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123
Journal of Population Research
ISSN 1443-2447
Volume 35
Number 3
J Pop Research (2018) 35:237-288
DOI 10.1007/s12546-018-9208-9
Family typology and gender empowerment:
the labour market performance of married
immigrants
Yunsun Huh
123
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Vol.:(0123456789)
Journal of Population Research (2018) 35:237–288
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12546-018-9208-9
1 3
Family typology and gender empowerment: the labour
market performance of married immigrants
Yunsun Huh1
Published online: 30 August 2018
© Springer Nature B.V. 2018
Abstract
This paper examines the impact of gender empowerment on labor market performance of U.S. married immigrants across diferent family types. Three types of families are defned based on the nationality of immigrants’ spouses; ‘Home-country
Marriage’ where both spouses come from the same home-country, ‘Native Marriage’
where one spouse is an immigrant and the other is a Native, and ‘Foreign Marriage’
where both spouses are immigrants, but each comes from a diferent country of origin from the other. Recognizing the role of gender ideology across diferent family structures, this study provides empirical evidence of the impact culturally based
gender status has on immigrants across family types. Labor market performance is
measured by wages and the labor force participation decision of immigrants, using
the Ordinary Least Squares and Logit models. The gender empowerment measure
is utilized to refect diferent cultural and institutional conditions, which shape gender status in the immigrants’ home countries. Results indicate the positive efect of
gender equality on women’s earnings and labor force participation, as well as that
home-country gender status strongly infuence women’s labor force participation
and earnings when they share the same cultural norms as their husbands. Interestingly, women are more infuenced by their spouses’ gender norms than men when
immigrants come from a diferent cultural gender norm than their spouse.
Keywords Cultural gender norms · Family typology · Gender empowerment ·
Gender inequality · Labor market performance of married immigrants · GEM
(gender empowermentmeasure) · Labor force participation of married immigrants ·
Earnings of married immigrants
* Yunsun Huh
huhy@uww.edu
1 Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin-Whitewater, 800 W. Main St, Whitewater,
WI 53190, USA
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Introduction
Research on the economic performance of immigrant workers provides information not only on the labour supply they provide but also on how immigrants
and their families adapt to a host country labour market. Given that individuals’
decision-making in a society, as well as within a family, are greatly infuenced
by the gender norms of a country, family migration needs to be analysed from a
gendered perspective. This means examining both the economic incentives and
gender norms facing immigrants.
Cultural gender norms provide diferent rights and responsibilities by gender,
and gender norms also infuence individuals’ choice and decision-making diferently by gender. Fernández (2008) defnes these types of cultural diferences as
systematic variation in belief and preferences across time, space or social group.
Since immigrants from diferent countries of origin convey their home-country
cultural norms, these norms could infuence immigrants’ choice and decisionmaking diferently by country of origin as well as gender. In addition, diferent
family structures can result in diferential bargaining power between women and
men within the family. Given that gender norms restrict women’s choice and
economic activities more than men’s, the labour market performance of married
women would be more strongly infuenced by social gender ideology and family
typology than married men. Importantly, less egalitarian gender norms diminish
women’s confdence by restricting women’s opportunities and activities. Thus, if
women grow up with more egalitarian gender norms, they could earn more than
women who grow up in less egalitarian conditions, since they gain more confdence and a positive attitude which lead to more success in the labour market. On
the other hand, systematic variation in beliefs about gender equality can also lead
to variation in the capacity for immigrant men to work with new colleagues or
female coworkers in a new labour market. More egalitarian gender norms could
therefore also infuence the labour market success of immigrant men positively,
through the creation of and exposure to better attitudes towards female colleagues
in the working place. Despite the importance of family structure and gender inequality in the study of family migration, there are few studies investigating the
role of these types of gender norms on the labour market performance of married
immigrants across diferent family types. This is a notable gap in the literature
that this study attempts to address.
Recognising the endogeneity of gender ideology in family dynamics, this study
analyses how diferent gender norms and marriage types impact the United States
labour market performance of married immigrants. Using the one per cent sample
of the 2006 American Community Survey (ACS), the paper analyses the efect of
culturally based gender norms on the earnings and labour force participation of
married immigrants across diferent marriage types. The Gender Empowerment
Measure (GEM) is included in the analysis to refect diferent cultural and institutional conditions which shape gender equalities in immigrants’ home countries.
In the paper, three diferent marriage types are defned. The frst, ‘Home-country
Marriage’ defnes an immigrant family where both spouses come from the same
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Family typology and gender empowerment: the labour market…
home-country. ‘Native Marriage’ defnes an immigrant family where one spouse
is an immigrant and the other is an U.S. born native. Lastly, ‘Foreign Marriage’
defnes an immigrant family where both spouses are immigrants, but each spouse
comes from a diferent country of origin from the other. Using the GEM and these
family structures, this study specifcally focuses on the following questions: First,
do immigrants’ home-country gender norms afect the labour market outcomes of
immigrants and do outcomes difer by marriage type? Second, are outcomes different between women and men within the same type of family? And, if yes, what
are the implications for women’s empowerment and family structure? Addressing
these questions, this study flls a gap in the literature for international migration,
gender, and labour.
The results show home-country gender norms (as measured by GEM) have a statistically signifcant impact on the earnings and labour market participation of married immigrants across diferent marriage types. Earnings of all immigrants, except
‘Foreign Marriage’ women, are infuenced by home-country gender status with a
greater impact on women than men. In the case of ‘Foreign Marriage’, wives are
infuenced by their spouses’ home-country gender norms while husbands are infuenced by their own home-country gender norms. With the exception of ‘Foreign
Marriage’ women and men, the labour force participation of all married women is
infuenced by their home-country gender norms while there is no such infuence for
married men.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: “Literature review” in section
explains the background literature on family migration; “Data” in section details the
data sources employed; “Empirical process” in section provides the empirical models; “Results” in section presents the results; “Conclusion” in section concludes.
Literature review
Most prior literature on the gender and family dynamics of migration focuses on the
economic incentives associated with the family investment model. The framework
models immigrant families’ decisions regarding labour supply on the family strategy
of life-cycle human capital investment and family income maximisation. According
to the family investment hypothesis, immigrant wives work more upon arrival in
order to help their husbands’ host country human capital investment. Thus, immigrant wives are more likely to work longer hours and sacrifce their own investment
in host country human capital. As a result, immigrant wives work more at the time
of arrival and early diferences between the labour supply of immigrant women and
native women decline over time as years since migration increase. Therefore, many
prior studies focus on how married women’s labour supply or earnings change over
time depending on their spouses’ employment situation (i.e. job, education or earnings). Most early studies focus only on the economic activity of married immigrant
women, ignoring the labour supply of married men (Long 1980; Ong 1987; Duleep
and Sanders 1993; Macpherson and Stewart 1989).
Some studies have examined international migrant couples, analysing the labour
supply and wage assimilation of immigrant wives and husbands across diferent
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marriage types (e.g. immigrant couples, native couples, and mixed couples where
one spouse is an immigrant and the other spouse is native) (Worswick 1996; Baker
and Benjamin 1997; Blau et al. 2003). For example, Baker and Benjamin (1997) and
Blau et al. (2003) examine labour supply patterns and wage assimilation of immigrant husbands and wives in Canada and the U.S. respectively. While the results in
Baker and Benjamin (1997) show diferent labour supply patterns between immigrant wives and husbands (supporting the family investment hypothesis), Blau et al.
(2003) arrive at the opposite conclusion (showing a similar pattern of labour supply
for both spouses) and suggest that Baker and Benjamin’s (1997) results may refect
labour supply responses to each spouse’s wage.1 While their fndings regarding the
family investment hypothesis are diferent, both Baker and Benjamin (1997) and
Blau et al. (2003) closely consider gender roles and family types when analysing
the labour market activities of married immigrants. However, these studies do not
consider home-country specifc characteristics or immigrant families who share the
same cultural background. Given that immigrants come from diferent cultural backgrounds, the gender norms of U.S. immigrants will vary across their diferent countries of origin. In addition, it is also possible that gender ideology within the family
can vary across family type. Therefore, home-country gender norms may have infuenced the results of previous studies. Consequently, it is important to consider married couples who share the same cultural backgrounds separately from immigrant
couples in general.
While there are a few studies dealing with immigrant couples from the same
home-country separately from immigrant couples in general, these studies mostly
focus on issues related to tied movers who migrate as part of a household rather
than solely pursuing their private success (Cobb-Clark and Crossley 2004; Basilio
et al. 2009).2 Diferent from this paper, these previous studies do not focus on cultural transmissions of immigrants or the efect of home-country characteristics. For
example, Cobb-Clark and Crossley (2004) examine the secondary worker efect
on labour supply within immigrant couples where both spouses are from the same
home-country, comparing traditional and nontraditional households. Basilio et al.
(2009) also examine the labour market assimilation of immigrant couples (similar
1 Empirical results on the family investment model are somewhat ambiguous regarding the labour supply of married female immigrants, with diferent evidence across researchers. For example, Worswick
(1996) and Baker and Benjamin (1997) fnd results supportive of the family investment hypothesis, while
Blau et al. (2003) and Basilio et al. (2009) provide counterexamples to the family investment model,
fnding both wives and husbands have a similar pattern of wage increases relative to native workers in the
U.S. and Germany. Meanwhile, Cobb-Clark and Crossley (2004) fnd mixed results for the family investment hypothesis depending on the gender of the primary worker in the household. They fnd supportive
results on the family investment hypothesis for the traditional household but non-supportive results for
the non-traditional household.
2 Most empirical studies on tied movers deal with internal migrant couples rather than international
migrants due to difculties related to data collection and identifying tied movers or the strength of tie
between husband and wife for dual earning couples. Most of these studies show that married women
beneft less from migration in the job market in terms of earnings, employment, job market conditions,
etc. (Geist and McManus 2012; Blackburn 2010; Quinn and Rubb 2011; Cooke 2003a, b; Büchel and
Battu 2003; Bielby and Bielby 1992; Sandell 1977).
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to Baker and Benjamin (1997) and Blau et al. (2003)), but they extend their study by
comparing immigrant couples (who are married at the time of arrival) to immigrant
couples who move sequentially (one spouse arrives frst and the other spouse comes
later).
There has also been some work done addressing the importance of cultural
efects, focusing on the economic outcomes of immigrants’ descendants using epidemiological techniques3 (Fernández 2007, 2008; Fernández and Fogli 2006, 2009).
For example, Fernández and Fogli (2009) show the importance of the efect of culture on women’s labour supply and fertility behaviour by examining second-generation American women across time and their ancestors’ home countries. They use
female labour force participation (LFP) and total fertility rate (TFR) by country of
ancestry as cultural proxies to explain women’s work and fertility behaviour. They
fnd that a husband’s culture is more signifcant and has a greater impact on the work
behaviour of women than the wife’s culture when they diferentiate between the
efect of the wife’s and husband’s cultures. Fernández and Fogli (2006) and Fernández (2007) also show consistent results using the past and future value of female
LFP in women’s country of ancestry. Similarly, some recent researchers show the
relationship between gender-related home-country characteristics and economic
activity outcomes of female immigrants (Antecol 2001, 2003; Blau and Kahn 2011;
Huh 2011). While this literature proves the efect of gender-related cultural preferences and beliefs on the labour market activity and decision-making of immigrant
women, these studies either do not focus on married immigrant couples or fail to
consider family structure.
This paper belongs to a recent literature attempting to examine the efect of
home-country gender norms and the family typology of married immigrants simultaneously. There are only a few studies which consider family typology (including
immigrant couples from the same home-country) and cultural diferences together
(Orefce 2014; Blau et al. 2011). For instance, Orefce (2014) investigates the
role of intra-household bargaining power (in terms of age and non-labour income
gaps) in the labour supply of married couples, by comparing U.S.-born couples and
foreign-born couples in which both spouses come from the same home-country.
But the heterogeneity of cultural diferences is limited to only three levels between
immigrants’ home-country and the U.S.4 Meanwhile, Blau et al. (2011) examine
the labour supply assimilation of married immigrants and gender related homecountry characteristics (such as total fertility rate and the ratio between women’s
and men’s labour force participation rate). Comparing the working hours of native
families to the subsample of immigrant couples, they found that women from countries with high relative female LFP assimilate faster and work more than women
3 Epidemiological technique is an approach to analyse the infuence of culture separate from the infuence of markets and institutions using immigrants or immigrants’ descendants’ data (Fernández 2008).
4 The three categories assigned to foreign couples based on the degree of cultural diferences from the
U.S. are as follows: Foreign-born couples with a diferent culture from the U.S., foreign-born couples
with a somewhat similar culture to the U.S., and foreign-born couples with a very similar culture to the
U.S. This culture of origin diference is by ancestry not by country of birth. In addition, they do not consider family type such as intercultural marriage.
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from supply countries with low female LFP. However, they do not look into how
overall home-country gender norms infuence the labour market success of immigrants across marriage types or the labour force participation of immigrants. This
paper analyses the earnings and labour force participation of married immigrants
across diferent family types and countries of origin, while also considering the role
of cultural gender norms across family types by utilising the Gender Empowerment
Measure.
Data
Immigrants’ data
The data for individual immigrants comes from the Integrated Public Use Microdata
Series one per cent sample of the 2006 American Community Survey (Ruggles et al.
2010). The ACS dataset includes information on ethnic origin (place of birth, race),
a set of labour market variables (employment status, hours worked in the previous
year, wages and salaries in the previous year, industry, occupation), and personal
and family characteristics (age, year of arrival, education, marital status, number of
children, English fuency, and region in the U.S.).
Immigrants are defned as people born outside of the United States5 and the
analysis is restricted to married immigrants who migrated after the age of 18. This
restriction refects the fact that adult-immigrants who grew up in their home countries most likely possess that country’s cultural gender norms. Immigrants who
migrate as infants or children are more likely afected by cultural characteristics in
the host country. The sample is further restricted to individuals who are between the
ages of 25 and 65. A minimum age of 25 takes into consideration the fact that more
full-time rather than part-time workers (such as college students) will be included.
Only immigrants answering the married question on the ACS survey as “married,
spouse present” are included in the analysis. Linking spousal information on birth
place, married immigrants are divided into three groups: (1) Immigrants married to
immigrants from the same country of origin (labelled ‘Home-country Marriage’);
(2) Immigrants married to a Native (labelled ‘Native Marriage’); and (3) Immigrants
married to immigrants from a diferent country of origin (labelled ‘Foreign Marriage’). Given it is possible married immigrant couples migrate sequentially, ‘Homecountry Marriage’ couples could include more tied movers and hold home-country
gender norms more strongly than the other two groups.6
6 Basilio et al. (2009) report 37% of immigrant husbands arrive ahead of their wives, utilising a detailed
data set that includes the time of marriage for immigrant couples in Germany. This implies that married
immigrant couples from the same home-country may include many couples where spouses arrive in succession. For robustness, possible tied mover couples who move simultaneously, a subset of all ‘Homecountry Marriage’ couples, are tested.
5 Natives only include people who are born in the U.S and exclude people who are born in U.S outlying
areas such as Puerto Rico, Guam or other U.S. Possessions.
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Home‑country gender status: GEM
To capture immigrants’ cultural institutional background which shapes home-country gender norms and women’s status, the Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM)
is utilised from the 1999 Human Development Report (HDR) (UNDP 2007).7
The GEM measures the equality of choice and opportunity for women by capturing women’s empowerment level across three dimensions: political decision-making, economic decision-making and control over economic resources. To capture
empowerment levels using these three dimensions, GEM incorporates the percentage share of parliamentary seats held by women and men (for political decisionmaking power), the percentage shares of administrative and managerial positions
held by women and men and the percentage shares of professional and technical
jobs held by women and men (for economic decision making power), and the Purchasing Power Parity GDP per capita for women and men (for power over economic
resources).8
The GEM is calculated as an unweighted average of three component variables,
which measure how women’s opportunities are diferent from the harmonious mean
(pure equality between women and men). Each component is calculated through
the equally distributed equivalent percentage (EDEP) based on Atkinson’s social
value function (Atkinson 1970), which in-this-case measures the deviation from
pure equality between the two sexes. Therefore, the value of each component ranges
between 0 and 1 (with a value of 1 indicating perfect equality and 0 indicating perfect inequality). The value of the GEM, an unweighted average of the three components, also therefore ranges between 0 and 1. Since there are no countries where
men’s status is lower than women’s for any of the three components, the value of the
GEM denotes women’s relative status to pure equality across all three dimensions.
Therefore, a high GEM refects low gender inequality in a nation.
Utilising GEM, the sample is restricted to those countries where the index exists
and which have a large enough number of female immigrants in the U.S. (at least
100). This results in useable observations from 42 countries (Table 1). The use of
HDR from 1999 for the GEM ensures time consistency in the data observations.
Using the GEM measure based on values from 1999 is appropriate to represent the
gender inequality levels experienced by immigrants in the sample while growing
up in their home countries. This conclusion is drawn from the assumption that the
index of one year refects accumulated changes over at least a decade.9 It is appropriate to use the index of one year to refect accumulated changes over at least a decade
unless there is a large change in values or ranks of each country’s GEM index over
time. For the sample of 42 countries, the correlation of each index in terms of ranks
7 For details on the construction of the GEM, please see supplemental online Appendix I in Huh (2017).
8 Although the component for economic resources represented by GDP per capita may be more refective of a country’s overall development status than women’s empowerment, it is benefcial to include in
this study since the level of skill transference between host and home-country should be controlled.
9 Similar results from two studies, Fernández and Fogli (2006) and Fernández (2007), which use past
and future value of female LFP in women’s country of ancestry also show culture tends to evolve relatively slowly over time.
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Table 1 GEM and gender related data for countries of origin
Countries of origin (ACS) GEMa Component data for GEM GDIb
Value Rank % Female seats in
parliament
% Female administrators
& managerial jobs
% Female professional
& technical jobs
GDP per capita
($PPP)
Value Rank
Australia 0.707 9 25.9 43.3 25.5 24,574 0.935 2
Bangladesh 0.304 83 9.1 4.9 34.7 1464 0.459 121
Brazil 0.367 70 5.9 17.3 63.3 7037 0.743 64
Bulgaria 0.457 49 10.8 28.9 57 5071 0.77 53
Canada 0.742 4 23.3 42.2 51.1 26,251 0.934 3
Chile 0.449 54 9 18.5 51.6 8652 0.817 39
China 0.491 40 21.8 11.6 45.1 3617 0.715 76
Colombia 0.515 31 12.2 38.8 45.6 5749 0.76 56
Dominican Republic 0.528 25 14.5 44.8 49.9 5507 0.712 78
Ecuador 0.516 29 17.4 27.5 46.6 2994 0.711 79
Egypt/United Arab Rep. 0.275 86 2 16.4 28.4 3420 0.62 97
El Salvador 0.491 41 16.7 25.3 44.5 4344 0.694 87
France 0.499 36 9.1 9.4 41.4 22,897 0.922 10
Germany 0.740 5 29.8 26.6 49 23,742 0.916 15
Guatemala 0.482 44 12.5 32.4 45.2 3674 0.61 98
Guyana/British Guiana 0.434 57 15.6 12.8 47.5 3640 0.693 88
Honduras 0.450 53 9.4 39.2 56.3 2340 0.623 96
India 0.240 95 8.3 2.3 20.5 2248 0.553 105
Indonesia 0.362 71 11.4 6.6 40.8 2857 0.671 92
Iran 0.264 88 4.9 3.5 32.6 5531 0.696 83
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Table 1 (continued)
Countries of origin (ACS) GEMa Component data for GEM GDIb
Value Rank % Female seats in
parliament
% Female administrators
& managerial jobs
% Female professional
& technical jobs
GDP per capita
($PPP)
Value Rank
Ireland 0.556 20 13.7 17.3 48 25,918 0.908 18
Israel/Palestine 0.496 37 7.5 19.2 53.8 18,440 0.888 22
Italy 0.523 26 10 53.8 17.8 22,172 0.903 20
Japan 0.494 38 8.9 9.3 44.1 24,898 0.921 11
Korea 0.336 78 3.7 4.2 45 15,712 0.868 29
Malaysia 0.451 52 10.3 19.2 43.2 8209 0.768 55
Mexico 0.511 33 16.9 19.8 45.2 8297 0.782 49
Netherlands 0.702 10 31.6 16.8 44.8 24,215 0.926 8
Pakistan 0.176 101 2 4.3 21 1834 0.466 117
Panama 0.467 47 9.7 27.6 49.2 5875 0.782 50
Peru 0.421 63 10.8 20 39.4 4622 0.724 73
Philippines 0.480 45 12.9 34.8 65.1 3805 0.746 62
Poland 0.504 35 12.9 33.5 61.2 8450 0.826 36
Portugal 0.571 19 13 36.6 52.4 16,064 0.87 28
Romania 0.400 67 5.6 28.1 56.4 6041 0.769 54
South Africa (Union of) 0.582 18 28.4 17.4 46.7 8908 0.695 85
Spain 0.555 22 19.9 12 48.1 18,079 0.901 21
Thailand 0.407 64 6.6 20.4 54.5 6132 0.755 58
Trinidad &Tobago 0.540 24 19.4 23.3 53.3 8176 0.789 47
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Data Source: Human Development Report (1999, 2001)
aGEM Rank is reported out of 102 countries
bGDI collected from HDR 2001, which used GDP data close to the survey year 1999. GDI Rank is out of 143 countries
cThe category, “United Kingdom” in the HDR and ACS is matched with Scotland, England, UK, and Northern Ireland in IPUMs data. The expression of countries’ name
is matched with IPUMs (ACS) data when the name of one country is presented diferently between HDR and ACS
Table 1 (continued)
Countries of origin (ACS) GEMa Component data for GEM GDIb
Value Rank % Female seats in
parliament
% Female administrators
& managerial jobs
% Female professional
& technical jobs
GDP per capita
($PPP)
Value Rank
Turkey 0.280 85 2.4 8.6 33 6380 0.726 71
United Kingdomc 0.614 16 12.3 33 43.7 22,093 0.92 12
Venezuela 0.484 43 12.2 22.9 57.1 5495 0.759 57
Host Country (U.S.) 0.708 8 12.5 44.3 53.1 31,872 0.932 8
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and values for the widest interval of time, the time period between 1995 and 2007,
is quite high (0.841 for GEM ranks and 0.870 for GEM values).10 The high correlation of these gender indices over time, in terms of rank and value, provides validity
to using these GEM values to represent gender norms in a country since 1985. The
main characteristics of the sample show that most immigrants (60% of the sample)
migrated after 1990, the mean age of the sample is 44 years old, and the mean age
of migration is 29 years old.11 Therefore, the majority of the sample was residing in
their home countries at the time for which the values and ranks of the GEM index
are valid.
Descriptive statistics for the sample
Combining the restrictions on included countries with the individual restrictions
stated previously results in a sample size of 73,831 married immigrants, 52% of
whom are female and 48% of whom are male. Linking spousal information results
in 54,054 ‘Home-country Marriage’,12 14,446 ‘Native Marriage’, and 5331 ‘Foreign
Marriage’ observations (Table 2).13 Out of 38,398 married immigrant women, about
70% are ‘Home-country Marriage’, 23% are ‘Native Marriage’, and 7% are ‘Foreign
Marriage’. For male immigrants, about 76% are ‘Home-country Marriage, 16% are
Native Marriage and 7% are Foreign Marriage. ‘Home-country Marriage’ workers
comprise 37,832 observations in the sample of whom 39% are female and 61% are
male. ‘Native Marriage’ immigrant workers comprise 10,263 observations in the
sample of whom 52% are female and 48% are male, the most balanced sample of
workers by gender. ‘Foreign Marriage’ immigrant workers comprise 3777 observations, 42% female and 58% male (Table 3).
As seen in Table 4, the rate of labour market participation for men is similar
across all marriage types (roughly 85%), while women show varying rates of labour
market participation among diferent marriage groups. Labour market participants
are defned as immigrants who earned positive wages (comprised of an individual’s total pre-tax wage and salary income) for the previous year.14 About 45% of
10 These correlations are even higher between 1999 and 2007 when more consistent methods of measurement were implemented for GEM. The correlation among GEM ranks and values for the time period
between 1999 and 2007 are 0.877 and 0.910, respectively.
11 The youngest individuals in the sample are 25 years old in 2006 and if they migrated at the age of 18
(youngest migration age) then they migrated in 1999.
12 The subsample of ‘Home-country Marriage’, where both spouses moved simultaneously, is 21,908
and about 29% of ‘Home-country Marriage’ women migrated with their husband in the same year. The
simultaneously-moved ‘Home-country Marriage’ immigrants have similar characteristics with the total
sample of ‘Home-country Marriage’ immigrants, showing 47% of females and 15% of males do not
work. Among the 15,007 labour market participants, 61% are male and 39% are female.
13 Linking spousal birthplace information within the sample results in the same number of male and
female immigrants in ‘Home-country Marriage’ couples. ‘Foreign Marriage’ couples are composed of
49% male and 51% female while ‘Native Marriage’ couples are composed of 40% male and 60% female.
14 Sources of income-wage include wages, salaries, commissions, cash bonuses, tips, and other money
income received from an employer; payments-in-kind or reimbursements for business expenses are
excluded.
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Table 2 Number of immigrants by marriage type
Birth place (ACS) Female immigrants Male immigrants
All married Home-country
marriage
Native marriage Foreign
marriage
All married Home-country
marriage
Native marriage Foreign
marriage
Australia 140 26 87 27 131 26 88 17
Bangladesh 252 232 6 14 262 232 13 17
Brazil 610 343 202 65 448 343 71 34
Bulgaria 116 92 15 9 111 92 9 10
Canada 1308 465 726 117 1131 465 560 106
Chile 127 55 45 27 122 55 39 28
China 2747 2251 259 237 2494 2251 27 216
Colombia 931 542 254 135 745 542 125 78
Dominican Republic 575 399 101 75 506 399 77 30
Ecuador 411 288 73 50 389 288 45 56
Egypt/United Arab Rep. 209 183 10 16 290 183 63 44
El Salvador 1010 729 91 190 975 729 80 166
France 221 71 109 41 216 71 102 43
Germany 843 122 641 80 461 122 231 108
Guatemala 604 431 61 112 632 431 69 132
Guyana/British Guiana 334 280 31 23 325 280 26 19
Honduras 362 204 70 88 325 204 53 68
India 3529 3300 110 119 3653 3300 167 186
Indonesia 181 89 68 24 129 89 12 28
Iran 489 408 47 34 574 408 111 55
Ireland 184 63 96 25 213 63 130 20
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Table 2 (continued)
Birth place (ACS) Female immigrants Male immigrants
All married Home-country
marriage
Native marriage Foreign
marriage
All married Home-country
marriage
Native marriage Foreign
marriage
Israel/Palestine 215 117 69 29 282 117 111 54
Italy 233 104 104 25 320 104 169 47
Japan 870 356 446 68 461 356 74 31
Korea 1878 1307 523 48 1374 1307 33 34
Malaysia 146 59 54 33 113 59 8 46
Mexico 11,147 9386 1457 304 11,436 9386 1744 306
Netherlands 128 38 71 19 137 38 67 32
Pakistan 462 404 10 48 529 404 71 54
Panama 172 36 114 22 96 36 42 18
Peru 547 321 160 66 483 321 83 79
Philippines 3686 2339 1217 130 2509 2339 121 49
Poland 742 574 115 53 663 574 60 29
Portugal 181 141 22 18 217 141 48 28
Romania 284 219 52 13 269 219 28 22
South Africa (Union of) 190 116 48 26 213 116 77 20
Spain 142 30 88 24 112 30 56 26
Thailand 376 121 217 38 156 121 12 23
Trinidad &Tobago 257 165 53 39 238 165 46 27
Turkey 145 99 35 11 187 99 60 28
United Kingdom 1113 371 611 131 1258 371 721 166
Venezuela 301 151 92 58 248 151 57 40
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Table 3 Number of labour market participants
Birth place (ACS) Female immigrants Male immigrants
All married Home-country
marriage
Native marriage Foreign
marriage
All married Home-country
marriage
Native marriage Foreign
marriage
Australia 93 17 60 16 111 24 74 13
Bangladesh 111 103 3 5 230 202 13 15
Brazil 334 167 130 37 361 279 57 25
Bulgaria 88 69 11 8 98 81 7 10
Canada 761 222 475 64 941 375 474 92
Chile 70 25 30 15 102 42 36 24
China 1940 1593 178 169 2081 1895 19 167
Colombia 583 337 167 79 647 466 115 66
Dominican Republic 359 258 58 43 419 327 65 27
Ecuador 236 151 54 31 322 241 38 43
Egypt/United Arab Rep. 115 101 9 5 236 145 52 39
El Salvador 618 454 55 109 838 623 67 148
France 124 34 68 22 189 63 87 39
Germany 518 58 416 44 396 105 200 91
Guatemala 306 207 42 57 539 370 58 111
Guyana/British Guiana 239 199 24 16 282 244 20 18
Honduras 208 110 46 52 279 178 42 59
India 2118 1962 78 78 3313 3001 149 163
Indonesia 107 49 44 14 110 76 10 24
Iran 283 230 35 18 440 304 94 42
Ireland 113 32 67 14 172 53 103 16
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Table 3 (continued)
Birth place (ACS) Female immigrants Male immigrants
All married Home-country
marriage
Native marriage Foreign
marriage
All married Home-country
marriage
Native marriage Foreign
marriage
Israel/Palestine 115 53 46 16 229 97 89 43
Italy 125 54 57 14 243 73 135 35
Japan 360 91 230 39 398 314 63 21
Korea 932 644 260 28 967 914 28 25
Malaysia 97 40 38 19 100 50 8 42
Mexico 5025 4126 749 150 9810 8112 1452 246
Netherlands 73 18 44 11 118 33 57 28
Pakistan 205 165 9 31 465 356 63 46
Panama 116 24 77 15 79 28 34 17
Peru 348 204 110 34 421 279 75 67
Philippines 2893 1914 885 94 2124 1971 110 43
Poland 427 335 66 26 561 492 46 23
Portugal 98 77 13 8 166 103 40 23
Romania 182 143 33 6 222 178 25 19
South Africa (Union of) 118 73 34 11 181 98 66 17
Spain 83 15 56 12 97 28 49 20
Thailand 223 78 118 27 122 93 11 18
Trinidad &Tobago 171 105 36 30 199 139 39 21
Turkey 91 56 28 7 156 79 51 26
United Kingdom 650 188 382 80 1062 313 606 143
Venezuela 169 74 63 32 221 133 52 36
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Table 4 Labour force participation and unemployment of married immigrants
Source: author calculation
aTotal numbers are the column sums from Table 2
bTotal numbers are the column sums from Table 3
cUnemployment Rate is calculated as the ratio between labour market participants and labour force participants
Number of immigrants Female immigrants Male immigrants
All married Homecountry
marriage
Native marriage Foreign marriage All married Homecountry
marriage
Native marriage Foreign marriage

Total number of immigrantsa 38,398
Number of labour market participantsb 21,825
Number of labour force participants
Unemployment ratec (%)
Labour market participation rate (%)
Labour force participation rate (%)
22,024
0.9
56.8
57.4

27,027 8660 2711 35,433 27,027 5786 2620
14,855 5384 1586 30,047 22,977 4879 2191
14,934 5428 1662 31,404 23,874 5187 2343
0.5 0.8 4.6 4.3 3.8 5.9 6.5
55.0 62.2 58.5 84.8 85.0 84.3 83.6
55.3 62.7 61.3 88.6 88.3 89.6 89.4
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‘Home-country Marriage’ immigrant women did not work (this is the lowest labour
market participation among all family types), while 38% of ‘Native Marriage’ immigrant women and 41% of ‘Foreign Marriage’ immigrant women do not work. Further restricting the sample only to those who work results in more male immigrants
being included relative to female immigrants in the analysis. Among the 37,832
‘Home-country Marriage’ immigrants who earn positive income, 39% of the female
and 69% of the male immigrants work.15
While the labour market participation rates are in somewhat similar ranges
across all family types for each gender, the unemployment rate (defned as the ratio
between labour market participants and labour force participants) varies across family types. The highest unemployment rate for female married immigrants is 4.6%
for ‘Foreign Marriage’ women, while women in other family types show a less than
1% unemployment rate. The unemployment rates for married male immigrants are
higher than female groups in general, showing the highest for ‘Foreign Marriage’
at 6.5%, versus 5.9% and 3.8% for ‘Native Marriage’ and ‘Home-country Marriage’
respectively (See Table 4). The ‘Foreign Marriage’ group shows the highest unemployment rate for both women and men. This could be a result of smaller job search
network opportunities through connections to other immigrants from the same
home-country or natives in the host nation, relative to the other marriage types.
The basic characteristics of women and men in the sample of each group are similar across most measures, except that the age gap between women and men is the
largest for the ‘Foreign Marriage’ group. Compared to other groups, ‘Home-country
Marriage’ immigrants migrated at a relatively younger age. About 66% of female
and 68% of male ‘Home-country Marriage’ immigrants migrated after the age of
25. The average age for female and male ‘Home-country Marriage’ immigrants are
43 and 46, while the mean age of migration for women and men for the ‘Homecountry Marriage’ group are only slightly diferent at 29 and 30, respectively. For
‘Foreign Marriage’, the average ages of women and men are 44 and 47, while the
mean age of migration for women and men are 28 and 29 respectively; about 62%
of both ‘Foreign Marriage’ immigrant women and men migrated after the age of 25.
The average ages and age of migration for ‘Native Marriage’ are 44 and 27 for both
women and men, showing no diference by gender; about 56% and 52% of ‘Native
Marriage’ women and men migrated after the age of 25, respectively.
The average year of migration for ‘Home-country Marriage’ immigrant women
and men was 1992 and 1990 respectively. About 85% of immigrants in the sample
arrived after 1980, with the majority of both married men (55%) and women (63%)
arriving after 1990. Only 3% of the sample migrated before 1970 and 12% of the
sample arrived between 1970 and 1979. The immigrant cohort who migrated during
the 1990s is the largest at 38% of the sample, followed by the 1980 cohort at 25% of
the sample. The immigrant cohort who migrated between 2000 and 2006 is 23% of
15 About 35% of women and 38% of men in ‘Home-country Marriage’ couples have a bachelor’s degree
or higher education and about 49% of women and men have more than a high school education. For
labour market participants, 41% of women and 40% of men in ‘Home-country Marriage’ couples have a
bachelor’s degree or higher education.
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the sample. 84% of ‘Home-country Marriage’ women and men in the sample arrived
after 1980, with the majority of both women (67%) and men (56%) arriving after
1990. Only 2.8% of male and 1.5% of female ‘Home-country Marriage’ immigrants
are from the pre-1970 cohort. Similarly, 87% and 80% of ‘Foreign Marriage’ women
and men arrived after 1980, with the majority of both women (60%) and men (50%)
arriving after 1990. Only 3% of female and 6% of male ‘Foreign Marriage’ immigrants are in the pre-1970 cohort. 76% of ‘Native Marriage’ immigrants arrived
after 1980 with only 6% of these female and 5% of these male immigrants being in
the pre-1970 cohort. The post-1990 arrival dates of the majority of the sample also
support using the GEM index based on 1999 in this study.
Empirical process
The small labour force participation rate of all married women, in contrast to the
consistently high labour force participation rate for married men across all family
types, suggests a possible selection bias regarding labour market participation of
married immigrant women. If the sample of female workers consists only of women
who choose and are able to work in the host country, these women may difer in
important unmeasured ways from women who do not work. In addition, the lowest labour force participation rate being ‘Home-country Marriage’ women, coupled
with a higher likelihood for women being tied movers than men, suggests possible
selection bias into labour force participation for ‘Home-country Marriage’ women.
Therefore, this study analyses the labour force participation as well as earnings of
immigrants, in order to examine the labour market participation decision of married
women in addition to earning capability.
The paper frst provides the results of Logit regressions examining the labour
force participation of immigrants and next Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions examining labour market success of immigrant workers by diferent family
types. Regarding ‘Foreign Marriage’ couples, which are composed of immigrants
from two diferent home-countries, models which diferentiate between the husband’s and wife’s cultural gender norms were also estimated. To further analyse the
diferential efect of gender status in the home-country by gender, separate regressions are estimated for female and male immigrants.
Logit model (labour force participation)
The Logit model for labour force participation is illustrated in Eq. (1), where the
dependent variable, LFP,16 is a binary variable denoting whether immigrants are
participating in the labour force (= 1) or not (= 0) based on their ACS survey answer.
16 Through the remainder of the paper, italicised terms represent the variables’ names as presented in the
table.
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The model includes three types of independent variables: the GEM for each
country of origin, variables for observable personal characteristics and size of the
immigrant population from the same home-country. The home-country gender index
variable, GEM, is utilised to capture the infuences of immigrants’ beliefs and attitudes regarding gender status they obtained while growing up in their home countries. These beliefs and attitudes could change as the immigrants’ tenure in the
U.S. increases. As they live longer in the U.S., the GEM efect on log wages may
decrease as immigrants assimilate and adopt the culture of the host country. Therefore, the model includes the GEM with an interaction term between years in the U.S.
and the GEM, YrusGEM, to consider the possibility of a diferential GEM efect
with the passage of time. In addition, for ‘Foreign Marriage’ couples, the gender
norms of the spouse’s home country could be relevant. When examining Foreign
Marriage couple couples, Spouse_GEM is also included.
Age and Yrus denote the age of an individual and years for which an individual
has stayed in the U.S. since migration. EDU, English, Region, and Race are categorical dummy variables for education, language, the region of residence, and ethnicity
respectively. English denotes whether the individual can speak English fuently or
not.17 The education variable, EDU, includes 8 categories according to the level of
education; individuals who are educated less than 8 years (Under8th_grade), some
high school education (Some_Highschool), high school degree (reference group),
some college education (Some_college), associate degree (Associate_degree),
bachelor’s degree (BA), master degree (MS), and Ph.D. degree and over (Pro_doctor_degree). Region includes 4 categorical regions in the U.S.: East (East), West
(reference group), Middle-West (MWest), and South (South).18 Race includes 6 categories for immigrants’ racial status: White-non Hispanic (Whnh), Black-non Hispanic (Blnh), American Indian/Alaska Native-non Hispanic (AIANnh), Asian and
(1)
LFP = 훾0 + 훾1Age + 훾2Age2 + 훾3Yrus + 훾4Yrus2 + 훾5GEM
+ 훾6YrusGEM + 훾7Yrus2GEM + 훾8EDU
+ 훾9English + 훾10Region + 훾11Race + 훾12Immigshare
+ 훾13S_income + 훾14Number_child_under5 + ui
17 Immigrants responding to the fuency question on the ACS survey who state they “speak English
only”, “speak English very well”, and “speak English well” are classifed as “speaking English Fluently”
while those who respond to the same question by selecting “does not speak English” or “not well” are
denoted as “speaking English Non-fuently”.
18 Numerous ACS categories for region and race were combined in this analysis into larger divisions:
The ACS regional category of New England Division and Middle Atlantic Division to the “East”; East
North Central Division and West North Central Division were combined and classifed as the “Middle
West”; Mountain Division and Pacifc Division were coupled to form the “West”; and South Atlantic,
East South Central, and West South Central Division are incorporated in the “South”.
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Pacifc Islander-non Hispanic (AsianPInh), other-non Hispanic (Othernh), and Hispanic (reference group).19 Immigshare refects the percentage of immigrants from
the same home-country in a region, which is included to control for network efects
in the labour market (such as job search opportunities through immigrants from the
same home-country). The labour force participation model includes two additional
variables “S_income” and “Number_child_under5”. S_income denotes spouses’
income and Number_child_under5 denotes the number of young children an immigrant has under the age of 5.
OLS model (earnings of immigrants)
The model for the earning equation is illustrated in Eq. (2) where log wage, lnW, is
the dependent variable.20
The model for earnings includes all of the same wage determining factors from
Eq. (1), except “S_income” and “Number_child_under5”, which are excluded
because they mainly afect labour force participation but not earning capacity.21 In
addition, another independent variable (Lnwkhr) refecting working hours of immigrants is included. Lnwkhr denotes logged annual working hours last year. Annual
working hours are calculated by multiplying ‘usual worked hours per week last
year’ by ‘weeks worked last year’, based on the survey answers. Including working
hours (Lnwkhr) in an earning equation allows a clear interpretation of the results by
controlling diferent earning potential caused by diferent working hours. According to the family investment model, female tied movers are more likely to have a
higher earning potential during the early years after migration since they will work
more to fnance their husband’s human capital investment in host-country skills. If
a wage equation does not include labour supply for migrants, the inference of more
earning caused by better jobs with better wages may be misleading; in this case,
(2)
lnW = 훽0 + 훽1Age + 훽2Age2 + 훽3Yrus + 훽4Yrus2 + 훽5GEM
+ 훽6YrusGEM + 훽7Yrus2GEM + 훽8lnwkhr
+ 훽9EDU + 훽10English + 훽11Region
+ 훽12Race + 훽13Immigshare + 휀i
20 Wage is the earned wage and salary income of each individual.
21 Considering the infuence of assortative marriage on earnings, spousal income and the number
of children under 5 are tested in the earning equation, both together and separately. Although spousal
income shows almost zero infuence on both labour market participation as well as earnings, the number
of children shows a positive signifcant infuence on earnings across all immigrant men. However, the
main results of the paper are not changed much.
19 For the race category, information for “Hispanic” and “Single race identifcation” are combined
because a single race category in the 2006 ACS survey does not provide Hispanic information and the
portion of Hispanic among immigrants is large: 42% of female immigrants and 55% of male immigrants
classify themselves as Hispanic. People who did identify themselves as Hispanic in the sample are classifed as Hispanic no matter how they respond to the “race” question.
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the explanatory variables’ efects of interest on the earning capacity of immigrants
become unclear.22
The models presented in Eqs. (1) and (2) and accompanying results were fnalised after alternative specifcations and robustness checks were tested. The results of
these alternative specifcations and robustness checks are discussed at the end of the
results section.
Results
Regression results on labour force participation of immigrants
Table 5 presents odds ratios for Logit models described by Eq. (1). Overall, the signs
of the odds ratios for control variables for the Logit models follow expectations for
‘Home-country Marriage’ immigrants, and are statistically signifcant at the 1%
level for labour force participation. This does not hold for ‘Native Marriage’ and
‘Foreign Marriage’ couples. Race and region show no statistical signifcance for the
labour force participation of ‘Native Marriage’ and ‘Foreign Marriage’ men. More
education increases the likelihood of labour force participation for all immigrant
women but not much for men. Immigshare shows a slight negative impact on labour
force participation of ‘Home-country Marriage’ women and ‘Foreign Marriage’
women, but not men. As expected, the number of children under age 5 reduces the
likelihood of being in the labour force for all married women, but not men. In fact,
having young children slightly raises the likelihood of being in the labour force for
‘Native Marriage’ men. The contrasting impact of a young child on labour force
participation by gender, coupled with no GEM impact or signifcant impact of other
variables on labour force participation of married men, clearly demonstrates men’s
roles as breadwinners within families.
The frst row in Table 5 provides comparisons of the GEM efects on labour
force participation across all family types. The GEM has a statistically signifcant
impact on labour force participation for both ‘Home-country Marriage’ and ‘Native
Marriage’ women, but not for men.23 ‘Home-country Marriage’ women are most
strongly infuenced by the GEM, indicating that a unit change in the GEM increases
the likelihood of women’s labour force participation 11 times more at the time of
arrival in the U.S. Intuitively, an increase of one standard deviation in GEM24 yields
a 34% increase in the odds of being in the labour force for ‘Home-country Marriage’
22 An alternative dependent variable, imputed hourly wages, instead of annual salary-wages, is also
tested across all regressions. All regression results using imputed wages are the same as the main results.
In addition, considering the possibility of endogeneity of wages with respect to hours worked, wage
equations without working hours are tested as a robustness check. All regression results without working
hours are similar to the main results quantitatively and qualitatively.
23 The GEM shows strong signifcant efects on the selection equation and wage equation for all women
in the Heckman two-stage model, implying OLS results might be biased due to selection bias on labour
market participation for women, but not for men.
24 The standard deviation of the GEM is 0.121067.
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Table 5 Labour force participation logit regression results
Independent
variables
Female immigrants Male immigrants
Home-country marriage Native marriage Foreign marriage Home-country marriage
Native marriage Foreign marriage
Odds ratio Robust S.E Odds ratio Robust S.E Odds ratio Robust S.E Odds ratio Robust S.E Odds ratio Robust S.E Odds ratio Robust S.E
GEM 11.1581*** 3.2345 3.0192** 1.6863 1.5634 1.4701 1.9097 0.8630 0.6818 0.7043 0.0269** 0.0415
YrusGEM 0.8490*** 0.0357 0.9534 0.0610 1.0046 0.1260 0.8596** 0.0501 1.0921 0.1234 1.7085** 0.2923
Yrus2GEM 1.0033** 0.0012 1.0006 0.0015 1.0008 0.0034 1.0024 0.0015 0.9982 0.0026 0.9869*** 0.0039
Age 1.1586*** 0.0152 1.1269*** 0.0272 1.0303 0.0425 1.2178*** 0.0230 1.2653*** 0.0528 1.2683*** 0.0835
Age2 0.9982*** 0.0001 0.9983*** 0.0003 0.9993 0.0005 0.9973*** 0.0002 0.9969*** 0.0005 0.9968*** 0.0007
Yrus 1.1936*** 0.0241 1.1180** 0.0396 1.1141 0.0731 1.1723*** 0.0329 1.0539 0.0665 0.8466* 0.0776
Yrus2 0.9963*** 0.0006 0.9980** 0.0009 0.9974 0.0018 0.9968*** 0.0007 0.9990 0.0015 1.0045** 0.0021
English 1.5174*** 0.0522 1.6359*** 0.1478 1.4250** 0.1684 1.0667 0.0570 1.0932 0.1647 1.0324 0.2021
Under8th_
grade
0.7583*** 0.0327 0.6614*** 0.0692 0.9279 0.1493 0.7956*** 0.0544 0.7045** 0.1115 0.9598 0.2328
Some_Highschool
0.8416*** 0.0424 0.7270*** 0.0703 0.8779 0.1500 0.7414*** 0.0595 0.8470 0.1444 1.1393 0.3118
Some_college 1.1011*** 0.0598 1.2383** 0.0908 1.2106 0.1742 0.9385 0.0770 1.0591 0.1575 1.2903 0.3102
Associate_
degree
1.2484*** 0.0809 1.3796*** 0.1214 1.5257** 0.2739 0.9298 0.0992 1.3613 0.3111 1.0351 0.3047
BA 1.3558*** 0.0620 1.8954*** 0.1371 1.5591*** 0.2134 1.1389* 0.0814 1.7776*** 0.2890 1.3379 0.2897
MS 2.0259*** 0.1212 2.3418*** 0.2384 2.0974*** 0.3562 1.7200*** 0.1574 1.4715** 0.2587 3.9146*** 1.2879
Pro_doctor_degree
3.0072*** 0.2461 3.3705*** 0.4836 3.1757*** 0.7128 2.2565*** 0.2410 2.3312*** 0.5358 1.8451** 0.5310
East 0.9940 0.0397 1.1060 0.0829 1.0189 0.1182 0.9734 0.0573 0.8810 0.1165 1.1354 0.2102
MWest 0.9405 0.0442 1.1155 0.0915 0.9376 0.1693 1.0990 0.0818 1.2571 0.2113 1.1634 0.3532
South 0.8467*** 0.0288 0.8500** 0.0491 0.9815 0.1053 1.0225 0.0539 1.1605 0.1334 0.8546 0.1360
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Table 5 (continued)
Independent
variables
Female immigrants Male immigrants
Home-country marriage Native marriage Foreign marriage Home-country marriage
Native marriage Foreign marriage
Odds ratio Robust S.E Odds ratio Robust S.E Odds ratio Robust S.E Odds ratio Robust S.E Odds ratio Robust S.E Odds ratio Robust S.E
Whnh 0.8276*** 0.0411 0.9867 0.0744 0.7070** 0.0879 0.7142*** 0.0535 1.0220 0.1340 1.3204 0.2628
Blnh 1.4330** 0.2099 1.4059 0.3290 1.7984** 0.5099 1.3066 0.3033 0.8815 0.3212 1.1108 0.6002
AIANnh 2.7910** 1.1948 0.5590 0.3621 0.7341 0.9671 0.2036*** 0.0865 1.0000 (omitted) 1.0000 (omitted)
AsianPInh 1.1869*** 0.0513 0.9736 0.0673 1.0200 0.1217 0.5882*** 0.0393 1.0198 0.2069 1.0227 0.2019
Othernh 0.9722 0.1372 1.3346 0.3897 0.8077 0.3711 0.7507 0.1580 1.0586 0.5804 0.8366 0.5388
Immigshare 0.9244*** 0.0085 0.9756 0.0201 0.9078** 0.0308 1.0108 0.0144 0.9610 0.0323 1.1043 0.0757
S_income 1.0000*** 0.0000 1.0000*** 0.0000 1.0000*** 0.0000 1.0000** 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000
Number_child_
under5
0.5855*** 0.0163 0.5154*** 0.0243 0.5067*** 0.0434 1.0503 0.0517 1.1914* 0.1212 1.0762 0.1830
Constant 0.0128*** 0.0038 0.0608*** 0.0340 0.4949 0.4906 0.1762*** 0.0833 0.0746** 0.0733 0.3846 0.6491
Pseudo R2 0.0858 0.0829 0.0710 0.0940 0.0925 0.1161
Obervation 27,027 8660 2711 27,027 5779 2619
Dependent variable: a binary variable denoting labor force participation
Reference category for statistical signifcance. *p <0.10; **p <0.05; ***p <0.01
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women and a 14% increase in the odds of being in the labour force for ‘Native Marriage’ women.25
These results show that GEM also has a signifcant efect on labour force participation for ‘Foreign Marriage’ men but not ‘Foreign Marriage’ women. The GEM
shows a slight negative efect on ‘Foreign Marriage’ men’s labour force participation, indicating that an increase of one standard deviation in GEM causes ‘Foreign
Marriage’ men to be 0.65 times less likely to be in the labour force. However, when
both spouses’ home-country GEMs are controlled, even this small GEM efect on
‘Foreign Marriage’ men disappears (See Table 6). Diferent from the impact on
earnings, none of the home-country gender statuses for either wives or husbands
afects the labour force participation of ‘Foreign Marriage’ couples.
Regression results on earnings of immigrants
Table 7 presents regression results for the OLS model described in Eq. (2). Overall, the signs of the control variables’ coefcients are similar across the diferent
model specifcations, with either GEM or the interaction terms between years in
U.S. and the GEM being signifcant. All of the parameter signs measuring the interaction of the GEM and years since migration are of the opposite sign of the GEM,
indicating that years in the U.S. reduces the infuence of home-country characteristics. Education positively afects wages of both women and men, with an increasing
rate of wage growth for additional categories of education beyond the base group
(high school education). Most variables for race and region are statistically signifcant at the 1% level, showing non-Hispanic immigrants generally earn more than
the Hispanic group and immigrants in the West earn the most. Among all other race
categories, White-non Hispanic earn the most across all male immigrant groups;
Asian and Pacifc Islander-non Hispanic and American Indian/Alaska Native-non
Hispanic earn the highest income for ‘Home-country Marriage’ and ‘Foreign Marriage’ women respectively, while for ‘Native Marriage’ women, other non-Hispanics
earn the most. The larger the share of immigrants from the same home-country in a
region, the more negative the impact on the earnings of ‘Home-country Marriage’
immigrants for both women and men, but there is no efect on either ‘Native Marriage’ or ‘Foreign Marriage’ immigrants.
Focusing on GEM efects, the frst row in Table 7 shows the earnings of married
immigrants who participate in the labour market across diferent family types. The GEM
efect on earnings is greater for women than men for both ‘Home-country Marriage’
and ‘Native Marriage’ families. For example, an increase of one standard deviation in
GEM raises wages of ‘Home-country Marriage’ and ‘Native Marriage’ women when
they arrive in the U.S. on average 8.0% and 12.2% respectively. Meanwhile, an increase
of one standard deviation in GEM raises wages of ‘Home-country Marriage’ and ‘Native
25 A standard deviation factor change is calculated as follows: Exponent (Log Odds Ratio × S.D. of
GEM).
Thus, the likelihood of being in the labour force increases 1.34 times [Exp (2.41217 ×
0.121067)= 1.34] for ‘Home-country Marriage’ women and 1.14 times [Exp (1.10499 ×
0.121067)=1.14] for ‘Native Marriage’ women at the time of arrival.
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Table 6 Labour force participation of ‘foreign marriage’ immigrants logit regression results (spousal GEM included)
Dependent variable: a binary variable denoting labour force participation
All models include all other independent variables in Eq. (2)
Reference category for statistical signifcance. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p< 0.01
Labour force participation
(logit model)
Female immigrants Male immigrants
Model without interactions Model with interactions Model without interactions Model with interactions
Independent variable Odds ratio (Robust S.E) Odds ratio (Robust S.E) Odds ratio (Robust S.E) Odds ratio (Robust S.E)
GEM 1.4002 (0.6341) 1.4452 (1.5335) 1.6070 (1.1591) 0.0692 (0.1212)
Spouse_GEM 1.0882 (0.4140) 1.5710 (0.7328) 0.5019 (0.3113) 0.3065 (0.2408)
YrusGEM 0.9148 (0.1312) 1.5888** (0.3092)
Yrus2GEM 1.0040 (0.0039) 0.9889** (0.0045)
Yrus Spouse_GEM 0.9616 (0.0383) 1.1093* (0.0645)
Yrus2 Spouse_GEM 1.0005 (0.0010) 0.9973* (0.0015)
Pseudo R2 0.0733 0.0753 0.1104 0.1183
Observation 2161 2161 2092 2092
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Table 7 Earnings of married immigrants OLS results (labour market participants only)
Independent
variables
Female immigrants Male immigrants
Home-country marriage
Native marriage Foreign marriage Home-country Marriage Native marriage Foreign marriage
Coefcient Robust
S.E
Coefcient Robust
S.E
Coefcient Robust
S.E
Coefcient Robust
S.E
Coefcient Robust
S.E
Coefcient Robust
S.E
GEM 0.6325*** 0.1559

0.9599***
– 0.0757**
0.0013**
0.0113
-0.0002
0.0722***
0.2353
0.0254
0.0006
0.0106
0.0001
0.0146
-0.0012*** 0.0004
0.9788***
0.1898***
– 0.1238**
0.0180
0.0436
0.0482

0.2490 0.4985

0.4496***
-0.0422**
0.0010*
0.0251***
0.1291
0.0184
0.0005
0.0045
-0.0003*** 0.0000
0.0368***
-0.0006**
0.7597***
0.2398***
0.0086
0.0002
0.0199
0.0111
0.5284**
-0.0027
-0.0004
0.0485***
0.2400
0.0281
0.0007
0.0105
-0.0005*** 0.0001
0.0207 0.0159
0.8479**
-0.0418
0.0007
0.3596
0.0475
0.0013

YrusGEM – 0.0065 0.0212

0.0414
-0.0018
0.0631
0.0016

Yrus2GEM – 0.0002 0.0006 Age 0.0033 0.0056

0.0355* 0.0187
-0.0004** 0.0002
– 0.0012
0.0007
0.0333
0.0009
0.0497** 0.0162
-0.0005** 0.0002
0.0339
-0.0006
0.0239
0.0006
0.8697*** 0.0576
0.2597*** 0.0404
-0.0493 0.0512

Age2 – 0.0001 0.0001 Yrus 0.0210** 0.0102 Yrus2 0.0000 0.0003

0.0000
0.8921***
0.2380***
0.0004
0.0333
0.0336

Lnwkhr 0.9303*** 0.0105 0.8650*** 0.0306 English 0.2122*** 0.0143 0.3166*** 0.0511 Under8th_
grade
– 0.0725*** 0.0173 – 0.1375** 0.0702 – 0.0578*** 0.0134 -0.1877*** 0.0371 Some_Highschool
– 0.0445** 0.0202 – 0.0791* 0.0429 – 0.0638 0.0661 0.0010 0.0158 -0.0809** 0.0349 -0.0684 0.0546
Some_college
0.1221*** 0.0216 0.1506*** 0.0294 0.1581** 0.0618 0.1076*** 0.0180 0.0673** 0.0338 0.2881*** 0.0553
Associate_
degree
0.2098*** 0.0263 0.2302*** 0.0348 0.1508** 0.0692 0.1940*** 0.0243 0.0805* 0.0462 0.2552*** 0.0736
BA 0.4397*** 0.0184 0.4853*** 0.0279 0.4228*** 0.0589 0.4918*** 0.0171 0.3926*** 0.0330 0.5236*** 0.0507
MS 0.6504*** 0.0229 0.6883*** 0.0357 0.5899*** 0.0693 0.7610*** 0.0194 0.5994*** 0.0372 0.8340*** 0.0580
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Dependent variable: log wages
Reference category for statistical signifcance. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p< 0.01
Table 7 (continued)
Independent
variables
Female immigrants Male immigrants
Home-country marriage
Native marriage Foreign marriage Home-country Marriage Native marriage Foreign marriage
Coefcient Robust
S.E
Coefcient Robust
S.E
Coefcient Robust
S.E
Coefcient Robust
S.E
Coefcient Robust
S.E
Coefcient Robust
S.E
Pro_doctor_
degree
0.7944*** 0.0300 0.8349*** 0.0449 0.8278*** 0.0884 0.8621*** 0.0217 0.7780*** 0.0443 0.7484*** 0.0651

East – 0.0153
MWest – 0.0871***
South – 0.1010***
Whnh 0.2436***
Blnh 0.1791***
AIANnh 0.1743
AsianPInh 0.3179***
Othernh 0.2726***
Immigshare – 0.0256***
Constant 2.1399***
R2 0.6866

0.0159

0.0534* 0.0297
– 0.1144*** 0.0315
– 0.1194*** 0.0232
0.1166***
0.0800
0.0283
0.0898

-0.0356 0.0479

-0.0359** 0.0139
-0.0577*** 0.0153
-0.0892*** 0.0113
0.4087***
0.1244**
0.3292***
0.1463***
0.1527***
0.0179
0.0442
0.0921
0.0150
0.0464
-0.0105*** 0.0027
3.3621***
0.4923
22,977
0.1760
-0.0049 0.0314
-0.1108*** 0.0318
-0.1577*** 0.0247
0.2317***
0.0344
-0.3834
0.2235***
0.0279
0.0816
0.3536
0.0424

-0.0332 0.0387
0.0187 0.0114 0.0827 0.0077 0.0598
0.0143 -0.0845* 0.0454 -0.0732* 0.0392
0.0205 0.1822*** 0.0524 0.2941*** 0.0433
0.0524 0.2261** 0.0992 0.0216 0.0912
0.1092

0.3167
0.0829**
0.2555**
– 0.0076
1.3737***
0.6703
5384
0.3273
0.0275
0.1053
0.0087
0.2702

1.6619*** 0.1208 0.0000 omitted
0.0169 0.2359*** 0.0473 0.1213** 0.0457
0.0570 -0.2459 0.2126

0.0006
-0.0005
1.8211***
0.5018
4879
0.1020
0.0070
0.3177

-0.0802 0.2700
0.0036 0.0085 0.0138 -0.0114 0.0112
0.1501 2.0848*** 0.5389 1.7369*** 0.5346
0.6307 0.4903
Observation 14,855 1586 2191
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Table 8 Earnings of ‘foreign marriage’ immigrants OLS results (spousal GEM included)
Dependent variable: log wages
All models include all other independent variables as Eq. (1). All models consider labour market participants only
Reference category for statistical signifcance. *p <0.10; **p <0.05; ***p < 0.01
Earnings (OLS model) Female immigrants Male immigrants
Model without interactions Model with interactions Model without interactions Model with interactions
Independent variable Coefcient (Robust S.E) Coefcient (Robust S.E) Coefcient (Robust S.E) Coefcient (Robust S.E)
GEM 0.3169 (0.2229) 0.1539 (0.5309) 0.4280** (0.1656) 0.8136** (0.4048)
Spouse_GEM 0.3423** (0.1655) 0.4793** (0.2145) 0.4329** (0.1654) 0.3234 (0.1976)
YrusGEM 0.0495 (0.0682) – 0.0412 (0.0531)
Yrus2GEM – 0.0018 (0.0017) 0.0008 (0.0014)
Yrus Spouse_GEM – 0.0047 (0.0175) 0.0153 (0.0153)
Yrus2 Spouse_GEM – 0.0002 (0.0004) – 0.0003 (0.0005)
R-squared 0.6458 0.6483 0.4959 0.4967
Observation 1239 1239 1753 1753
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Marriage’ men at the time of arrival on average about 5.7% and 6.6% respectively. While
the GEM does not afect wages of ‘Foreign Marriage’ women, it is associated with a
strong positive efect on the wages of ‘Foreign Marriage’ men, showing that an increase
of one standard deviation in GEM raises wages on average 10.7% at their time of arrival.
Table 8 provides regression results, which include both spouses’ home-country
GEM for ‘Foreign Marriage’ immigrants. Interestingly, the results show a diferential infuence depending on the gender of immigrants. The earnings of wives are
infuenced not by their own home-country gender norms but by their husbands’
home-country gender norms. Husbands, on the other hand, are infuenced by their
own home-country gender norms rather than their wives’ gender norms. This
implies that husbands’ gender norms are more infuential than wives’ gender norms
when two spouses have diferent cultural backgrounds within the family.26
Robustness checks and alternative specifcations
A variety of alternative specifcations and robustness checks were run, including models with and without interactions between years in the U.S. and GEM, as
well as with an alternative gender related variable: the Gender Development Index
(GDI).27 Other models were also run which included adding several dummy variables for eliminating selection bias for migrants relative to non-migrants,28 cohort
diferences over time, and heterogeneity of gender inequality within a country,29 as
well as reducing possible correlation between omitted country-specifc factors and
GEM.30 In addition, all regressions were repeated on subsamples of data to check the
26 This is similar to fndings on work behaviour of second generation American women in Fernández
and Fogli (2009) in that the impact of husbands’ culture is more signifcant than that of wives’.
27 The Gender Development Index (GDI) measures the conditions in a country necessary to provide
individuals with the opportunity to develop their ‘basic capabilities’, to pursue their goals and achieve
well-being in terms of standard of living. It also includes three components to measure standard of living
in health, education, and economic resources. It incorporates the longevity of women and men, the adult
literacy rate and the combined primary, secondary and tertiary enrolment ratios of women and men, and
estimated earned income for women and men based on GDP in a nation. The regressions with the GDI
and the interaction between years in the U.S. and GDI, as well as regressions including both GDI and
GEM and their interactions with years in the U.S. are tested. Replacing GEM, GDI shows qualitatively
similar results but with much more pronounced impact on men’s outcome and no signifcant impact on
women’s labour force participation, demonstrating the GEM is a better measurement for gender inequality. When both indices are controlled together, the signifcance of GDI decreases across all models,
refecting the fact that part of GEM subsumes GDI’s impact. The signifcance of GEM on both earnings
and labour force participation on women did not change.
28 Utilising the Barro-Lee World Educational Attainment Dataset (2000), a binary dummy variable
which indicates whether immigrants are more or less educated than the average school years of their corresponding home-country population is created.
29 Models including the interaction between GEM and educational level are tested in an attempt to transform GEM into a within-country efect.
30 Huh (2017) demonstrates that all immigrant workers from 42 countries are more educated than their
home-country population counterparts and low GEM leads to more positive selection of immigrant
women. Positive (Negative) selection occurs when immigrants have attributes which help (or hinder)
labour market success more than those who remained in their home-country. Findings in Huh (2017)
reinforce the results of this study since those results would make it more likely to underestimate the positive GEM efects on earnings of immigrant women.
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robustness of the results. These subsamples include ‘Home-country Marriage’ couples where spouses moved simultaneously31 and the segment of the data set which
excludes either Mexican or Filipino immigrants (which comprise a large portion of
the sample) in order to check the sensitivity of the results to these groups. Moreover,
to consider the selection bias into the labour market of married women, the Heckman two-stage model for all samples was estimated.32 The main results of the paper
presented in Tables 5 and 7 were unchanged under all of these specifcations.
All regression results in the paper are reported with robust standard errors. Testing for multicollinearity in the regression, a Variance Infation Factor test was conducted and no issues were found for all models. The results demonstrate consistently statistically signifcant efects for GEM on the earnings of immigrant women
(besides ‘Foreign Marriage’ women) across diferent model specifcations and different segments of the data set.
Conclusion
Despite the importance of family migration, most studies on immigrants do not
examine gender empowerment of women across diferent family types. The majority of studies dealing with family migration focus on the family investment model,
only analysing the labour supply of married immigrant women. A few recent studies
include both married immigrant women and men together, but they do not investigate gender empowerment across family types and its impact on the earning capabilities of immigrants. Addressing a gap in the literature, this study provides empirical evidence of the efects of culturally-based gender status on the earning capacity
of married immigrants in the U.S., and compares the labour market performance of
married immigrants by diferent family types as well as gender. In particular, this
paper includes the GEM index as an indicator of immigrants’ home-country gender
norms.
The results illustrate that controlling for human capital factors does not eliminate
the efect of GEM for women in ‘Home-country Marriage’ and ‘Native Marriage’
couples, providing evidence of the role of gender status in determining earnings and
32 Women’s low labour market participation suggests a possible sample selection issue for women in the
labour force not being representative of the whole population. If women who participated in the labour
market are not a random sample and are a more positively (or negatively) self-selected group, the estimates in the earning equations could be biased upward (or downward). In this case, GEM efects on
earnings could be overestimated (or underestimated). Complications regarding labour market participation and earnings can also cause selection bias. For example, if women from high GEM countries are
more likely to participate in the labour market, then relatively higher numbers of low wage women from
these countries may appear in the sample, whereas only high wage women from countries with low GEM
would appear in the earnings sample. In this case, GEM efects would be biased downward. This will
reinforce the main results, a positive GEM efect on earnings.
31 Simultaneously-moved couples from the same home country is tested in all models to examine possible bias from tied movers.
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labour force participation of immigrant women in the U.S. Overall, the results of all
models indicate immigrants’ home-country GEM has a strong positive impact on
married women in ‘Home-country Marriage’ and ‘Native Marriage’ couples.
The strong positive GEM efects imply women from more equal societies in terms
of gender are more likely to participate in the labour force and earn more in the host
country. It is possible that women who grew up in nations with higher gender equality do have more confdence than women who grew up in nations with lower gender
equality, since gender inequality can diminish women’s confdence and positive attitudes of women in the work place. In these situations, women’s earning capability
may decrease due to lower home-country gender equality. Meanwhile, immigrant
men who grew up in higher gender equality countries could be more successful in
the host country since they are more easily able to build positive collaborations and
working attitudes with colleagues, including women.
The most pronounced GEM efect occurs with immigrants in ‘Home-country
Marriage’ couples refecting that immigrants hold their home-country values most
strongly when spouses hold the same cultural backgrounds. A positive but less pronounced GEM efect on labour force participation for ‘Native Marriage’ women,
relative to ‘Home-country Marriage’ women, is understandable given that native
spouses can provide better information and network opportunities regarding the host
country job market. It is possible that home-country conditions are less important in
job searching for ‘Native Marriage’ women, compared to women in ‘Home-country
Marriage’ families. However, the slightly greater GEM efect on earnings of ‘Native
Marriage’ women than ‘Home-country Marriage’ women could refect the diference in the sample of the labour market participants between these two groups. For
example, immigrant women in ‘Home-country Marriage’ couples, who entered the
labour market, might include more tied immigrants so they are working in lower
paying jobs in order to support their husbands’ human capital investment. In this
case, the diference in unobserved characteristics for the labour market success of
labour market participants and non-participants in ‘Native Marriage’ women would
be greater than those in ‘Home-country Marriage’ women. In addition, married
women who have native spouses may have better jobs through the information and
network their spouses can provide. This may create upward selection regarding the
GEM efect.33
On the other hand, the results from ‘Foreign Marriage’ families demonstrate that
women are likely to command less bargaining power within the family when husbands and wives have diferent gender norms. In ‘Foreign Marriage’ couples, wives’
earnings are infuenced by husbands’ home-country gender norms rather than their
own cultural gender norms, while husbands are infuenced by their own home-country gender norms. The signifcant GEM efects on men but not women in ‘Foreign
Marriage’ families suggest that married men hold their home-country values more
33 This is also supported by the regression results using the Heckman two-stage model, which considered selection bias regarding labour market participation. Once selection into the labour market is controlled, ‘Home-country Marriage’ immigrants show the strongest infuence from GEM in the outcome
equation.
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strongly than married women in these multicultural families. It is intuitively understandable given gender dynamics within the family. Considering most gender norms
suppress women’s empowerment rather than men’s, the bargaining power of women
is likely less than men within the family. Consequently, married women are more
sensitive to, and infuenced by, their spouse’s cultural gender norms than married
men.
Regarding the labour force participation of married men, the GEM shows an
insignifcant impact across all family types. Given that traditional gender norms
suppress women’s opportunities and conditions more than men’s, a strong signifcant GEM efect on married women but not men is sensible. In addition, this
may refect the ‘breadwinner’ notion from traditional gender ideology, which
emphasises the husband’s position as the primary worker and earner in the
family.
Meanwhile, the GEM impact on the earnings of married men is somewhat ambiguous given the insignifcant results from the model which includes broader regional
dummies. The positive GEM efect on wages of men might be derived from the economic or political structures of the nation subsumed in the GEM. The GEM is a
proxy for the overall condition of gender status in a nation, which can shape women’s empowerment in political and economic decision making and economic power
over resources. Although the GEM is a relatively good measure for overall gender
status among currently existing metrics, it cannot distinguish pure gender inequality
from other economic and institutional conditions. The positive GEM efects in OLS
might be a result of some economic, political and institutional diferences which are
included in the GEM. To reach defnite conclusions for men regarding the impact of
gender norms, additional studies employing newly developed, more detailed measures regarding gender inequality, which can separate gender inequality purely from
economic conditions, would be necessary.
In sum, the home-country gender norms most strongly infuence the labour market participation and earnings of married women when husbands’ cultural backgrounds are the same. Facing host country culture, immigrant women are still infuenced by their home country gender norms even if they are married to native men in
the host country. Facing diferent cultural gender norms from their spouse, women
are more infuenced by their spouses’ cultural norms than men. While home-country gender inequality does not infuence the labour force participation of married
immigrant men, its impact on the earning capacity of immigrant men is somewhat
unclear. Nonetheless, all of these results taken together highlight the importance of
the political and socioeconomic status of women in a society, providing evidence of
the positive efect of gender equality on women’s labour force participation as well
as earning capacity for both women and men.
Compliance with ethical standards
Confict of interest The author declares that she has no confict of interest.
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Appendix: Robustness checks and alternative specifcations
A number of robustness checks and diferent model specifcations for Eqs. (1) and
(2) are conducted. First, a selection corrected model for earnings is tested, which
considers women’s potential selection bias into the labor market. Equations (1)
and (2) are used for the output and selection equations in the Heckman two-stage
selection model, respectively (see “Appendix Table 9”). As expected, all married
women show selection bias regarding labour market participation, but no selection bias for married men is found in the selection corrected model. The results
from the selection corrected model demonstrate a strong positive GEM efect on
both labour market participation and earnings for ‘Home-country Marriage’ and
‘Native Marriage’ women. Additionally, the Heckman FIML (Full Information
Mfaximum Likelihood) estimation, which consists of fnding the parameter values that maximize the likelihood of the data, is also tested but no diferences were
found.34 Considering the paper includes a large sample (1000 + observations), the
robustness of the Heckman estimator is supported by existing Monte Carlo evidence and theoretical knowledge from OLS estimates (Fu et al. 2009) (Appendix
Tables 10, 11 and 12).
Second, all regressions for Eqs. (1) and (2) are repeated with additional dummy
variables which consider the selection bias of immigrants relative to non-migrants
who remained in their home countries, as well as cohort diferences by time of
arrival for immigrants. Using 10- year intervals (besides individuals who migrated
before the 1970s which is a single interval) all regressions include 5 categories,
pre1970, C7079, C8089, C9099, and C2000 s which correspond to immigrants
who migrated before 1970, during 1970–1979, 1980–1989, 1990–1999, and
2000–2006 respectively.35 Examining selection bias between immigrants and their
home-country populations, a binary dummy variable (More_Edu) is employed,
which indicates whether immigrants are more or less educated than the average school years of their corresponding home-country population who did not
migrate by utiliszing the Barro-Lee World Educational Attainment Dataset (2000).
In addition, the interaction between GEM and educational level36 is also tested
in an attempt to transform GEM into a within-country efect which examines
34 This is to consider the fact that Heckman’s two-stage model sometimes underestimates standard errors
in the second stage (outcome) equation. But, Heckman (1979)’s two-stage procedure, the LIML (Limited
Information Maximum Likelihood) estimator, is also more robust than FIML in that FIML more heavily
relies on its normality assumption.
35 Accounting for cohort efects in some specifcations must be done with caution since with a single
cross section, years -in the -U.S.S and year of arrival are jointly determined. Estimation of both in the
current case will turn on functional form.
36 A discrete variable which contains 9 levels of education (No school, primary education (1–6 grade),
middle school (7–9 grade), high school (10–12 grade) drop out, High school graduate, Some college
education, Associate degree, Bachelor’s degree, Master’s degree, and Doctoral/Postgraduate degree) is
created.
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Table 9 Heckman two-stage results for married immigrant women
Independent variables Home country marriage Married to American Married to foreign
Selection equation Outcome equation Selection equation Outcome equation Selection equation Outcome equation
Coefcient S.E Coefcient S.E Coefcient S.E Coefcient S.E Coefcient S.E Coefcient S.E
Age 0.0716*** 0.0080 0.0408*** 0.0069 0.0396** 0.0149 0.0291** 0.0115 -0.0060 0.0257 0.0398** 0.0196
Age2 -0.0009*** 0.0001 -0.0005*** 0.0001 -0.0007*** 0.0002 -0.0004*** 0.0001 -0.0002 0.0003 – 0.0005** 0.0002
Yrus 0.1109*** 0.0122 0.0547*** 0.0100 0.0518** 0.0212 0.0806*** 0.0154 0.0781** 0.0393 0.0187 0.0316
Yrus2 -0.0024*** 0.0004 -0.0008** 0.0003 -0.0009* 0.0005 -0.0013*** 0.0004 0.0019* 0.0011 0.0002 0.0009
GEM 1.8595*** 0.1765 1.2199*** 0.1528 0.6134* 0.3450 1.0276** 0.2422 0.5151 0.5770 0.3416 0.4588
YrusGEM – 0.1185*** 0.0252 – 0.0400** 0.0201 – 0.0314 0.0382 – 0.0748** 0.0274 -0.0380 0.0753 0.0338 0.0592
Yrus2GEM 0.0025*** 0.0007 0.0005 0.0006 0.0006 0.0009 0.0013*** 0.0007 0.0015 0.0020 -0.0014 0.0016
Lnwkhr 0.9367*** 0.0065 0.9877*** 0.0105 0.8730*** 0.0203
English 0.2865*** 0.0208 0.3143*** 0.0183 0.3802*** 0.0546 0.3220*** 0.0496 0.1941** 0.0707 0.3669*** 0.0587
Under8th_grade -0.1426*** 0.0261 -0.1254*** 0.0214 -0.1725** 0.0639 -0.1798** 0.0533 0.0035 0.0984 -0.1314* 0.0799
Some_Highschool -0.0662** 0.0302 -0.0714** 0.0241 – 0.1116* 0.0588 -0.1080** 0.0471 0.0919 0.1022 – 0.0370 0.0801
Some_college 0.0857** 0.0327 0.1464*** 0.0247 0.1644*** 0.0444 0.1965*** 0.0334 0.1243 0.0867 0.1925** 0.0676
Associate_degree 0.1884*** 0.0404 0.2684*** 0.0298 0.2849*** 0.0546 0.3143*** 0.0404 0.3058** 0.1085 0.2325** 0.0824
BA 0.2420*** 0.0278 0.5035*** 0.0212 0.4199*** 0.0435 0.5930*** 0.0342 0.3304*** 0.0813 0.5009*** 0.0657
MS 0.4367*** 0.0362 0.7568*** 0.0269 0.5508*** 0.0595 0.8196*** 0.0434 0.4000*** 0.1021 0.6815*** 0.0794
Pro_doctor_degree 0.6599*** 0.0471 0.9566*** 0.0335 0.5763*** 0.0753 0.9521*** 0.0525 0.6992*** 0.1244 0.9837*** 0.0972
East -0.0158 0.0241 -0.0191 0.0177 0.1116** 0.0446 0.0763** 0.0312 0.1459** 0.0697 0.0024 0.0529
MWest 0.0104 0.0288 -0.0820*** 0.0213 0.1080** 0.0489 -0.0814** 0.0343 0.1864* 0.1094 0.0597 0.0800
South -0.0910*** 0.0207 -0.1316*** 0.0161 -0.0626* 0.0346 -0.1381*** 0.0253 0.1887** 0.0652 – 0.0360 0.0510
Whnh -0.1317*** 0.0300 0.1784*** 0.0231 – 0.0244 0.0453 0.1005** 0.0318 -0.0482 0.0746 0.1594** 0.0565
Blnh 0.2136** 0.0838 0.2483*** 0.0569 0.1158 0.1359 0.1126 0.0905 0.4262** 0.1799 0.3306** 0.1177
AIANnh 0.6445** 0.2456 0.3676** 0.1560 -0.3032 0.3506 0.2194 0.2764 -0.1673 0.9216 1.4686** 0.7393
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Table 9 (continued)
Independent variables Home country marriage Married to American Married to foreign
Selection equation Outcome equation Selection equation Outcome equation Selection equation Outcome equation
Coefcient S.E Coefcient S.E Coefcient S.E Coefcient S.E Coefcient S.E Coefcient S.E
AsianPInh 0.1715*** 0.0264 0.3707*** 0.0196 -0.0195 0.0422 0.0757** 0.0297 0.2799*** 0.0711 0.3055*** 0.0551
Othernh – 0.0116 0.0854 0.2686*** 0.0655 0.1296 0.1727 0.2985** 0.1137 -0.1343 0.2602 -0.2735 0.2066
Immigshare – 0.0416*** 0.0056 – 0.0410*** 0.0045 -0.0125 0.0124 -0.0123 0.0092 -0.0314 0.0211 – 0.0023 0.0175
Spouseincome 0.0000*** 0.0000 0.0000*** 0.0000 0.0000*** 0.0000
Number_child_
under5
– 0.2959*** 0.0165 – 0.4329*** 0.0288 -0.3771*** 0.0516

Constant
Mills lambda
Roh
– 2.5013***
0.6455***
0.8082
Sigma
Wald Chi2(25)
Prob> chi2
0.7988
24,898.84
0.000

0.1780 0.3720* 0.2034 -0.9096*** 0.3458 0.4254 0.2967 -0.2490 0.6058 1.3726** 0.5315
0.0520 0.5599*** 0.0787 0.5126*** 0.1538
0.7112 0.6566
0.7872 0.7807
10,010.51 2317.36
0.000 0.000
Censored observation 12,172 3276 1125
Uncensored observation
14,855 5384 1586
Dependent variable: log wages
Reference category for statistical signifcance. *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p <0.01
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Table 10 Selected regression results of earnings and labour force participation of immigrants
All models include all other independent variables in Eqs. (1) and (2). OLS Models consider labour market participants only
Dependent variable: log wages (OLS), a binary variable denoting labour force participation (Logit)
Reference category for statistical signifcance. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p< 0.01
Earnings of immigrants
(OLS model)
Female immigrants Male immigrants
Home-country marriage Native marriage Foreign marriage Home-country marriage Native marriage Foreign marriage
Independent variable Coefcient (robust S.E) Coefcient (robust S.E) Coefcient (robust S.E) Coefcient (robust S.E) Coefcient (robust S.E) Coefcient (robust S.E)
Model without interaction terms

GEM 0.4957*** (0.0608)
Model with interaction terms
GEM 0.6325*** (0.1559)
YrusGEM
Yrus2GEM
-0.0065 (0.0212)
-0.0002 (0.0006)

0.2142** (0.0914) 0.3037 (0.1979) 0.1429** (0.0540) 0.3112*** (0.0959) 0.4426*** (0.1409)
0.9599*** (0.2353) 0.2490 (0.4985) 0.4496*** (0.1291) 0.5284** (0.2400) 0.8479** (0.3596)
-0.0757** (0.0254) 0.0414 (0.0631) -0.0422** (0.0184) -0.0027 (0.0281) -0.0418 (0.0475)
0.0013** (0.0006) – 0.0018 (0.0016) 0.0010* (0.0005) – 0.0004 (0.0007) 0.0007 (0.0013)
Labour force participation of immigrants
(logit model)
Female immigrants Male immigrants
Home-country marriage Native marriage Foreign marriage Home-country marriage Native marriage Foreign marriage
Independent variable Odds ratio (robust S.E) Odds ratio (robust S.E) Odds ratio (robust S.E) Odds ratio (robust S.E) Odds ratio (robust S.E) Odds ratio (robust S.E)
Model without interaction terms

GEM 3.3674*** (0.4775)
Model with interaction terms
GEM 11.1581*** (3.2345)
YrusGEM
Yrus2GEM
0.8490*** (0.0357)
1.0033** (0.0012)

1.7062** (0.4293) 2.1509* (0.8746) 0.4482*** (0.0953) 1.4280 (0.6225) 0.9554 (0.5835)
3.0192** (1.6863) 1.5634 (1.1701) 1.9097 (0.8630) 0.6818 (0.7043) 0.0269** (0.0415)
0.9534 (0.0610) 1.0046 (0.1260) 0.8596** (0.0501) 1.0921 (0.1234) 1.7085** (0.2923)
1.0006 (0.0015) 1.0008 (0.0034) 1.0024 (0.0015) 0.9982 (0.0026) 0.9869*** (0.0039)
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Table 11 Selected regression results with GDI for married immigrants
All models include all independent variables except GEM and its interaction terms in Eqs. (1) and (2). OLS Models consider labour market participants only
Dependent variable: log wages (OLS), a binary variable denoting labour force participation (Logit)
Reference category for statistical signifcance. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p< 0.01
Earnings of immigrants
(OLS model)
Female immigrants Male Immigrants
Home-country marriage Native marriage Foreign marriage Home-country marriage
Native marriage Foreign marriage
Independent variable Coefcient (robust S.E) Coefcient (robust S.E) Coefcient (robust S.E) Coefcient (robust S.E) Coefcient (robust S.E) Coefcient (robust S.E)
Model without interaction terms

GDI 0.4283*** (0.0691)
Model with interaction terms
GDI 0.6901*** (0.1757)
YrusGDI
Yrus2GDI
-0.0238 (0.0238)
0.0003 (0.0007)

0.1139 (0.1210) 0.3059 (0.2282) 0.2320*** (0.0574) 0.3360*** (0.1238) 0.4407*** (0.1658)
1.0215*** (0.3040) 0.1307 (0.5589) 0.9000*** (0.1394) 0.6342** (0.2884) 1.0057** (0.4151)
-0.0861*** (0.0336) 0.0531 (0.0652) – 0.0837*** (0.0192) -0.0075 (0.0329) -0.0448 (0.0510)
0.0013 (0.0008) -0.0020 (0.0016) 0.0017*** (0.0005) -0.0004 (0.0008) 0.0004 (0.0014)
Labour Force Participation of Immigrants
(Logit Model)
Female immigrants Male Immigrants
Home-country marriage Native marriage Foreign marriage Home-country marriage Native marriage Foreign marriage
Independent variable Odds Ratio (robust S.E) Odds Ratio (robust S.E) Odds Ratio (robust S.E) Odds Ratio (robust S.E) Odds Ratio (robust S.E) Odds Ratio (robust S.E)
Model without interaction terms

GDI 0.7993 (0.1229)
Model with interaction terms
GDI 1.5467 (0.4748)
YrusGDI
Yrus2GDI
0.9033** (0.0418)
1.0024** (0.0013)

0.1837*** (0.0620) 0.8088 (0.3810) 0.3064*** (0.0683) 1.8112 (1.0427) 0.6475 (0.4784)
1.7827 (1.2689) 0.2344 (0.2519) 0.4417* (0.2179) 0.0765* (0.1014) 0.0098* (0.0183)
0.7462*** (0.0641) 1.0804 (0.1459) 0.9656 (0.0605) 1.5003*** (0.2055) 1.7576*** (0.3481)
1.0063*** (0.0021) 1.0002 (0.0035) 1.0005 (0.0016) 0.9913*** (0.0031) 0.9869*** (0.0045)
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Table 12 Regression Results with both GEM and GDI for Married Immigrants
Earnings of immigrants (OLS model)
Female immigrants Male immigrants
Home-country marriage
Native marriage Foreign marriage Home-country marriage
Native marriage Foreign marriage
Independent variable Coefcient (robust
S.E)
Coefcient (robust
S.E)
Coefcient (robust
S.E)
Coefcient (robust
S.E)
Coefcient (robust
S.E)
Coefcient (robust S.E)
Model without interaction terms

GEM 0.4505*** (0.0849)
GDI 0.0725 (0.0961)
Model with interaction terms
GEM 0.4593** (0.2241)
GDI 0.2593 (0.2516)
YrusGEM
Yrus2GEM
YrusGDI
Yrus2GDI
0.0099 (0.0304)
– 0.0005 (0.0009)
– 0.0246 (0.0339)
0.0006 (0.0010)

0.2395** (0.1126) 0.2231 (0.2833)

-0.0272 (0.0781)
0.2523*** (0.0830)
0.2723* (0.1476)
0.0680 (0.1900)

0.3949* (0.2099)
-0.0605 (0.1488) 0.1253 (0.3262) 0.0751 (0.2460)
0.7988** (0.3492) 0.4969 (0.8924)

-0.4179** (0.2049)
1.2420*** (0.2199)
0.0339 (0.0279)
-0.0004 (0.0008)
0.3329 (0.3954)
0.2958 (0.4693)
0.0041 (0.0483)
-0.0003 (0.0012)

0.5349 (0.5735)
0.2794 (0.4511) – 0.3242 (1.0011) 0.4575 (0.6563)
-0.0641 (0.0390) – 0.0063 (0.1032) -0.0439 (0.0737)
0.0013 (0.0009) -0.0006 (0.0025) 0.0015 (0.0020)
-0.0213 (0.0518) 0.0641 (0.1088) -0.1107*** (0.0286) -0.0095 (0.0563) – 0.0004 (0.0783)
0.0000 (0.0013) -0.0017 (0.0026) 0.0021*** (0.0008) -0.0002 (0.0014) – 0.0010 (0.0020)
Labour Force Participation of Immigrants
(Logit Model)
Female immigrants Male immigrants
Home-country Marriage
Native Marriage Foreign Marriage Home-country Marriage
Native Marriage Foreign Marriage
Independent variable Odds Ratio (Robust
S.E)
Odds Ratio (Robust
S.E)
Odds Ratio (Robust
S.E)
Odds Ratio (Robust
S.E)
Odds Ratio (Robust
S.E)
Odds Ratio (Robust
S.E)
Model without interaction terms

GEM 12.7302*** (2.5016) 4.7455*** (1.3810)
GDI 0.1305*** (0.0270) 0.0689*** (0.0261)

6.0668*** (3.4883) 0.8833 (0.2558) 1.0395 (0.6983) 1.6642 (1.5394)
0.1940** (0.1266) 0.3331*** (0.0998) 1.7429 (1.5568) 0.4123 (0.4523)
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Table 12 (continued)
Labour Force Participation of Immigrants
(Logit Model)
Female immigrants Male immigrants
Home-country Marriage
Native Marriage Foreign Marriage Home-country Marriage
Native Marriage Foreign Marriage
Independent variable Odds Ratio (Robust
S.E)
Odds Ratio (Robust
S.E)
Odds Ratio (Robust
S.E)
Odds Ratio (Robust
S.E)
Odds Ratio (Robust
S.E)
Odds Ratio (Robust
S.E)
Model with interaction terms

GEM
GDI
YrusGEM
Yrus2GEM
YrusGDI
Yrus2GDI
132.4972*** (58.8879) 3.6698* (2.8219)
0.0285*** (0.0134) 0.7383 (0.7250)
0.7630*** (0.0474) 1.1026 (0.0955)
1.0047*** (0.0018) 0.9966 (0.0021)
1.1605** (0.0785) 0.6931*** (0.0810)
0.9979 (0.0020) 1.0091*** (0.0029)

19.8118** (28.7155) 11.2060*** (7.9090) 62.1051** (108.3224) 0.3739 (0.9107)
0.0167** (0.0271) 0.0689*** (0.0505) 0.0014*** (0.0030) 0.0183 (0.0519)
0.8967 (0.1738) 0.7828*** (0.0685)

0.5692*** (0.1129) 1.4232 (0.4053)
1.0126*** (0.0046) 0.9901 (0.0066)
2.6089*** (0.6272) 1.3286 (0.4193)

1.0014 (0.0052) 1.0036 (0.0022) 1.2185 (0.2512) 1.1529 (0.1074) 0.9983 (0.0054) 0.9980 (0.0024) 0.9791*** (0.0054) 0.9948 (0.0073)
All models include all independent variables except GEM and its interaction terms in Eqs. (1) and (2). OLS Models consider labour market participants only
Dependent variable: log wages (OLS), a binary variable denoting labour force participation (Logit)
Reference category for statistical signifcance. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p <0.01
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Table 13 Selected regression with interaction between education level and GEM
All models include all independent variables except GEM and its interaction terms in Eqs. (1) and (2). OLS Models consider labour market participants only
Dependent variable: log wages (OLS), a binary variable denoting labour force participation (Logit)
Reference category for statistical signifcance. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p< 0.01
Earnings of immigrants
(OLS model)
Female immigrants Male immigrants
Home-country marriage Native marriage Foreign marriage Home-country marriage Native marriage Foreign marriage
Independent variable Coefcient (robust S.E) Coefcient (robust S.E) Coefcient (robust S.E) Coefcient (robust S.E) Coefcient (robust S.E) Coefcient (robust S.E)
GEM 1.2809*** (0.3004) 1.1705** (0.4598) 0.5649 (0.9965) 2.0035*** (0.2965) 0.9110** (0.4563) 2.4022*** (0.8409)
YrusGEM -0.0067 (0.0212) -0.0754*** (0.0254) 0.0471 (0.0629) -0.0435** (0.0183) -0.0025 (0.028) -0.0501 (0.0490)
Yrus2GEM – 0.0002 (0.0006) 0.0013** (0.0006) -0.0020 (0.0016) 0.0010* (0.0005) -0.0004 (0.0007) 0.0009 (0.0009)
Edu_Level*GEM -0.0955** (0.0376) -0.0322 (0.0594) – 0.0518 (0.1228) -0.2199*** (0.0369) -0.0501 (0.0590) -0.2081** (0.0969)
Edu_Level 0.0313 (0.0256) 0.0199 (0.0580) 0.1334 (0.0903) 0.0816*** (0.0243) -0.0005 (0.0478) 0.0342 (0.0342)
R2 0.6869 0.6703 0.6316 0.4939 0.5029 0.4923
Observation 14,855 5384 1586 22,977 4879 2191
Labour force participation of immigrants
(logit model)
Female immigrants Male immigrants
Home-country marriage Native Marriage Foreign Marriage Home-country Marriage
Native Marriage Foreign Marriage
Independent variable Odds ratio (robust S.E) Odds ratio (robust S.E) Odds ratio (robust S.E) Odds ratio (robust S.E) Odds ratio (robust S.E) Odds Ratio (robust S.E)
GEM 8.7308*** (5.5894)
(5.5894)
7.7629* (8.8018) 1.8433 (3.5052) 9.5292** (8.9664) 4.7516 (9.0561) 0.0042* (0.0127)
YrusGEM 0.8485*** (0.0356) 0.9487 (0.0609) 1.0061 (0.1260) 0.8583*** (0.0501) 1.1058 (0.1248) 1.7142*** (0.2952)
Yrus2GEM 1.0034*** (0.0012) 1.0006 (0.0015) 1.0008 (0.0034) 1.0024* (0.0015) 0.9980 (0.0026) 0.9869*** (0.0040)
Edu_Level*GEM 1.0395 (0.0891) 0.8736 (0.1284) 0.9708 (0.2438) 0.7798** (0.0975) 0.7286 (0.1879) 1.3083 (0.4968)
Edu_Level 1.0441 (0.0624) 1.4579*** (0.1760) 1.2565 (0.2317) 1.3385*** (0.1218) 1.6441** (0.3265) 0.9485 (0.2899)
Pseudo R2 0.086 0.0841 0.0716 0.0948 0.0946 0.1165
Observation 27,027 8660 2711 27,027 5779 2619
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heterogeneity of gender-based socioeconomic status within a country (“Appendix
Table 13”). All results under these specifcations do not change the main results of
Tables 5 and 7.37
Additionally, additional regional dummy variables which indicate the broader
region in the world from which an immigrant came from are also tested to control
for country-specifc efects, since it is not possible to consider the full set of country
fxed efects (“Appendix Table 14”).38 The results under this specifcation reinforce
the strong and consistent GEM efects of the main results for all women, but OLS
results for married men show some diference, namely insignifcant GEM efects
across all family types.
Finally, subsamples of the data are also tested as a robustness check. The subsample of ‘Home-country Marriage’, composed of simultaneously-moved couples from the same home-country, is tested for all models to examine possible bias
from tied movers (“Appendix Tables 15, 16 and 17”). As expected, the results for
simultaneously-moved couples from the same home -country were very similar
to the main fndings of ‘Home-country Marriage’ couples. In addition, all regressions are repeated with datasets excluding either Mexican or Filipino immigrants or
both, which compose the largest immigrant groups in the data. The results from all
of these diferent subsets of data were consistent with the main results (Appendix
Tables 18 and 19).
All regression results in the paper are reported with robust standard errors. Testing for multicollinearity in the regression, a Variance Infation Factor test was conducted and no issues were found for anyall models. The results demonstrate consistently statistically signifcant efects for GEM on the earnings of immigrant women
(besides ‘Foreign Marriage’ women) across diferent model specifcations and different segments of the data set.
37 Huh (2017) demonstrates that all immigrant workers from 42 countries are more educated than their
home-country population counterparts and low GEM leads to more positive selection of immigrant
women. Positive (Negative) selection occurs when immigrants have attributes which help (or hinder)
labor market success more than those who remained in their home-country. Findings in Huh (2017) reinforce the results of this study since those results would make it more likely to underestimate the positive
GEM efects on earnings of immigrant women.
38 Regional dummy variables in 6 categories (Asia, Europe, Middle East, Latin America and Caribbean,
and Others) are created. All results are similar to the main fndings in both quantitative and qualitative
ways, except for the regressions on earnings of married men when regions are controlled.
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Table 14 Selected regression results with regions in the world
Earnings of immigrants (OLS model)
Female immigrants Male immigrants
Independent Variable Home-country marriage
Native marriage Foreign marriage Home-country marriage
Native marriage Foreign marriage
Coefcient (robust
S.E)
Coefcient (robust
S.E)
Coefcient (robust
S.E)
Coefcient (robust
S.E)
Coefcient (robust
S.E)
Coefcient (robust S.E)
GEM 0.4887*** (0.1597)

0.6405** (0.2576) – 0.0682 (0.5281)
-0.0724*** (0.0253) 0.0346 (0.0621)
0.0013** (0.0006) -0.0016 (0.0016)

-0.1417 (0.1336) 0.0502 (0.2714) 0.4090 (0.3765)
YrusGEM -0.0039 (0.0211) -0.0349* (0.0184) -0.0108 (0.0283) -0.0464 (0.0477)
Yrus2GEM -0.0002 (0.720) 0.0008 (0.0005) -0.0003 (0.0007) 0.0009 (0.0013)
Latin American Caribbean
– 0.0661 (0.0481) -0.0418 (0.0743) 0.2185* (0.1307) 0.0856** (0.0419) 0.0966 (0.0689) -0.0014 (0.1101)
Asia 0.0804* (0.0486) -0.0692 (0.0778) 0.2080 (0.1326) 0.1244*** (0.0342) 0.1783*** (0.0694) 0.1587* (0.0914)
Europe 0.0558 (0.0410) 0.0623 (0.0623) 0.3282 (0.1357) 0.4002*** (0.0385) 0.2901*** (0.0643) 0.2326*** (0.0881)
Others 0.1823*** (0.0602) 0.1417 (0.0874) 0.2842 (0.1739) 0.7312*** (0.0535) 0.3249*** (0.0850) 0.3485*** (0.1217)
R2 0.6872 0.6709 0.6326 0.4990 117.93 0.4940
Observation 14,855 5384 1586 22,977 4879 2191
Labor force participation of immigrants
(logit model)
Female immigrants Male immigrants
Independent Variable Home-country marriage
Native marriage Foreign marriage Home-country marriage
Native marriage Foreign marriage
Odds ratio (robust
S.E)
Odds ratio (robust
S.E)
Odds ratio (robust
S.E)
Odds ratio (robust
S.E)
Odds ratio (robust
S.E)
Odds ratio (robust S.E)
GEM 14.4247*** (4.3792) 3.4578** (2.1572) 2.2443 (2.3194) 1.0981 (0.5187) 0.2062 (0.2410) 0.0126*** (0.0209)
YrusGEM 0.8302*** (0.0347) 0.9612 (0.0619) 0.9972 (0.1249) 0.8624** (0.0511) 1.0783 (0.1236) 1.6735*** (0.2584)
Yrus2GEM 1.0039*** (0.0012) 1.0005 (0.0015) 1.0009 (0.0034) 1.0021 (0.0015) 0.9985 (0.0026) 0.9875*** (0.0040)
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All models include all independent variables except GEM and its interaction terms in Eqs. (1) and (2). OLS Models consider labour market participants only. Base group
of the regions is Middle East
Dependent variable: log wages (OLS), a binary variable denoting labour force participation (Logit)
Reference category for statistical signifcance. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p< 0.01
Table 14 (continued)
Labor force participation of immigrants
(logit model)
Female immigrants Male immigrants
Independent Variable Home-country marriage
Native marriage Foreign marriage Home-country marriage
Native marriage Foreign marriage
Odds ratio (robust
S.E)
Odds ratio (robust
S.E)
Odds ratio (robust
S.E)
Odds ratio (robust
S.E)
Odds ratio (robust
S.E)
Odds ratio (robust S.E)
Latin American
Caribbean
1.3888*** (0.1589) 0.8188 (0.1781) 1.3051 (0.3610) 1.2876 (0.2260) 1.7156* (0.5587) 2.5971** (1.1564)
Asia 1.6987*** (0.1636) 0.8523 (0.1979) 1.1077 (0.2966) 0.8147 (0.1359) 1.5736 (0.5286) 1.2368 (0.4979)
Europe 1.0447 (0.1031) 0.7171 (0.1550) 0.9317 (0.2568) 2.0303*** (0.2928) 1.5946* (0.4270) 1.8133* (0.6524)
Others 0.7009*** (0.0954) 0.8004 (0.0954) 0.9093 (0.3133) 1.8227*** (0.3384) 2.3825** (0.0015) 2.1266 (1.0247)
Pseudo R2 0.0872 0.0833 0.0718 0.0957 0.0944 0.1192
Observation 27,027 8660 2711 27,027 5779 2619
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Table 15 OLS results for earnings of simultaneously moved home-country marriage immigrants (labour
market participants only)
Dependent variable: log wages
Reference category for statistical signifcance. *p <0.10; **p <0.05; ***p <0.01
Independent variables Female immigrants Male immigrants
Coefcient Robust S.E Coefcient Robust S.E
Age 0.0026 0.0088 0.0501*** 0.0070
Age2 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0006*** 0.0001
Yrus 0.0067 0.0149 0.0290** 0.0127
Yrus2 0.0006 0.0004 -0.0003 0.0004
GEM 0.6387** 0.2186 0.7456*** 0.1615
YrusGEM 0.0212 0.0307 – 0.0258 0.0264
Yrus2GEM – 0.0014*** 0.0009 0.0004 0.0008
lnwkhr 0.9657*** 0.0160 0.8145*** 0.0287
English 0.1965*** 0.0227 0.2427*** 0.0188
Under8th_grade – 0.1392*** 0.0286 – 0.0506** 0.0230
Some_Highschool – 0.1421*** 0.0317 0.0046 0.0267
Some_college 0.1172*** 0.0339 0.1266*** 0.0299
Associate_degree 0.1715*** 0.0437 0.2127*** 0.0403
BA 0.3837*** 0.0288 0.5491*** 0.0269
MS 0.5635*** 0.0367 0.7546*** 0.0307
Pro_doctor_degree 0.7038*** 0.0482 0.8167*** 0.0330
East – 0.0248 0.0258 – 0.0453** 0.0228
MWest – 0.0723** 0.0298 – 0.0671** 0.0254
South – 0.0854*** 0.0226 – 0.0979*** 0.0181
Whnh 0.2637*** 0.0297 0.4468*** 0.0255
Blnh 0.1629** 0.0793 0.1065 0.0701
AIANnh 0.2789 0.1991 0.2483*** 0.0771
AsianPInh 0.3367*** 0.0272 0.1919*** 0.0240
Othernh 0.3738*** 0.0843 0.2052** 0.0675
Immigshare – 0.0208*** 0.0064 – 0.0117** 0.0047
Constant 1.9854*** 0.2517 2.2595*** 0.2623
R2 0.6788 0.5166
Observations 5790 9217
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Table 16 Odds ratio from Logit regression for labour force participation: Results for simultaneouslymoved home-country marriage couple
Dependent variable: a binary variable denoting labour force participation
Reference category for statistical signifcance. *p <0.10; **p <0.05; ***p <0.01
Independent variables Female immigrants Male immigrants
Odds Ratio Robust S.E Odds Ratio Robust S.E
Age 1.1659*** 0.0240 1.2749*** 0.0366
Age2 0.9982*** 0.0002 0.9968*** 0.0003
Yrus 1.1699*** 0.0358 1.1860*** 0.0504
Yrus2 0.9962*** 0.0009 0.9963** 0.0012
GEM 3.3294** 1.3326 1.1612 0.6619
YrusGEM 0.8892* 0.0558 0.8654* 0.0753
Yrus2GEM 1.0029 0.0019 1.0023 0.0025
English 1.5512*** 0.0804 1.1381 0.0926
Under8th_grade 0.7195*** 0.0499 0.8028** 0.0845
Some_Highschool 0.8315** 0.0660 0.7711** 0.0955
Some_college 1.0407 0.0871 1.0254 0.1337
Associate_degree 1.0448 0.1012 0.7313** 0.1136
BA 1.1338* 0.0768 1.1305 0.1205
MS 1.8132*** 0.1618 1.4931** 0.1995
Pro_doctor_degree 2.6398*** 0.3222 2.2531*** 0.3542
East 1.0123 0.0624 0.9613 0.0852
MWest 0.9652 0.0693 0.9798 0.1060
South 0.8501*** 0.0440 1.0859 0.0859
Whnh 0.8779* 0.0620 0.8117* 0.0902
Blnh 1.3966 0.3037 0.8411 0.2573
AIANnh 2.9194 2.0968 0.1311*** 0.0811
AsianPInh 1.0326*** 0.0686 0.5500*** 0.0570
Othernh 1.0319*** 0.1994 0.8966 0.2853
Immigshare 0.9291*** 0.0145 1.0038 0.0236
S_income 1.0000*** 0.0000 1.0000*** 0.0000
Number_child_under5 0.5848*** 0.0273 0.9987 0.0811
Constant 0.0188*** 0.0088 0.0808*** 0.0568
Pseudo R2 0.0766 0.1058
Observations 10,954 10,954
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Table 17 Heckman results for simultaneously moved home-country marriage
Independent variables Female immigrants Male immigrants
Selection equation Outcome equation Selection equation Outcome equation
Coefcient Robust S.E Coefcient Robust S.E Coefcient Robust S.E Coefcient Robust S.E
Age 0.0783*** 0.0124 0.0473*** 0.0112 0.0756*** 0.0146 0.0358** 0.0134
Age2 -0.0009*** 0.0001 – 0.0006*** 0.0001 -0.0011*** 0.0002 -0.0004** 0.0002
Yrus 0.1017*** 0.0182 0.0389** 0.0153 0.0532** 0.0211 0.0215* 0.0127
Yrus2 -0.0024*** 0.0006 – 0.0002 0.0005 -0.0014** 0.0006 -0.0001 0.0004
GEM 1.1611*** 0.2449 0.9617*** 0.2110 0.6699** 0.2927 0.6547*** 0.1655
YrusGEM -0.1029** 0.0372 -0.0085 0.0306 -0.0616 0.0433 – 0.0194 0.0235
Yrus2GEM 0.0025** 0.0011 -0.0007 0.0009 0.0012 0.0013 0.0004 0.0007
Lnwkhr 0.9742*** 0.0105 0.8141*** 0.0134
English 0.2969*** 0.0316 0.3123*** 0.0291 0.1259*** 0.0378 0.2224*** 0.0255
English – 0.1586*** 0.0420 – 0.2004*** 0.0359 0.0296 0.0520 -0.0558 0.0274
Under8th_grade – 0.0755 0.0477 – 0.1715*** 0.0398 -0.0233 0.0595 0.0078 0.0313
Some_Highschool 0.0636 0.0504 0.1396*** 0.0403 0.0230 0.0610 0.1222*** 0.0323
Some_college 0.1082* 0.0613 0.2070*** 0.0482 0.0764 0.0812 0.1982*** 0.0445
Associate_degree 0.1403** 0.0413 0.4143*** 0.0329 0.1833*** 0.0509 0.5170*** 0.0365
BA 0.4208*** 0.0545 0.6721*** 0.0425 0.3668*** 0.0633 0.6975*** 0.0541
MS 0.6622*** 0.0712 0.8721*** 0.0531 0.4654*** 0.0686 0.7468*** 0.0634
Pro_doctor_degree – 0.0170 0.0376 – 0.0261 0.0294 0.0228 0.0449 -0.0486** 0.0230
East 0.0080 0.0441 – 0.0621* 0.0347 0.1240** 0.0554 -0.0853** 0.0302
MWest – 0.0905** 0.0317 – 0.1182*** 0.0260 -0.0061 0.0383 -0.0969*** 0.0193
South – 0.0725* 0.0428 0.2036*** 0.0341 -0.2932*** 0.0510 0.4934*** 0.0446
Whnh 0.2165* 0.1244 0.2443** 0.0887 -0.0215 0.1460 0.1092 0.0707
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Dependent variable: log wages
Reference category for statistical signifcance. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p< 0.01
Table 17 (continued)
Independent variables Female immigrants Male immigrants
Selection equation Outcome equation Selection equation Outcome equation
Coefcient Robust S.E Coefcient Robust S.E Coefcient Robust S.E Coefcient Robust S.E
Blnh 0.6514* 0.3963 0.4781* 0.2645

-0.3236
-0.2179***
-0.0541
-0.0212*
0.0000
0.4646
0.0496
0.1500
0.0115
0.0000

0.2976 0.2428
AIANnh 0.0933** 0.0409 0.3624*** 0.0318 0.2286*** 0.0379
AsianPInh 0.0202 0.1222 0.3848*** 0.0969 0.2140** 0.0733
Othernh – 0.0398*** 0.0093 -0.0359*** 0.0079 -0.0084 0.0062
S_ncome 0.0000*** 0.0000 Number_child_under5 – 0.3013*** 0.0278

0.0598
-0.5747
-0.4593
Roh
0.0366
0.3598
0.3590
Sigma
Wald-Chi (25)
Prob >Chi2
Censored Obser
vation
= 8577.42
0.000

Constant – 2.3463*** 0.2827 0.0973 0.3162 2.6806*** 0.3834
Mills lambda 0.6980*** 0.0766 Roh 0.8352 – 0.6267
Sigma 0.8357 0.7328
Wald Chi(25) = 10,326.48 Prob> Chi2 0.000 Censored Observation 5164 1737
Uncensored Observation
5790 Uncensored
Observation
9217
Total Observation 10,954 Total Observation
10,954
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Table 18 Regression results without working hours for earnings of immigrants
Independent variables
Female immigrants Male immigrants
Home-country marriage Native marriage Foreign marriage Home-country marriage Native marriage Foreign marriage
Coefcient Robust
S.E
Coefcient Robust
S.E
Coefcient Robust
S.E
Coefcient Robust
S.E
Coefcient Robust
S.E
Coefcient Robust
S.E

Age
Age2
Yrus
Yrus2
GEM
0.0005
– 0.0001
0.0208**
0.0000
0.6375***
0.0056
0.0001
0.0103
0.0003
0.1561
0.0214
0.0006
0.0145
YrusGEM – 0.0096
Yrus2GEM – 0.0001
English 0.2063***
0.0117
– 0.0002
0.0707***
0.0106
0.0001
0.0145
– 0.0012*** 0.0003
0.9477*** 0.2347
– 0.0743*** 0.0254
0.0013**
0.1861***
-0.1220**
0.0006
0.0437
0.0484
0.0402** 0.0190
– 0.0005** 0.0002
– 0.0073
0.0008
0.0339
0.0009
0.0224*** 0.0045
-0.0003*** 0.0001
0.0285***
-0.0004
0.3945***
-0.0329*
0.0008
0.2338***
0.0090
0.0003
0.1320
0.0196
0.0006
0.0113
0.0428*** 0.0106
-0.0005*** 0.0001
0.0164 0.0157
0.0460*** 0.0161
-0.0005*** 0.0002
0.0306
-0.0005
0.8051**
-0.0374
0.0235
0.0006
0.3531
0.0467
0.0001
0.4925**
0.0004
0.2382

0.2357 0.5007

0.0462
– 0.0020
0.0636
0.0016
0.2963*** 0.0514
– 0.1316* 0.0718
0.0008
-0.0005
0.2387***
0.0280
0.0007
0.0339
0.0006
0.2611***
– 0.0389
0.0013
0.0407
0.0521

Under8th_
grade
-0.0700*** 0.0174 -0.0543*** 0.0138 -0.1799*** 0.0374 Some_
Highschool
-0.0418** 0.0204 -0.0770* 0.0431 – 0.0674 0.0681 0.0036 0.0164 -0.0815** 0.0354 – 0.0626 0.0552
Some_college
0.1212*** 0.0218 0.1510*** 0.0295 0.1666*** 0.0637 0.1045*** 0.0185 0.0702** 0.0339 0.2906*** 0.0564
Associate_
degree
0.2090*** 0.0264 0.2310*** 0.0348 0.1423** 0.0701 0.1843*** 0.0251 0.0799*** 0.0459 0.2584*** 0.0746
BA 0.4341*** 0.0186 0.4845*** 0.0279 0.4161*** 0.0601 0.4783*** 0.0173 0.3870*** 0.0329 0.5233*** 0.0510
MS 0.6444*** 0.0229 0.6875*** 0.0357 0.5691*** 0.0699 0.7414*** 0.0194 0.5920*** 0.0370 0.8265*** 0.0579
Pro_doctor_
degree
0.7793*** 0.0301 0.8307*** 0.0448 0.7739*** 0.0884 0.8281*** 0.0219 0.7687*** 0.0445 0.7382*** 0.0651
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Family typology and gender empowerment: the labour market…
Dependent variable: log hourly wages
Models consider labour market participants only
Reference category for statistical signifcance. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p< 0.01
Table 18 (continued)
Independent variables
Female immigrants Male immigrants
Home-country marriage Native marriage Foreign marriage Home-country marriage Native marriage Foreign marriage
Coefcient Robust
S.E
Coefcient Robust
S.E
Coefcient Robust
S.E
Coefcient Robust
S.E
Coefcient Robust
S.E
Coefcient Robust
S.E

East – 0.0193 0.0160
MWest
South
– 0.0874*** 0.0187
– 0.0998*** 0.0144
Whnh
Blnh
AIANnh
0.2470***
0.1738***
0.1707
0.0206
0.0518
0.1077
0.0171
0.0580
AsianPInh 0.3114***
Othernh 0.2723***
0.0532* 0.0297
– 0.1146*** 0.0314
– 0.1209*** 0.0233
0.1163***
0.0794
0.0283
0.0902

-0.0457 0.0485 -0.0439*** 0.0141

-0.0064 0.0314
-0.1193*** 0.0320
-0.1621*** 0.0248
0.2303***
0.0371
-0.3895
0.0280
0.0833
0.3464

– 0.0347 0.0386
0.0252 0.0861 -0.0661*** 0.0154 0.0047 0.0599
-0.0825* 0.0458 -0.0984*** 0.0114 – 0.0742* 0.0395
0.2065*** 0.0521

0.4014***
0.1428***
0.3600***
0.1625***
0.1491***
0.0181
0.0460
0.0966
0.0153
0.0467

0.2859*** 0.0440
0.2049** 0.1010 0.0171 0.0921

0.3180
0.0810***
0.2502**
0.3313
0.0276
0.1056

1.6439*** 0.1223 0.0000 (omitted)
0.2490*** 0.0483

0.2264***
0.0115
0.0426
0.1024

0.1157** 0.0464
-0.2662 0.2088 – 0.0944 0.2660
Immigshare
– 0.0245*** 0.0037 – 0.0075 0.0087 0.0084 0.0140 -0.0117*** 0.0027 -0.0002 0.0071 – 0.0120 0.0113
Constant 1.7198*** 0.1346 1.2319*** 0.2439 1.0660** 0.4848 1.6503*** 0.1083 1.1553*** 0.2334 0.8476** 0.3653
R2 0.3371 0.2018 0.2542 0.3347 0.2841 0.3064
Observation
14,855 5384 1586 22,977 4879 2191
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Table 19 Regression results without working hours for earnings of ‘foreign marriage immigrants (both
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