1971-1980 Ford Pinto
BY THE AUTO EDITORS OF CONSUMER GUIDE
The Pinto Fire Controversy
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One of the biggest continuing automotive news stories in the latter part of the
Seventies dealt with tales of exploding Ford Pintos and the considerable
awards civil-court juries were presenting to victims of accidents involving the
cars. Was the Pinto fire controversy a lot of hype, or had Ford truly discounted
human lives in order to save a few dollars?
As early as 1972, reports of explosions in low-speed collisions involving Pintos
struck from the rear started to come in to the National Highway Safety and
Transportation Administration. Accident investigations in many of the cases
revealed that victims had few, if any, trauma injuries as a result of the impacts,
but had burned to death when the cars exploded into flames. Some had been
trapped inside the cars due to the body buckling and doors becoming jammed
shut.
| By the 1973 model year, Ford may have already known the Pinto was a fire hazard. |
Fire safety had been a major concern at Ford since the mid Sixties. Arjay Miller, then
company president, had been involved in a fiery crash while driving his new 1965 Lincoln
Continental. When traffic slowed unexpectedly, he was rear-ended by another car. The fuel
tank started to leak and a spark sent the rear of the luxury car up in flames.
Fortunately, the driver’s door wasn’t damaged and Miller was able to get out
relatively unscathed. He went on a crusade for safer fuel tanks, and worked
with several suppliers for systems that would contain highly
flammable gasoline and give motorists a wider margin of safety. He even
testified before Congress about the importance Ford Motor Company placed
on the matter. What went wrong with the Pinto, then?
Records indicated that Ford had first conducted rear-end collision tests on the
Pinto in December 1970, months after it was already in production. Initially, 11
carefully coordinated crashes were conducted, and in all but three of them,
gas tanks ruptured and often burst into flames. In the three tests that didn’t
result in fires, the cars had prototype safety devices that engineers had
developed while working with suppliers.
Most effective was the use of a rubber bladder/liner produced by the
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company. Despite rupturing the exterior of the
tank, no fuel was spilled, and no fire resulted. It was estimated that the unit
cost of bladders would have amounted to $5.08 per car.
The second method that had been employed was an extra steel plate
attached to the rear of the car just behind the bumper, isolating the tank from
direct contact during impact. It successfully warded off a blow at 30 mph,
helping to keep the tank intact. No company cost analysis was done at the
time, but experts felt that this part could have cost up to $11 per car to install.
Engineers found that the majority of the ruptures were caused by two factors:
1) the filler neck breaking off and allowing fuel to pour out, where it could be
exposed to an ignition source; and 2) the tank being penetrated by contact
with the differential mounting bolts and right shock absorber.
This is where a third successful fix had been devised — a rather simple plastic
insulator fitted on the differential that would keep the bolts from ever making
contact with the fuel tank. Cost of this item was less than $1.
Several company memos presented as evidence during the civil trials
revealed that these remedies were discussed, with the conclusion that to shut
down production and retool would be too expensive. Most damaging to Ford
were memos found and published by author/researcher Mark Dowie in the
muckraking magazine Mother Jones that detailed a cost analysis of corporate
liability in the event of having to compensate crash victims.
Experts calculated the value of a human life at around $200,000, while a
serious burn injury was worth about $67,000. Using an estimate of 180 deaths
and 180 serious burns, someone put on paper that the cost to redesign and
rework the Pinto’s gas tank would cost close to $137 million, while possible
liability costs worked out to around $49 million.
Comparisons were drawn up between the Pinto and the imported Capri that
was being sold by Lincoln-Mercury dealers. Both cars were of similar size and
construction, but everyone agreed that the Capri’s fuel tank was in a much
safer location: up and away from the rear bumper, and less vulnerable in a
rear-end collision.
Ford engineers argued that to place the tank any higher up in the Pinto would
rob the trunk of already meager storage space, and that even a set of golf
clubs would have a hard time being squeezed into the leftover space.
Ultimately, 27 people were determined to have been killed in rear-end-crash
explosions involving Pintos. In one of the few cases brought to trial, a
California jury awarded a boy who had been severely burned and disfigured a
total of $126 million. The driver of the car had died from her injuries a few
days after the accident.
When the memos regarding the liability assessments were entered into
evidence, the case was as good as over. Even after a judge reduced the
amount to $3.5 million on appeal, this was far more than the company had
ever counted on paying. It was a real wake-up call for Ford, whose legal
teams went to work to try and settle as many of the pending cases as possible
out of court.
Matters were to get even more serious for the company. In 1978, Elkhart
County, Indiana, Prosecutor Michael Cosentino called for a grand jury hearing
in the case of three girls who had died in a Pinto collision fire. As a result of
the grand jury findings, he filed criminal charges of negligent homicide against
officials of the Ford Motor Company.
Once again, Ford’s corporate legal machine went to work. It was found that
the accident had occurred on a stretch of road that was notorious for being
dangerous. Then, too, the driver of the speeding van that rear-ended the Pinto
was in possession of alcohol and drugs, which were deemed to have
contributed more to the accident than anything else.
Ultimately, the trial judge had to dismiss the criminal charges. However, this
was another stern warning not only to Ford, but to all of American industry
regarding its responsibility for product safety.
Finally, in September 1978, Ford issued a recall for 1.5 million 1971-76 Pinto
sedans and Runabouts, plus all similar 1975-76 Mercury Bobcats, for a safety
repair. Each car received a new fuel-tank filler neck that extended deeper into
the tank and was more resistant to breaking off in a rear-end collision. A
plastic shield was installed between the differential and the tank, as well as
another to deflect contact with the right-rear shock absorber.
(While not totally immune from the hazards of rear-end collisions, station
wagons — with their 10 extra inches of rear-end sheetmetal and different
configuration for the fuel filler — were deemed far safer, and were not a part of
the recall notice.)
Reflecting on the Pinto incident and Ford’s attempts to control the damage at
the risk of its public image, former Ford exec Lee Iacocca made this
summation in his book Talking Straight: “Clamming up is what we did at Ford
in the late ’70s when we were bombarded with suits over the Pinto, which was
involved in a lot of gas tank fires. The suits might have bankrupted the
company, so we kept our mouths shut for fear of saying anything that just one
jury might have construed as an admission of guilt. Winning in court was our
top priority; nothing else mattered. And of course, our silence added to all the
suspicions people had about us and the car.”
Source: http://auto.howstuffworks.com/1971-1980-ford-pinto12.htm
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