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Problem-Oriented Policing

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8
Critic
Problem-Oriented Policing: The Disconnect between
Principles and Practice
Anthony A. Braga and David Weisburd
Problem-oriented policing works to identify why things are going wrong and to
frame responses using a wide variety of innovative approaches (Goldstein, 1979).
Using a basic iterative approach of problem identification, analysis, response,
assessment, and adjustment of the response, this adaptable and dynamic analytic
approach provides an appropriate framework to uncover the complex mechanisms
at play in crime problems and to develop tailor-made interventions to address the
underlying conditions that cause crime problems (Eck & Spelman, 1987;
Goldstein, 1990). Many police departments have experimented with the
approach and the available evaluation evidence suggests that problem-oriented
policing is a fundamentally sound approach to controlling crime and disorder
problems (Skogan & Frydl, 2004; Weisburd & Eck, 2004; Braga, 2008;
Weisburd et al., 2010). The US National Academies of Science, Engineering, and
Medicine Committee on Proactive Policing recently reviewed the more rigorous
evaluations of problem-oriented policing and concluded that these programs lead
to short-term reductions in crime and disorder (Weisburd & Majmundar, 2018).
But is the “problem-oriented policing” that researchers have evaluated
similar to the model of problem-oriented policing that its originators
proposed? There is substantial evidence that, too often, the principles
envisioned by Herman Goldstein are not being practiced in the field.
Deficiencies in current problem-oriented policing practices exist in all phases
of the process. A number of scholars have identified challenging issues in the
substance and implementation of many problem-oriented policing projects,
including the tendency for officers to conduct only a superficial analysis of
problems and rushing to implement a response, the tendency for officers to
rely on traditional or faddish responses rather than conducting a wider search
for creative responses, and the tendency to completely ignore the assessment of
the effectiveness of implemented responses (Cordner, 1998; but also see Clarke,
1998; Read & Tilley, 2000; Scott & Clarke, 2000). Indeed, the research
literature is filled with a long history of cases where problem-oriented policing
182
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programs tend to lean toward traditional methods and where the problemsolving process is weak (Goldstein & Susmilch, 1982; Eck & Spelman, 1987;
Buerger, 1994; Capowich, Roehl & Andrews, 1995; Read & Tilley, 2000).
In his review of several hundred submissions for the Police Executive Research
Forum’s Herman Goldstein Award for Excellence in Problem-Oriented
Policing, Clarke (1998) laments that many problem-oriented policing projects
bear little resemblance to Goldstein’s original definition. Eck (2000) comments
that contemporary problem-oriented policing is but a shadow of the original
concept.
In this chapter, we examine the nature of problem solving and problemoriented policing as it is practiced in the field. Our main conclusion is that
there is a disconnect between the rhetoric and reality of problem-oriented
policing, and that this is not likely to change irrespective of the efforts of
scholars and policy makers. Indeed, we take a very different approach to
this problem than others who have examined the deficiencies of problemoriented approaches. We argue that there is much evidence that what might
be called “shallow” problem solving can be effective in combating crime
problems. This being the case, we question whether the pursuit of problemoriented policing, as it has been modeled by Goldstein and others, should
be abandoned in favor of the achievement of a more realistic type of
problem solving. While less satisfying for scholars, it is what the police
have tended to do, and it has been found to lead to real crime prevention
benefits.
defining the problem
To understand our argument, it is useful to review the problems that police
encounter at each stage of the well-known SARA model (Scanning, Analysis,
Response, Assessment) that was developed in Newport News, Virginia, to
crystallize the problem-oriented process (Eck & Spelman, 1987). It is worth
noting here that other models have been developed to guide police officers in
their problem-solving efforts. For instance, Ekblom (2005) proposed the
“5Is” (Intelligence, Intervention, Implementation, Involvement, Impact) as
a better way to capture what problem-oriented policing calls for and ideally
does. SARA, however, remains the most influential model for implementing
problem-oriented policing. In practice, many problem-oriented policing
projects that follow the SARA model do not follow its linear stepwise
approach. Rather, the steps tend to occur simultaneously or in a fashion by
which officers move back and forth between scanning, analysis, and responses
(Capowich & Roehl, 1994; Braga, 1997; Cordner & Biebel, 2005).
Nevertheless, the model provides a useful way to structure our discussion of
the disconnect between principles and practice in the problem-oriented
policing process.
8 Critic: Problem-Oriented Policing 183
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Scanning
Scanning involves the identification of problems that are worth looking at
because they are important and amenable to solution. Herman Goldstein
(1990) suggests that the definition of problems be at the street level of analysis
and not be restricted by preconceived typologies. Goldstein further clarifies
what is meant by a problem by specifying the term as “a cluster of similar,
related, or recurring incidents rather than a single incident; a substantive
community concern; or a unit of police business” (1990: 66). To ensure that
problems are specified correctly, it is important to break down larger categories
of crime into more specific kinds of offenses (Clarke, 1997). For example, auto
theft should be further specified into particular types of auto theft such as “joy
riding” or “stripping for auto parts.” Close analysis of these specific problems
may lead to very different types of intervention that might be more appropriate
for each component of an auto theft problem when compared to a more general
approach.
There are many ways a problem might be nominated for police attention.
A police officer may rely upon his or her informal knowledge of a community to
identify a problem that he or she thinks is important to the well-being of the
community. Another approach to identifying problems is through consultation
with community groups of different kinds, including other government
agencies. Another possibility is to identify problems from the examination of
citizen calls for service coming in to a police department. This approach is
implicitly recommended by those who advocate “repeat call analysis” in the
identification of crime “hot spots” (Sherman & Weisburd, 1988; Sherman,
Gartin & Buerger, 1989; Weisburd & Mazerolle, 2000). The notion is that
citizens will let the police know what problems are concerning them by making
calls as individuals. Problems can be identified by examining the distribution of
crime incidents at specific public or private places such as stores, bars,
restaurants, shopping malls, ATM locations, apartment buildings, and other
facilities (Clarke & Eck, 2007).
Crime mapping remains a very popular way for police departments to
identify existing crime problems (Weisburd, Mastrofski & Greenspan, 2001)
and, relatedly, hot spots policing has diffused widely among police departments
as a strategy to address identified high-crime places (Weisburd & Lum, 2005).
Problem-oriented policing has been applied to address crime hot spots with the
available evaluation evidence suggesting stronger crime prevention impacts
relative to simply increasing traditional policing activities in targeted highcrime places (Braga, Papachristos & Hureau, 2014).
Relative to their performance in other phases of the process, police officers
are generally good at identifying problems (Bynum, 2001). However, Clarke
(1998) suggests that problem-oriented police officers often fail to make
appropriate specifications of the problems they are addressing in one of two
ways: they either undertake a project that is too small or too big. Small, beat-
184 Anthony A. Braga and David Weisburd
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level projects, such as dealing with a confused lonely old man who is seeking
some daily companionship by repeatedly calling the police for a variety of
concerns, may be better handled as a citywide project addressing older
citizens who live alone and generate a large number of calls for trivial matters
(Clarke, 1998). Some overly ambitious initiatives, such as dealing with “gang
delinquency” or focusing on a “problem neighborhood,” do not represent
a single problem, but a collection of problems. For example, in the “problem
neighborhood,” there could be a diverse set of problems such as drug markets,
auto theft, and domestic violence. These are separate problems that require
individual attention. Problems in problem-oriented policing programs are often
broadly identified; this destroys the discrete problem focus of the project and
leads to a lack of direction at the beginning of analysis (Clarke, 1998).
Analysis
The analysis phase challenges police officers to analyze the causes of problems
behind a string of crime incidents or substantive community concern. Once the
underlying conditions that give rise to crime problems are known, police officers
develop and implement appropriate responses. The challenge to police officers
is to go beyond the analysis that naturally occurs to them; namely, to find the
places and times where particular offenses are likely to occur, and to identify the
offenders who are likely to be responsible for the crimes. Although these
approaches have had some operational success, this type of analysis usually
produces directed patrol operations or a focus on repeat offenders. The idea of
analysis was intended to go beyond this. Unfortunately, as Boba (2003)
observes, while problem-oriented policing has blossomed in both concept and
practice, problem analysis has been the slowest part of the process to develop.
In his twenty-year review of problem-oriented policing, Michael Scott (2000)
concludes that problem analysis remains the aspect of problem-oriented
policing that is most in need of improvement. The Police Executive Research
Forum’s national assessment of the US Community Oriented Policing Services
(COPS)-sponsored “Problem Solving Partnerships” program also found that
problem analysis was the weakest phase of the problem-oriented policing
process (PERF, 2000).
Bynum (2001) suggests that police have difficulty clearly defining problems,
properly using data sources, conducting comprehensive analyses, and
implementing analysis-driven responses. Some officers skip the analysis phase
or conduct an overly simple analysis that does not adequately dissect the
problem or does not use relevant information from other agencies (such as
hospitals, schools, and private businesses) (Clarke, 1998). Based on his
extensive experience with police departments implementing problem-oriented
policing, Eck (2000) suggests that much problem analysis consists of a simple
examination of police data coupled with the officer’s working experience with
the problem. In their analysis of problem-oriented initiatives in forty-three
8 Critic: Problem-Oriented Policing 185
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police departments in England and Wales, Read and Tilley (2000) found that
problem analysis was generally weak with many initiatives accepting the
definition of a problem at face value, using only short-term data to unravel
the nature of the problem, and failing to adequately examine the genesis of the
crime problems.
Analyzing problems at crime hot spots may present a particularly vexing
challenge to problem-oriented police officers. Given the contemporary
popularity of crime mapping in the identification of problems worthy of
police attention, we feel that it is important to highlight the difficulties in
analyzing problems at hot spots. High-activity crime places tend to have
multiple problems and the problems at crime places can be quite complex and
involved. In their close analysis of hot spots in Minneapolis, Weisburd and his
colleagues (1992) suggest that a heterogeneous mix of crime types occur at high
activity crime places rather than a concentration of one type of crime occurring
at a place. In their examination of problem-oriented policing in San Diego,
Capowich and Roehl (1994: 144) observed that multiple problems tend to
coincide at places and report, “at the beat level, there are no pure cases in
which the problem can be captured under a single classification. The range of
problems is wide, with each presenting unique circumstances.” In Oakland’s
Beat Health program to deal with drug nuisance locations, officers encountered
difficulties unraveling what was happening at a place and deciding how it
should be addressed (Green, 1996). Evaluations of problem-oriented policing
programs to control crime hot spots in Lowell (Braga & Bond, 2008) and
Boston (Braga, Hureau & Papachristos, 2011), Massachusetts, also noted the
multitude of identified problems at each crime place and the challenges faced by
officers in analyzing these problems.
In the Jersey City (NJ) problem-oriented policing in violent crime hot spots
experiment, the number of identified problems per place ranged from three to
seven, with a mean of 4.7 problems per place (Braga, 1997; Braga et al., 1999).
Table 8.1 presents the problems identified by officers for further analysis and
the key characteristics of violent crime hot spots in the Jersey City problemoriented policing experiment. From their training and the reading materials
made available to them, the problem-oriented officers expected that they would
be preventing violence at each place by focusing on very specific underlying
characteristics or situational factors. After examining places closely, the officers
observed that they would be controlling a multitude of crime problems. All
twelve places were perceived to suffer from social disorder problems such as
loitering, public drinking, and panhandling; eleven places suffered from
physical disorder such as trash-filled streets, vacant lots, and abandoned
buildings. Seven places had problems with illicit drug selling and three places
had problems with property crimes.
Across and within places in the Jersey City problem-oriented policing
experiment, few problems were analyzed thoroughly (Braga, 1997). Eck and
Spelman (1987) suggest two classifications for the depth of problem analysis:
186 Anthony A. Braga and David Weisburd
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table 8.1 Problems and Characteristics of Twelve Violent Crime Places
Place Problems Relevant Characteristics
1

Assault and robbery of commuters Train and bus terminals
Shoplifting
Pick-pocketing
Drug selling
Restaurants and retail stores
Abandoned buildings
Abandoned automobiles
Homeless loitering and panhandling Holes in fences around terminal
Disorderly groups of youths Poor lighting
Physical disorder Piles of lumber used by loiterers
Piles of trash deposited by illegal
dumpers
Major thoroughfare
Bodega
Street fights
Drug market
Public drinking and drug use Tavern
Disorderly groups of youths Abandoned buildings
Physical disorder Vacant lot
Assault and robbery of college students College campus
Burglary and larceny on campus
Loitering
Minor drug selling
Physical disorder
Multiple bus stops
Trash-strewn vacant lot with tall weeds
Low-income apartment building
Trash-strewn alley
Poor lighting
Grammar/middle school
Community college
Assault and robbery of students
Car jacking
Homeless loiterers Retail stores
Disorderly groups of youths Major intersection
Robbery of retail stores
Street fights
Disorderly groups of youths
Retail stores
Restaurants
Major thoroughfare
Public drinking Poor lighting
Physical disorder
Drug market Liquor store
Loitering Major thoroughfare
Public drinking Poor lighting
Physical disorder
Robbery of elderly
Disorderly groups of youths
Physical disorder
Senior citizen housing complex
Low-income housing project
Interstitial area between middle- and
lower-class neighborhoods
Poor lighting
Bus stop
Large low-income apartment building
Tavern
Retail stores
(continued)
Drug market
Street fights
Bar fights

2 3 4 5 6 7 8 8 Critic: Problem-Oriented Policing 187
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limited analysis and extended analysis. Eck and Spelman (1987) grouped
problem-solving efforts by the Newport News (VA) Police Department by
determining whether there were obvious information sources that were not
used, given the nature of the problem; if there were not any obvious unused
sources, the effort was classified as extended. Using these definitions, slightly
less than one third (31.1 per cent; 19 of 61) of the identified problems in the
Jersey City study received what could be described as an extended analysis.
It must be noted that, for certain problems, a superficial analysis was all that
was necessary (e.g., alleviating a trash problem by recognizing that there were
not any trash receptacles at the place). Weak problem analyses occurred for two
reasons. First, at ten of twelve places, the officers believed that they “knew what
was going on” based on their working knowledge and “on the spot” appraisals
of problems. Second, the officers believed that most of the street crime at the
place could be linked directly or indirectly to the physical and social disorder of
table 8.1 (continued)
Place Problems Relevant Characteristics
Disorderly groups loitering
Public drinking
Physical disorder
9 Active indoor and outdoor drug market Abandoned buildings

Street fights
Loitering
Low-income apartment building
Major thoroughfare
Public drinking Vacant lots
Physical disorder
Robbery of convenience stores Retail stores
Disorderly groups of youths
Loitering
Major thoroughfare
Trash-strewn streets
Burglaries
Physical disorder
Street fights
Drug market
Abandoned buildings
Residential neighborhood
Public drinking Poor lighting
Loitering
Physical disorder
Vacant lots
Graffiti
Trash-strewn streets
Park
Taverns
Poor lighting
Retail stores and restaurants
Trash-strewn streets
Drug market
Bar fights
Street fights
Public drinking
Loitering
Disorderly groups of youths
Physical disorder

10 11 12 188 Anthony A. Braga and David Weisburd
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a place. From their problem-oriented policing training, the officers were
familiar with the “broken windows” thesis and much preferred the simplicity
of a general plan to restore order and reduce crime at places over the specifics of
the SARA model to control the multiple and interrelated problems of a place.
Rather than conducting rigorous analysis of crime problems and developing
tailor-made solutions, the officers generally attempted to control their places via
aggressive order maintenance and making physical improvements such as
securing vacant lots or removing trash from the street.
Responses
After a problem has been clearly defined and analyzed, police officers confront
the challenge of developing a plausibly effective response. The development of
appropriate responses is closely linked with the analysis that is performed.
The analysis reveals the potential targets for an intervention, and it is at least
partly the idea about what form the intervention might take that suggests
important lines of analysis. As such, the reason police often look at places and
times where crimes are committed is that they are already imagining that an
effective way to prevent the crimes would be to get officers on the scene through
directed patrols. The reason they often look for the likely offender is that they
think that the most effective and just response to a crime problem would be to
arrest and incapacitate the offender. However, the concept of “problemoriented policing” as envisioned by Herman Goldstein (1990), calls on the
police to make a much more “uninhibited” search for possible responses and
not to limit themselves to getting officers in the right places at the right times, or
identifying and arresting the offender (although both may be valuable
responses). Effective responses often depend on getting other people to take
actions that reduce the opportunities for criminal offending, or to mobilize
informal social control to drive offenders away from certain locations.
Newer intelligence-led policing and predictive policing models overlap with
problem-oriented policing in the analysis of crime problems to drive decisionmaking on police deployments and crime prevention strategies. Intelligence-led
policing challenges police departments to enhance criminal intelligence and
crime data collection and analysis techniques to improve the strategic
management of crime problems, especially those generated by prolific and
serious offenders (Ratcliffe, 2016). Predictive policing uses statistical
algorithms that draw on different types of data to anticipate where and when
crime might occur and to identify patterns among past criminal incidents (Perry
et al., 2013; Ratcliffe, 2014). To date, unfortunately, most police crime
prevention strategies generated through enhanced analyses in intelligence-led
and predictive policing models have been comprised of traditional enforcement
activities rather than nuanced responses rooted in underlying conditions and
dynamics that give rise to recurring crime problems (Eck, Chapter 7 in this
volume; Boba, Chapter 16 in this volume).
8 Critic: Problem-Oriented Policing 189
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The available research evidence suggests that the responses of many
problem-oriented policing projects rely heavily upon traditional police tactics
(such as arrests, surveillance, and crackdowns) and neglect the wider range of
available alternative responses (Clarke, 1998). Many evaluations of problemoriented policing efforts have documented a preponderance of traditional
policing tactics (see, e.g., Capowich & Roehl, 1994; Cordner, 1994). Read
and Tilley (2000) found that officers selected certain responses prior to, or in
spite of, analysis; failed to think through the need for a sustained crime
reduction; failed to think through the mechanisms by which the response
could have a measurable impact; failed to fully involve partners; narrowly
focused responses, usually on offenders; as well as a number of other
weakness in the response development process. Cordner (1998) observed that
some problem-oriented policing projects gravitate toward faddish responses
rather than implementing a response that truly fits the nature of the problem.
As suggested above, the complexity of problems at crime hot spots may
discourage police officers from developing innovative responses. For example,
frustrated narcotics officers may choose to chase drug dealers at a place rather
than implementing a plan to change the multiple underlying characteristics of
a place that make it an attractive spot for illicit drug sales (Green, 1996; Eck &
Wartell, 1998; Taylor, 1998). In the Jersey City problem-oriented policing
experiment, the numerous responses implemented at the violent crime hot
spots mirrored the complexity of the problems they were intended to control
(Braga, 1997). Twenty-eight types of responses were implemented across the
places (Table 8.2). The number of responses per place ranged from one to
twelve, with a mean of 6.7 responses per place. Traditional policing tactics
were used at all places and comprised between 14 percent (Place 7) and
100 percent (Place 4 and Place 10) of the responses per place. On average,
almost a third (31.1 per cent) of the responses implemented per place involved
traditional enforcement. Situational interventions intended to modify the
characteristics of a place were implemented at ten of twelve treatment places.
The situational strategies varied according to the nuances of the problems at
places (e.g., razing an abandoned building or the code inspection of a tavern).
However, at all locations, a package of aggressive order maintenance
interventions was used to control the social disorder of the places. These
tactics included repeat foot and radio car patrols, dispersing groups of
loiterers, issuing summons for public drinking, “stop and frisks” of suspicious
persons, and so on. At nine places, drug enforcement was used to disrupt drug
sales at the place. The officers believed that an increased presence and the
harassment of illicit users of the place would quell egregious social disorder,
at least temporarily, until a better plan could be developed and implemented.
According to the officers, aggressive order maintenance was a treatment that
could affect all illicit activity no matter what the variation: drug selling, loitering
by disorderly youth, homeless panhandlers, predatory robbers – all could be
affected by an increased presence in a bounded geographical area. The Jersey
190 Anthony A. Braga and David Weisburd
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table 8.2 Responses to Problems at Violent Crime Places
Place Responses
1 Aggressive order maintenance to disperse loitering homeless and disorderly
youths
Drug enforcement to disrupt street-level drug sales around train and bus
terminal
Robbery investigation to apprehend robbery crew
Public works removed trash at place to discourage illegal dumping
Hung “No dumping – Police take notice” sign to discourage illegal dumping
Fixed holes in fence to secure access to the bus and train terminal
Boarded and fenced abandoned buildings to prevent drug activity and squatting
Helped homeless find shelter and substance abuse treatment
Dispensed crime prevention literature to commuters
Removed piles of lumber to discourage loitering
2 Aggressive order maintenance to disperse groups of disorderly youths
Drug enforcement to disrupt street-level drug sales on street corner and from
bodega
Required store owners to clean trash from store fronts
Erected fences to secure vacant lot from illicit drug activity
Cleaned vacant lot
Boarded and fenced abandoned buildings to prevent drug activity
Removed drug-selling crew’s stashed guns
Housing code enforcement to repair dilapidated building
Eviction of drug seller from low-income apartment at place
Surveillance of drug offenders using videotapes
3 Aggressive order maintenance to disperse loiterers from vacant lot and
apartment building area
Drug enforcement to disrupt street-level drug sales from vacant lot, alley, and
apartment building
Robbery investigation to apprehend robbery crew
Cut weeds and removed trash from vacant lot
Erected fence around vacant lot to prevent drug sales and robberies
Public works removed trash and drug paraphernalia from alley
Public works trimmed trees to increase lighting around vacant lot, alley, and
apartment building
Dispensed crime prevention literature to students and campus security
Improved apartment building security by adding new door locks; prevented
access to drug dealers
4 Aggressive order maintenance to disperse vagrants and groups of disorderly
youths
Directed patrol before and after school hours
Robbery investigation to apprehend robbery crew
5 Aggressive order maintenance to disperse groups of disorderly youths
Required store owners to clean store fronts
(continued)
8 Critic: Problem-Oriented Policing 191
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table 8.2 (continued)
Place Responses
Changed style of trash cans to prevent loitering
6 Aggressive order maintenance to disperse loiterers
Drug enforcement to disrupt street-level drug sales in front of liquor store
Required store owners to clean store fronts
Opened and cleaned vacant lot to allow neighborhood kids to play basketball
Repaired street lights to increase lighting in area
Housing code enforcement to clean apartment building used as stash house
7 Aggressive order maintenance to disperse loitering groups of disorderly youths
Housing code enforcement to remove trash from within housing project
Evicted squatters and drug sellers from unoccupied apartments in low-income
housing project
Public works removed trash from around low-income housing project
Improved housing project security by adding new locks to doors; prevented
access to drug dealers
Improved lighting around housing project by installing floodlights and
replacing streetlights
Enforced parking ordinances around housing project to impound cars of drug
sellers and buyers
8 Aggressive order maintenance to disperse loiterers
Intensive drug enforcement to disrupt street-level sales and dismantle major
drug organization
Required store owners to clean store fronts
Code investigation of taverns
9 Aggressive order maintenance to disperse loiterers
Drug enforcement to disrupt street-level drug sales
Housing code enforcement to clean up low-income property
Evicted drug sellers from low-income apartment building
Boarded and fenced abandoned buildings to prevent drug activity
Razed abandoned buildings
Cleaned vacant lots
Public works removed trash from street
Erected fences around vacant lots to secure from drug activity
Surveillance of offenders at place using video tapes
Hung sign “No drug selling – Area under video surveillance by police”
10 Aggressive order maintenance to disperse groups of disorderly youths
11 Aggressive order maintenance to disperse loiterers
Drug enforcement to disrupt street-level drug sales
Surveillance of offenders at place using video tapes
Hung sign “No public drinking – Area under video surveillance by police”
Public works trimmed trees to increase lighting in area
Boarded and fenced abandoned buildings to prevent drug activity
Cleaned vacant lot
Erected fence around vacant lot to secure from drug activity
192 Anthony A. Braga and David Weisburd
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City officers much preferred this strategy to the additional work necessary to
implement alternative situational responses (Braga, 1997).
Assessment
The crucial last step in the practice of problem-oriented policing is to assess the
impact the intervention has had on the problem it was supposed to solve.
Assessment is important for at least two different reasons. The first is to
ensure that police remain accountable for their performance and for their use
of resources. Citizens and their representatives want to know how the money
and freedom they surrendered to the police are being used, and whether
important results in the form of less crime, enhanced security, or increased
citizen satisfaction with the police has been achieved. A second reason
assessment is important is to allow the police to learn about what methods
are effective in dealing with particular problems. Unless the police check to see
whether their efforts produced a result, it will be hard for them to improve their
practices.
The degree of rigor applied to the assessment of problem-oriented initiatives
will necessarily vary across the size and overall importance of the problems
addressed (Clarke, 1998). Serious, large and recurrent problems such as
controlling gang violence or handling domestic disputes deserve highly
rigorous examinations. Other problems that are less serious, or common,
such as a lonely elderly person making repeat calls to the police for
companionship, are obviously not worth such close examinations.
Unfortunately, Scott and Clarke (2000) observe that assessment of responses
is rare and, when undertaken, it is usually cursory and limited to anecdotal or
impressionistic data.
Clarke’s (1998: 319–320) review of submissions for the Herman Goldstein
award provides a good summary of the common limitations of assessments
table 8.2 (continued)
Place Responses
Removed graffiti from building
Mobilized residents to keep streets clean in front of their homes
Public works removed trash from street
Added trash receptacles to prevent litter
12 Aggressive order maintenance to disperse loiterers and groups of disorderly
youth
Drug enforcement to disrupt drug sales at park and in and around bars
Code investigation of taverns; one bar shut down and other bar owners
discontinue sales of “take-out” alcohol
Required storeowners to clean storefronts
8 Critic: Problem-Oriented Policing 193
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performed by police departments engaged in problem-oriented policing
projects:
• Police report reductions in calls for service or arrests without relating the
results to specific actions taken. In other words, the police frequently fail to
examine whether variations in “dosage levels” of the response correlate with
variations in relevant crime statistics.
• Police consider assessment only as an afterthought, rather than building it
into the original outline of the project.
• Police fail to present any control data. For example, if some action has been
taken in one location that appears to have produced a decrease in the number
of calls for service, the police do not generally document what, if anything,
happened in a similar nearby location where no action was taken.
• On the rare occasion when control data are presented, police fail to ensure
that the control is adequate. For example, the control location may be so
different from the original site that it is impossible to conclude anything from
the comparison.
• Police fail to study displacement. Many agencies do not realize that their
response may simply have pushed the problem elsewhere.
It is worth noting here that the existing program evaluation evidence base for
problem-oriented policing largely consists of weaker evaluation studies while
rigorous studies comprise a very small group (Braga, 2010; Weisburd &
Majmundar, 2018). Indeed, Weisburd et al. (2010) only identified ten
evaluations that met the minimum methodological standards of their
systematic review – a comparison group that did not receive the problemoriented policing treatment. Their systematic review also identified forty-five
before/after intervention studies without a strong control or comparison group.
Weak evaluations, unfortunately, provide less valid answers to policy questions
when compared to well-designed quasi-experiments and randomized controlled
trials (Weisburd, Lum & Petrosino, 2001; Shadish, Cook & Campbell, 2002).
When the evaluation evidence base is largely informed by weak designs,
practitioners risk implementing certain treatments or programs as effective
crime prevention practices when they are not; this can lead to significant
economic and social costs (see, e.g., Boruch, 1975; Weisburd, 2003). Beyond
improving officer assessments of specific problem-oriented policing projects
implemented by local police departments, the rigor of more formal problemoriented policing program evaluations needs to be improved.
Is “Shallow” Problem Solving Enough?
Despite the gap between the desired application of the approach and its actual
implementation, there is considerable evidence that problem-oriented policing
is effective in preventing crime (see, e.g., Skogan & Frydl, 2004; Weisburd &
Eck, 2004; Braga, 2008; Weisburd et al., 2010; Weisburd & Majmundar,
194 Anthony A. Braga and David Weisburd
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2018). This suggests that problem-oriented policing interventions may not need
to be implemented in the ways envisioned by Herman Goldstein in order to
produce a crime prevention effect. Perhaps, simply focusing police resources on
identifiable risks that come to the attention of problem-oriented policing
projects, such as high-activity offenders, repeat victims, and crime hot spots,
may be enough to produce crime control gains. Therefore, we think that it is
critically important to refine and extend current definitions of police crime
prevention efforts.
Given the long police tradition of responding to high-crime locations and the
current popularity of hot spots policing, our concluding discussion focuses on
police crime efforts at high-crime places. These concepts could also be applied
to offender- and victim-focused responses. Figure 8.1 presents a continuum of
strategies, ranging from traditional to innovative, that police can use to control
crime at high-crime places. At one extreme, police departments use traditional,
incident-driven strategies to control crime in the community. Although these
activities coincidentally cluster in space and time, these ad-hoc enforcement
strategies are not specifically targeted at problem places and the limitations of
this approach are, by now, well known. Based on Eck’s (1993) examination of
alternative futures for problem-oriented policing, problem-solving efforts can
be divided into “enforcement” and “situational” problem-oriented policing
programs. “Enforcement” problem-oriented policing interventions have
moved the police response forward by focusing mostly traditional tactics at
high-risk times and locations. Although these programs are “problemoriented” in a global way, their tactics do not employ the individualized
treatments to crime problems advocated by Herman Goldstein (1990). These
interventions have included optimizing patrol time in hot spots (Koper, 1995;
Sherman & Weisburd, 1995), conducting aggressive Terry searches for guns in
areas that are known for high levels of firearms violence (Sherman, Shaw &
Rogan, 1995), and implementing systematic crackdowns in street-level drug
markets (Weisburd & Green, 1995).
Traditional Innovative

Incident-Driven
· Random Patrol
Enforcement
· Directed Patrol
POP Situational POP
· Understanding Causal
Mechanisms
· Investigation and Arrest · Crackdowns
· Implementing
· Rapid Response · Terry Searches Alternative Responses

· Collaborating with
Others
figure 8.1 Continuum of Police Strategies to Control High-Crime Places
8 Critic: Problem-Oriented Policing 195
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These enforcement problem-oriented policing interventions focus mainly on the
time and location of crime events, rather than focusing on the characteristics and
dynamics of a place that make it a hot spot for criminal activity. Although these
interventions have produced crime control gains and have added to law
enforcement’s array of crime prevention tools, it is commonly assumed that
police could be more effective if they focused their efforts on the criminogenic
attributes that cause a place to be “hot.” In other words, adding an increased level
of guardianship at a place by optimizing patrol is a step in controlling crime, but
reducing criminal opportunities by changing site features, facilities, and the
management at a place (e.g., adding streetlights, razing abandoned buildings, and
mobilizing residents) may have a more profound effect on crime. At the innovative
end of the continuum is Goldstein’s (1990) vision of “situational” problemoriented policing: members of police agencies undertake thorough analysis of
crime problems at places, collaborate with community members and other city
agencies, and conduct a broad search for situational responses to problems.
Similar to other studies, translating problem-oriented policing theory into
practice was difficult for Jersey City problem-oriented police officers. On the
continuum of police strategies to control high-activity crime places, the
program as implemented would fit between enforcement and situational
problem-oriented interventions (see Figure 8.1). Despite falling short of
Goldstein’s vision, the Jersey City problem-oriented policing program was
still found to be effective in preventing crime (Braga et al., 1999). Some
scholars would describe the efforts of the Jersey City police officers as
“problem solving” rather than problem-oriented policing (Cordner, 1998).
Problem solving is a “shallow” version of problem-oriented policing as these
efforts are smaller in scope, involve rudimentary analysis, and lack formal
assessments. According to Cordner (1998), problem solving better describes
what an officer does to handle a particular dispute or drug house rather than
initiatives to deal with problems of substantial magnitude like prostitution in
a downtown area and thefts from autos in parking lots. Enforcement problemoriented initiatives would also fit what we would consider shallow problem
solving. When the complexities of crime problems at places and the difficulties
police officers experience in unraveling these problems and implementing
individualized responses are considered, shallow problem solving can be
a very practical way for police departments to prevent crimes at places. And,
as suggested by a growing evidence base, shallow problem-solving efforts to
control high-crime locations do seem to control crime and disorder problems
(e.g., see Braga & Bond, 2008; Braga, Hureau & Papachristos, 2011).
Should We Expect Police Agencies to Develop More
In-Depth Problem Solving?
Problem-oriented policing advocates lament the state-of-the-art in problem
solving and offer a laundry list of suggestions to improve the capacity of
196 Anthony A. Braga and David Weisburd
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police agencies to engage strategic problem solving (see, e.g., Scott, 2000; Boba,
2003; Braga, 2008). Is it realistic to expect police agencies to develop their
capacity to conduct more in-depth problem-oriented policing so their officers
can go beyond the shallow problem solving that is practiced in the field?
Cordner and Biebel (2005) found that, despite fifteen years of national
promotion and a concerted effort at implementation within the San Diego
Police Department, problem-oriented policing as practiced by ordinary police
officers fell far short of the ideal model. Cordner and Biebel (2005) suggest that
it may be unreasonable to expect every police officer to continuously engage in
full-fledged problem-oriented policing.
We believe that it is unlikely that police agencies will enhance their problemsolving efforts in the foreseeable future. There seems to be, at least, two obstacles.
First, the hierarchical organizational structure of policing in itself tends to inhibit
innovation and creativity. In their close examination of CompStat, Willis,
Mastrofski, and Weisburd (2004) found that, while the program holds out the
promise of allowing police agencies to adopt innovative technologies and
problem-solving techniques, it actually hindered innovative problem solving
while strengthening the existing hierarchy through the added pressure of
increased internal accountability. Officers were reluctant to brainstorm problemsolving approaches during CompStat meetings for fear of undermining authority
or the credibility of their colleagues. Moreover, the danger of “looking bad” in
front of superior officers discouraged middle managers from pursuing more
creative crime strategies with a higher risk of failure.
Second, the organizational culture of policing is resistant to this in-depth
approach to problem solving. The community policing movement that emerged
in the 1980s stressed greater police recognition of the role of the community and
emphasized “decentralization” and “debureaucratization” to empower rank
and file officers to make decisions about how to better serve the neighborhoods
to which they were assigned (Skolnick & Bayley, 1986; Mastrofski, 1998).
Weisburd and his colleagues (2003) suggest that the popularity and rapid
diffusion of CompStat programs across larger police departments in the
United States during the 1990s could be interpreted as an effort to maintain
and reinforce traditional police structures rather than an attempt to truly reform
American policing. The rapid rise of CompStat within police agencies did not
enhance their strategic problem-solving capacity at the beat level as CompStat
departments were found to be reluctant to relinquish power that would
decentralize some key elements of decision making such as allowing middle
managers to determine beat boundaries and staffing levels, enhancing
operational flexibility, and risk going beyond the standard tool kit of police
tactics and strategies (Weisburd et al., 2003). The overall effect of the spread of
CompStat, whether intended or not, was to reinforce the traditional
bureaucratic model of command and control.
More generally, the type of in-depth problem solving that Goldstein and
other problem-oriented policing advocates have proposed seems unrealistic in
8 Critic: Problem-Oriented Policing 197
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the real world of policing, especially at the street level where it is often
envisioned. In the real world of police organizations, community and problemoriented police officers rarely have the latitude necessary to assess and respond
to problems creatively. As William Bratton (1998: 199) observed in his
assessment of community policing in New York City at the beginning of his
tenure, “street-level police officers were never going to be empowered to follow
through.” CompStat was offered as a solution to this problem, but the ability of
the rank and file officer to make decisions changed little as middle managers
were held accountable for achieving organizational goals of successful crime
control (Willis et al., 2004). Of course, decentralizing decision-making power to
line-level officers does not guarantee effective problem solving. In their
assessment of problem solving in Chicago, a police department well known
for its efforts to decentralize their organization to facilitate community policing,
Skogan and his colleagues (1999: 231) gave a failing grade ranging from
“struggling” to “woeful” for problem solving efforts in 40 per cent of the
beats they studied. Inadequate management, poor leadership and vision, lack
of training, and weak performance measures were among the operational
problems identified as affecting problem solving in the poorly performing
beats (Skogan et al., 1999).
conclusion
Problem-oriented policing represents an important innovation in American
policing. However, as we have illustrated, the practice of problem-oriented
policing too often falls short of the principles suggested by Herman Goldstein
(1990). Given the extensive literature on the gap between principles and
practice, it seems unrealistic to expect line-level officers to conduct in-depth
problem-oriented policing as their routine way of dealing with crime problems.
Successful applications of problem-oriented policing usually involve largerscale problems, the involvement of academic researchers and crime analysis
units, and the solid support of the police command staff to implement
alternative responses. The Boston Police Department’s Operation Ceasefire
intervention to prevent gang violence (Braga et al., 2001; Braga, Hureau &
Papachristos, 2014), the Newport News Police Department’s efforts to reduce
thefts from cars parked in shipyard parking lots (Eck & Spelman, 1987), and
the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department’s program to reduce theft from
construction sites (Clarke & Goldstein, 2002) involved resources that were far
beyond the reach of the rank and file police officer.
Research evidence suggests that shallow problem-solving efforts, ranging from
focused enforcement efforts in high-risk places and at high-risk times to problem
solving with weak analyses, mostly traditional responses, and limited assessments,
are enough to prevent crime. Perhaps it is time to stop trying to achieve the ideal of
strategic problem-oriented policing at the street level and embrace the reality of
what has been shown to lead to real crime prevention value – ad hoc shallow
198 Anthony A. Braga and David Weisburd
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problem-solving efforts that focus police on high-risk places, situations, and
individuals. We suggest that line-level officers should be encourageD to problem
solve at the beat level and more sophisticated problem-oriented policing projects
should be engaged higher up in the organization with the support of a crime
analysis unit and in collaboration with other criminal justice agencies, academic
researchers, and community-based groups. However, it is time for police
practitioners and policy makers to set aside the fantasy of street-level problemoriented policing and embrace the reality of what they can expect from the beat
officer in the development of crime prevention plans at the street level.
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202 Anthony A. Braga and David Weisburd
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