROUP REPORT PRESENTATIONS
Week 13 Tutorial
NO CLASSES IN THIS WEEK
30

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