Aristotle, Categories Excerpt (Book I, Parts 1-5, translated by E. M. Edghill):
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Part 1
Things are said to be named ‘equivocally’ when, though they have a common name, the
definition corresponding with the name differs for each. Thus, a real man and a figure in
a picture can both lay claim to the name ‘animal’; yet these are equivocally so named,
for, though they have a common name, the definition corresponding with the name
differs for each. For should any one define in what sense each is an animal, his
definition in the one case will be appropriate to that case only.
On the other hand, things are said to be named ‘univocally’ which have both the name
and the definition answering to the name in common. A man and an ox are both ‘animal’,
and these are univocally so named, inasmuch as not only the name, but also the
definition, is the same in both cases: for if a man should state in what sense each is an
animal, the statement in the one case would be identical with that in the other.
Things are said to be named ‘derivatively’, which derive their name from some other
name, but differ from it in termination. Thus the grammarian derives his name from the
word ‘grammar’, and the courageous man from the word ‘courage’.
Part 2
Forms of speech are either simple or composite. Examples of the latter are such
expressions as ‘the man runs’, ‘the man wins’; of the former ‘man’, ‘ox’, ‘runs’, ‘wins’.
Of things themselves some are predicable of a subject, and are never present in a
subject. Thus ‘man’ is predicable of the individual man, and is never present in a subject.
By being ‘present in a subject’ I do not mean present as parts are present in a whole, but
being incapable of existence apart from the said subject.
Some things, again, are present in a subject, but are never predicable of a subject. For
instance, a certain point of grammatical knowledge is present in the mind, but is not
predicable of any subject; or again, a certain whiteness may be present in the body (for
colour requires a material basis), yet it is never predicable of anything.
Other things, again, are both predicable of a subject and present in a subject. Thus while
knowledge is present in the human mind, it is predicable of grammar.
There is, lastly, a class of things which are neither present in a subject nor predicable of
a subject, such as the individual man or the individual horse. But, to speak more
generally, that which is individual and has the character of a unit is never predicable of a
subject. Yet in some cases there is nothing to prevent such being present in a subject.
Thus a certain point of grammatical knowledge is present in a subject.
Aristotle, Categories Excerpt (Book I, Parts 1-5, translated by E. M. Edghill):
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Part 3
When one thing is predicated of another, all that which is predicable of the predicate will
be predicable also of the subject. Thus, ‘man’ is predicated of the individual man; but
‘animal’ is predicated of ‘man’; it will, therefore, be predicable of the individual man also:
for the individual man is both ‘man’ and ‘animal’.
If genera are different and co-ordinate, their differentiae are themselves different in kind.
Take as an instance the genus ‘animal’ and the genus ‘knowledge’. ‘With feet’, ‘twofooted’, ‘winged’, ‘aquatic’, are differentiae of ‘animal’; the species of knowledge are not
distinguished by the same differentiae. One species of knowledge does not differ from
another in being ‘two-footed’.
But where one genus is subordinate to another, there is nothing to prevent their having
the same differentiae: for the greater class is predicated of the lesser, so that all the
differentiae of the predicate will be differentiae also of the subject.
Part 4
Expressions which are in no way composite signify substance, quantity, quality, relation,
place, time, position, state, action, or affection. To sketch my meaning roughly,
examples of substance are ‘man’ or ‘the horse’, of quantity, such terms as ‘two cubits
long’ or ‘three cubits long’, of quality, such attributes as ‘white’, ‘grammatical’. ‘Double’,
‘half’, ‘greater’, fall under the category of relation; ‘in a the market place’, ‘in the Lyceum’,
under that of place; ‘yesterday’, ‘last year’, under that of time. ‘Lying’, ‘sitting’, are terms
indicating position, ‘shod’, ‘armed’, state; ‘to lance’, ‘to cauterize’, action; ‘to be lanced’,
‘to be cauterized’, affection.
No one of these terms, in and by itself, involves an affirmation; it is by the combination of
such terms that positive or negative statements arise. For every assertion must, as is
admitted, be either true or false, whereas expressions which are not in any way
composite such as ‘man’, ‘white’, ‘runs’, ‘wins’, cannot be either true or false.
Part 5
Substance, in the truest and primary and most definite sense of the word, is that which is
neither predicable of a subject nor present in a subject; for instance, the individual man
or horse. But in a secondary sense those things are called substances within which, as
species, the primary substances are included; also those which, as genera, include the
species. For instance, the individual man is included in the species ‘man’, and the genus
to which the species belongs is ‘animal’; these, therefore-that is to say, the species ‘man’
and the genus ‘animal,-are termed secondary substances.
Aristotle, Categories Excerpt (Book I, Parts 1-5, translated by E. M. Edghill):
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It is plain from what has been said that both the name and the definition of the predicate
must be predicable of the subject. For instance, ‘man’ is predicted of the individual man.
Now in this case the name of the species man’ is applied to the individual, for we use the
term ‘man’ in describing the individual; and the definition of ‘man’ will also be predicated
of the individual man, for the individual man is both man and animal. Thus, both the
name and the definition of the species are predicable of the individual.
With regard, on the other hand, to those things which are present in a subject, it is
generally the case that neither their name nor their definition is predicable of that in
which they are present. Though, however, the definition is never predicable, there is
nothing in certain cases to prevent the name being used. For instance, ‘white’ being
present in a body is predicated of that in which it is present, for a body is called white:
the definition, however, of the colour white’ is never predicable of the body.
Everything except primary substances is either predicable of a primary substance or
present in a primary substance. This becomes evident by reference to particular
instances which occur. ‘Animal’ is predicated of the species ‘man’, therefore of the
individual man, for if there were no individual man of whom it could be predicated, it
could not be predicated of the species ‘man’ at all. Again, colour is present in body,
therefore in individual bodies, for if there were no individual body in which it was present,
it could not be present in body at all. Thus everything except primary substances is
either predicated of primary substances, or is present in them, and if these last did not
exist, it would be impossible for anything else to exist.
Of secondary substances, the species is more truly substance than the genus, being
more nearly related to primary substance. For if any one should render an account of
what a primary substance is, he would render a more instructive account, and one more
proper to the subject, by stating the species than by stating the genus. Thus, he would
give a more instructive account of an individual man by stating that he was man than by
stating that he was animal, for the former description is peculiar to the individual in a
greater degree, while the latter is too general. Again, the man whogives an account of
the nature of an individual tree will give a more instructive account by mentioning the
species ‘tree’ than by mentioning the genus ‘plant’.
Moreover, primary substances are most properly called substances in virtue of the fact
that they are the entities which underlie everything else, and that everything else is
either predicated of them or present in them. Now the same relation which subsists
between primary substance and everything else subsists also between the species and
the genus: for the species is to the genus as subject is to predicate, since the genus is
predicated of the species, whereas the species cannot be predicated of the genus. Thus
we have a second ground for asserting that the species is more truly substance than the
genus.
Aristotle, Categories Excerpt (Book I, Parts 1-5, translated by E. M. Edghill):
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Of species themselves, except in the case of such as are genera, no one is more truly
substance than another. We should not give a more appropriate account of the individual
man by stating the species to which he belonged, than we should of an individual horse
by adopting the same method of definition. In the same way, of primary substances, no
one is more truly substance than another; an individual man is not more truly substance
than an individual ox.
It is, then, with good reason that of all that remains, when we exclude primary
substances, we concede to species and genera alone the name ‘secondary substance’,
for these alone of all the predicates convey a knowledge of primary substance. For it is
by stating the species or the genus that we appropriately define any individual man; and
we shall make our definition more exact by stating the former than by stating the latter.
All other things that we state, such as that he is white, that he runs, and so on, are
irrelevant to the definition. Thus it is just that these alone, apart from primary
substances, should be called substances.
Further, primary substances are most properly so called, because they underlie and are
the subjects of everything else. Now the same relation that subsists between primary
substance and everything else subsists also between the species and the genus to
which the primary substance belongs, on the one hand, and every attribute which is not
included within these, on the other. For these are the subjects of all such. If we call an
individual man ‘skilled in grammar’, the predicate is applicable also to the species and to
the genus to which he belongs. This law holds good in all cases.
It is a common characteristic of all substance that it is never present in a subject. For
primary substance is neither present in a subject nor predicated of a subject; while, with
regard to secondary substances, it is clear from the following arguments (apart from
others) that they are not present in a subject. For ‘man’ is predicated of the individual
man, but is not present in any subject: for manhood is not present in the individual man.
In the same way, ‘animal’ is also predicated of the individual man, but is not present in
him. Again, when a thing is present in a subject, though the name may quite well be
applied to that in which it is present, the definition cannot be applied. Yet of secondary
substances, not only the name, but also the definition, applies to the subject: we should
use both the definition of the species and that of the genus with reference to the
individual man. Thus substance cannot be present in a subject.
Yet this is not peculiar to substance, for it is also the case that differentiae cannot be
present in subjects. The characteristics ‘terrestrial’ and ‘two-footed’ are predicated of the
species ‘man’, but not present in it. For they are not in man. Moreover, the definition of
the differentia may be predicated of that of which the differentia itself is predicated. For
instance, if the characteristic ‘terrestrial’ is predicated of the species ‘man’, the definition
Aristotle, Categories Excerpt (Book I, Parts 1-5, translated by E. M. Edghill):
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also of that characteristic may be used to form the predicate of the species ‘man’: for
‘man’ is terrestrial.
The fact that the parts of substances appear to be present in the whole, as in a subject,
should not make us apprehensive lest we should have to admit that such parts are not
substances: for in explaining the phrase ‘being present in a subject’, we stated’ that we
meant ‘otherwise than as parts in a whole’.
It is the mark of substances and of differentiae that, in all propositions of which they form
the predicate, they are predicated univocally. For all such propositions have for their
subject either the individual or the species. It is true that, inasmuch as primary substance
is not predicable of anything, it can never form the predicate of any proposition. But of
secondary substances, the species is predicated of the individual, the genus both of the
species and of the individual. Similarly the differentiae are predicated of the species and
of the individuals. Moreover, the definition of the species and that of the genus are
applicable to the primary substance, and that of the genus to the species. For all that is
predicated of the predicate will be predicated also of the subject. Similarly, the definition
of the differentiae will be applicable to the species and to the individuals. But it was
stated above that the word ‘univocal’ was applied to those things which had both name
and definition in common. It is, therefore, established that in every proposition, of which
either substance or a differentia forms the predicate, these are predicated univocally.
All substance appears to signify that which is individual. In the case of primary
substance this is indisputably true, for the thing is a unit. In the case of secondary
substances, when we speak, for instance, of ‘man’ or ‘animal’, our form of speech gives
the impression that we are here also indicating that which is individual, but the
impression is not strictly true; for a secondary substance is not an individual, but a class
with a certain qualification; for it is not one and single as a primary substance is; the
words ‘man’, ‘animal’, are predicable of more than one subject.
Yet species and genus do not merely indicate quality, like the term ‘white’; ‘white’
indicates quality and nothing further, but species and genus determine the quality with
reference to a substance: they signify substance qualitatively differentiated. The
determinate qualification covers a larger field in the case of the genus that in that of the
species: he who uses the word ‘animal’ is herein using a word of wider extension than he
who uses the word ‘man’.
Another mark of substance is that it has no contrary. What could be the contrary of any
primary substance, such as the individual man or animal? It has none. Nor can the
species or the genus have a contrary. Yet this characteristic is not peculiar to substance,
but is true of many other things, such as quantity. There is nothing that forms the
contrary of ‘two cubits long’ or of ‘three cubits long’, or of ‘ten’, or of any such term. A
Aristotle, Categories Excerpt (Book I, Parts 1-5, translated by E. M. Edghill):
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man may contend that ‘much’ is the contrary of ‘little’, or ‘great’ of ‘small’, but of definite
quantitative terms no contrary exists.
Substance, again, does not appear to admit of variation of degree. I do not mean by this
that one substance cannot be more or less truly substance than another, for it has
already been stated’ that this is the case; but that no single substance admits of varying
degrees within itself. For instance, one particular substance, ‘man’, cannot be more or
less man either than himself at some other time or than some other man. One man
cannot be more man than another, as that which is white may be more or less white than
some other white object, or as that which is beautiful may be more or less beautiful than
some other beautiful object. The same quality, moreover, is said to subsist in a thing in
varying degrees at different times. A body, being white, is said to be whiter at one time
than it was before, or, being warm, is said to be warmer or less warm than at some other
time. But substance is not said to be more or less that which it is: a man is not more truly
a man at one time than he was before, nor is anything, if it is substance, more or less
what it is. Substance, then, does not admit of variation of degree.
The most distinctive mark of substance appears to be that, while remaining numerically
one and the same, it is capable of admitting contrary qualities. From among things other
than substance, we should find ourselves unable to bring forward any which possessed
this mark. Thus, one and the same colour cannot be white and black. Nor can the same
one action be good and bad: this law holds good with everything that is not substance.
But one and the selfsame substance, while retaining its identity, is yet capable of
admitting contrary qualities. The same individual person is at one time white, at another
black, at one time warm, at another cold, at one time good, at another bad. This capacity
is found nowhere else, though it might be maintained that a statement or opinion was an
exception to the rule. The same statement, it is agreed, can be both true and false. For if
the statement ‘he is sitting’ is true, yet, when the person in question has risen, the same
statement will be false. The same applies to opinions. For if any one thinks truly that a
person is sitting, yet, when that person has risen, this same opinion, if still held, will be
false. Yet although this exception may be allowed, there is, nevertheless, a difference in
the manner in which the thing takes place. It is by themselves changing that substances
admit contrary qualities. It is thus that that which was hot becomes cold, for it has
entered into a different state. Similarly that which was white becomes black, and that
which was bad good, by a process of change; and in the same way in all other cases it is
by changing that substances are capable of admitting contrary qualities. But statements
and opinions themselves remain unaltered in all respects: it is by the alteration in the
facts of the case that the contrary quality comes to be theirs. The statement ‘he is sitting’
remains unaltered, but it is at one time true, at another false, according to
circumstances. What has been said of statements applies also to opinions. Thus, in
respect of the manner in which the thing takes place, it is the peculiar mark of substance
that it should be capable of admitting contrary qualities; for it is by itself changing that it
does so.
Aristotle, Categories Excerpt (Book I, Parts 1-5, translated by E. M. Edghill):
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If, then, a man should make this exception and contend that statements and opinions
are capable of admitting contrary qualities, his contention is unsound. For statements
and opinions are said to have this capacity, not because they themselves undergo
modification, but because this modification occurs in the case of something else. The
truth or falsity of a statement depends on facts, and not on any power on the part of the
statement itself of admitting contrary qualities. In short, there is nothing which can alter
the nature of statements and opinions. As, then, no change takes place in themselves,
these cannot be said to be capable of admitting contrary qualities.
But it is by reason of the modification which takes place within the substance itself that a
substance is said to be capable of admitting contrary qualities; for a substance admits
within itself either disease or health, whiteness or blackness. It is in this sense that it is
said to be capable of admitting contrary qualities.
To sum up, it is a distinctive mark of substance, that, while remaining numerically one
and the same, it is capable of admitting contrary qualities, the modification taking place
through a change in the substance itself. Let these remarks suffice on the subject of
substance.
Source: The Internet Classics Archive
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