Fashion
Author(s): Georg Simmel
Source: American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 62, No. 6 (May, 1957), pp. 541-558
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
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THE AMERICAN
JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY
Volume LXII MAY 1957 Number 6
FASHION’
GEORG SIMMEL
ABSTRACT
Fashion is a form of imitation and so of social equalization, but, paradoxically, in changin
it differentiates one time from another and one social stratum from another. It unites th
class and segregates them from others. The elite initiates a fashion and, when the mass imitate
effort to obliterate the external distinctions of class, abandons it for a newer mode-a process t
with the increase of wealth. Fashion does not exist in tribal and classless societies. It concern
and superficialities where irrationality does no harm. It signalizes the lack of personal free
characterizes the female and the middle class, whose increased social freedom is matched by
dividual subjugation. Some forms are intrinsically more suited to the modifications of fashion
the internal unity of the forms called “classic” makes them immune to change.
The general formula in accordance with
which we usually interpret the differing aspects of the individual as well as of the public mind may be stated broadly as follows:
We recognize two antagonistic forces, tendencies, or characteristics, either of which, if
left unaffected, would approach infinity; and
it is by the mutual limitation of the two
forces that the characteristics of the individual and public mind result. We are constantly seeking ultimate forces, fundamental
aspirations, some one of which controls our
entire conduct. But in no case do we find
any single force attaining a perfectly independent expression, and we are thus obliged
to separate a majority of the factors and determine the relative extent to which each
shall have representation. To do this we
must establish the degree of limitation exercised by the counteraction of some other
force, as well as the influence exerted by the
latter upon the primlitive force.
Man has ever had a dualistic nature. This
fact, however, has had but little effect on the
uniformity of his conduct, and this uniformity is usually the result of a number of elements. An action that results from less than
a majority of fundamental forces would appear barren and empty. Over an old Flemish
house there stands the mystical inscription,
“There is more within me”; and this is the
formula according to which the first impression of an action is supplemented by a farreaching diversity of causes. Human life
cannot hope to develop a wealth of inexhaustible possibilities until we come to recognize in every moment and content of existence a pair of forces, each one of which, in
striving to go beyond the initial point, has
resolved the infinity of the other by mutual
impingement into mere tension and desire.
While the explanation of some aspects of the
soul as the result of the action of two fundamental forces satisfies the theoretical instinct, it furthermore adds a new charm to
the image of things, not only by tracing
distinctly the outlines of the fact, but also by
I International Quarterly (New York), X (October, 1904), 130-55. Reprinted by kind permission
of Dodd, Mead & Co.
541
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542 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY
| interpreting the vague, often enigmatic, realization that in the creation of the life of the soul deeper forces, more unsolved ten sions, more comprehensive conflicts and con ciliations have been at work than their im mediate reality would lead one to suppose. There seem to be two tendencies in the individual soul as well as in society. All des |
representing socialism on the one hand or individualism on the other, we have always to deal with the same fundamental form of duality which is manifested biologically in the contrast between heredity and varia tion. Of these the former represents the idea of generalization, of uniformity, of inactive similarity of the forms and contents of life; |
| ignations for this most general formn of dual the latter stands for motion, for differentia |
|
| ism within us undoubtedly emanate from a more or less individual example. This funda mental [131] form of life cannot be reached by exact definition; we must rest content with the separation of this primitive form from a multitude of examples, which more or less clearly reveal the really inexpressible element of this duality of our soul. The physiological basis of our being gives the |
tion of separate elements, producing the restless changing of an individual life. The essential forms of life in the history of our race invariably show the effectiveness of the two antagonistic principles. Each in its sphere attempts to combine the interest in duration, unity, and similarity with that in change, specialization, and peculiarity. It becomes self-evident that there is no institu |
| first hint, for we discover that human nature tion, no law, no estate of life, which can uni |
|
| requires motion and repose, receptiveness and productivity-a masculine and a femi nine principle are united in every human being. This type of duality applied to our spiritual nature causes the latter to be guided by the striving towards generaliza tion on the one hand, and on the other by the desire to describe the single, special ele ment. Thus generalization gives rest to the soul, whereas specialization permits it to move from example to example; and the same is true in the world of feeling. On the one hand we seek peaceful surrender to men and things, on the other an energetic activ ity with respect to both. |
formly satisfy the full demands of the two opposing principles. The only realization of this condition possible for humanity finds expression in constantly changing approxi mations, in ever retracted attempts and ever revived hopes. It is this that constitutes the whole wealth of our development, the whole incentive to advancement, the possibility of grasping a vast proportion of [132] all the infinite combinations of the elements of hu man character, a proportion that is ap proaching the unlimited itself. Within the social embodiments of these contrasts, one side is generally maintained by the psychological tendency towards imi |
| The whole history of society is reflected in tation. The charm of imitation in the first |
|
| the striking conflicts, the compromises, slowly won and quickly lost, between so cialistic adaptation to society and individual departure from its demands. We have here the provincial forms, as it were, of those |
place is to be found in the fact that it makes possible an expedient test of power, which, however, requires no great personal and cre ative application, but is displayed easily and smoothly, because its content is a given |
| great antagonistic forces which represent the quantity. We might define it as the child of |
|
| foundations of our individual destiny, and in which our outer as well as our inner life, our intellectual as well as our spiritual being, find the poles of their oscillations. Whether these forces be expressed philosophically in the contrast between cosmotheism and the doctrine of inherent differentiation and sep arate existence of every cosmic element, or |
thought and thoughtlessness. It affords the pregnant possibility of continually extend ing the greatest creations of the human spir it, without the aid of the forces which were originally the very condition of their birth. Imitation, furthermore, gives to the individ ual the satisfaction of not standing alone in his actions. Whenever we imitate, we trans |
whether they be ground in practical conflict
fer not only the demand for creative activThis content downloaded from 128.36.7.56 on Sat, 08 Sep 2018 04:59:34 UTC
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FASHION 543
| ity, but also the responsibility for the action from ourselves to another. Thus the individ ual is freed from the worry of choosing and appears simply as a creature of the group, as a vessel of the social contents. The tendency towards imitation charac terizes a stage of development in which the desire for expedient personal activity is pres ent, but from which the capacity for possess ing the individual acquirements is absent. It is interesting to note the exactness with which children insist upon the repetition of facts, how they constantly clamor for a repetition of the same games and pastimes, how they will object to the slightest varia tion in the telling of a story they have heard twenty times. In this imitation and in exact adaptation to the past the child first rises |
in change. Conversely, wherever prominence is given to change, wherever individual dif ferentiation, independence, and relief from generality are sought, there imitation is the negative and obstructive principle. The principle of adherence to given formulas, of being and of acting like others, is irrecon cilably opposed to the striving to advance to ever new and individual forms of life; for this very reason social life represents a battle-ground, of which every inch is stub bornly contested, and social institutions may be looked upon as the peace-treaties, in which the constant antagonism of both prin ciples has been reduced externally to a form of cobperation. The vital conditions of fashion as a uni versal phenomenon in the history of our race |
| above its momnentary existence; the immedi are circumscribed by these conceptions. |
|
| ate content of life reaches into the past, it expands the present for the child, likewise for primitive man; and the pedantic exact ness of this adaptation to the given formula need not be regarded offhand as a token of poverty or narrowness. At this stage every deviation from imitation of the given facts breaks the connection which alone can now unite the present with something that is more than the present, something that tends to expand existence as a mere creature of the moment. The advance beyond this stage is reflected in the circumstance that our thoughts, actions, and feelings are deter |
Fashion is the imitation of a given example and satisfies the demand for social adapta tion; it leads the individual upon the road which all travel, it furnishes a general condi tion, which resolves the conduct of every individual into a mere example. At the same time it satisfies in no less degree the need of differentiation, the tendency towards dis similarity, the desire for change and con trast, on the one hand by a constant change of contents, which gives to the fashion of to day an individual stamp as opposed to that of yesterday and of to-morrow, on the other hand because fashions differ for different |
| mined by the future as well as by fixed, past, classes-the fashions of the upper stratum |
|
| and traditional factors: the teleological indi vidual represents the counterpole of the imi tative mnortal. The imitator is the passive individual, who believes in social similarity and adapts himself to existing elements; the teleological individual, on the other hand, is ever experimenting, always restlessly striv |
of society are never identical with those of the lower; in fact, they are abandoned by the former as soon as the latter prepares to ap propriate them. Thus fashion represents nothing more than one of the many forms of life by the aid of which we seek to combine in uniform spheres of activity the tendency |
| ing, and he relies on his own personal convic towards social equalization with the desire |
|
| tion. Thus we see that imitation in all the in |
for individual differentiation and change. Every phase of the conflicting pair strives |
| stances where it is a productive factor repre visibly beyond the degree of satisfaction |
|
| sents one of the fundamental tendencies of | that any fashion offers to an absolute con |
| our character, [133] namely, that which con tents itself with similarity, with uniformity, with the adaptation of the special to the gen trol of the sphere of life in question. If we should study the history of fashions (which hitherto have been examined only from the |
|
| eral, and accentuates the constant element | view-point of the development of their con |
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544 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY
| tents) in connection with their importance | fashion dictates, for example, whether wide |
| for the form of the social process, we should or narrow trousers, colored or black scarfs |
|
| find that it reflects the history of the at tempts to adjust the satisfaction of the two counter-tendencies more and more perfectly to the condition of the existing individual and social culture. The various psychologi cal elements in fashion all conform to this fundamental principle. Fashion, as noted above, is a product of class distinction and operates like a number of other forms, honor especially, the double |
shall be worn. As a rule the mnaterial justifi cation for an action coincides with its gen eral adoption, but in the case of fashion there is a complete separation of the two ele ments, and there renmains for the individual only this general acceptance as the deciding motive to appropriate it. Judging from the ugly and repugnant things that are some times in vogue, it would seem as though fashion were desirous of exhibiting its power |
| function of which consists in revolving with by getting us to adopt the most atrocious |
|
| in a given circle and at the same time em phasizing it as separate from others. Just as the frame of a picture characterizes [134] the work of art inwardly as a coherent, homo geneous, independent entity and at the same time outwardly severs all direct relations with the surrounding space, just as the uni form energy of such forms cannot be ex pressed unless we determine the double ef fect, both inward and outward, so honor owes its character, and above all its moral |
things for its sake alone. The absolute indif ference of fashion to the material standards of life is well illustrated by the way in which it recommends something appropriate in one instance, something abstruse in another, and something materially and aesthetically quite indifferent in a third. The only motivations with which fashion is concerned are formal social ones. The reason why even aestheti cally impossible styles seem disting’ue, ele gant, and artistically tolerable when affected |
| rights, to the fact that the individual in his by persons who carry them to the extreme, |
|
| personal honor at the same time represents and maintains that of his social circle and his class. These moral rights, however, are |
is that the persons who do this are generally the most elegant and pay the greatest atten tion to their personal appearance, so that |
| frequently considered unjust by those with under any circumstances we would get the |
|
| out the pale. Thus fashion on the one hand | impression of something distingue and aes |
| signifies union with those in the same class, thetically cultivated. This impression we |
|
| the uniformity of a circle characterized by it, and, ino actt, the exclusion of all other groups. Union and segregation are the two funda mental functions which are here inseparably united, and one of which, although or be |
credit to the questionable element of fash ion, the latter appealing to our conscious ness as the new and consequently most con spicuous feature of the tout ensemble. [135] Fashion occasionally will accept ob jectively determined subjects such as re |
| cause it forms a logical contrast to the other, ligious faith, scientific interests, even social |
|
| becomes the condition of its realization. Fashion is merely a product of social de mands, even though the individual object |
ism and individualism; but it does not be come operative as fashion until these sub jects can be considered independent of the |
which it creates or recreates may represent a
more or less individual need. This is clearly
proved by the fact that very frequently not
the slightest reason can be found for the creations of fashion from the standpoint of an
| objective, aesthetic, or other expediency. While in general our wearing apparel is really adapted to our needs, there is not a |
ments-constitute the specific field of fash ion, for here no dependence is placed on really vital motives of human action. It is |
trace of expediency in the method by which
deeper human motives from which they
have risen. For this reason the rule of fashion becomes in such fields unendurable. We
therefore see that there is good reason why
externals-clothing, social conduct, amusethe field which we can most easily relinquish
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FASHION 545
| to the bent towards imitation, which it would be a sin to follow in important ques tions. We encounter here a close connection between the consciousness of personality and that of the material forms of life, a con nection that runs all through history. The more objective our view of life has become in the last centuries, the more it has stripped the picture of nature of all subjective and anthropomorphic elements, and the more sharply has the conception of individual personality become defined. The social regu lation of our inner and outer life is a sort of embryo condition, in which the contrasts of the purely personal and the purely objective are differentiated, the action being syn chronous and reciprocal. Therefore wher ever man appears essentially as a social being we observe neither strict objectivity in the view of life nor absorption and independ ence in the consciousness of personality. Social forms, apparel, aesthetic judgment, the whole style of human expression, are constantly transformed by fashion, in such a way, however, that fashion-i.e., the latest fashion-in all these things affects only the upper classes. Just as soon as the lower classes begin to copy their style, thereby crossing the line of demarcation the upper classes have drawn and destroying the uni |
cause the objects of fashion, embracing as they do the externals of life, are most ac cessible to the mere call of money, and con formity to the higher set [136] is more easily acquired here than in fields which denand an individual test that gold and silver can not affect. We see, therefore, that in addition to the element of imitation the element of demnar cation constitutes an important factor of fashion. This is especially noticeable wher ever the social structure does not include any super-imposed groups, in which case fashion asserts itself in neighboring groups. Among primitive peoples we often find that closely connected groups living under ex actly similar conditions develop sharply dif ferentiated fashions, by means of which each group establishes uniformity within, as well as difference without the prescribed set. On the other hand, there exists a wide-spread predilection for importing fashions from without, and such foreign fashions assume a greater value within the circle, simply be cause they did not originate there. The prophet Zephaniah expressed his indigna tion at the aristocrats who affected im ported apparel. As a matter of fact the exotic origin of fashions seems strongly to favor the exclusiveness of the groups which |
| formity of their coherence, the upper classes adopt them. Because of their external origin, |
|
| turn away from this style and adopt a new one, which in its turn differentiates thenm from the masses; and thus the game goes merrily on. Naturally the lower classes look and strive towards the upper, and they en counter the least resistance in those fields which are subject to the whims of fashion; for it is here that mere external imitation is most readily applied. The same process is at |
these imported fashions create a special and significant form of socialization, which arises through mutual relation to a point without the circle. It sometimes appears as though social elements, just like the axes of vision, converge best at a point that is not too near. The currency, or more precisely the medium of exchange among primitive races, often consists of objects that are |
| work as between the different sets within the brought in from without. On the Solomon |
|
| upper classes, although it is not always as visible here as it is, for example, between mistress and maid. Indeed, we may often observe that the more nearly one set has ap proached another, the more frantic becomes the desire for imitation from below and the seeking for the new from above. The in crease of wealth is bound to hasten the proc ess considerably and render it visible, be |
Islands, and at Ibo on the Niger, for ex ample, there exists a regular industry for the manufacture of money from shells, etc., which are not employed as a medium of ex change in the place itself, but in neighboring districts, to which they are exported. Paris modes are frequently created with the sole intention of setting a fashion elsewhere. This motive of foreignness, which fash |
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546 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY
| ion employs in its socializing endeavors, is restricted to higher civilization, because novelty, which foreign origin guarantees in extreme form, is often regarded by primitive races as an evil. This is certainly one of the reasons why primitive conditions of life favor a correspondingly infrequent change of fashions. The savage is afraid of strange appearances; the difficulties and dangers that beset his career cause him to scent dan ger in anything new which he does not un derstand and which he cannot assign to a familiar category. Civilization, however, transforms this affectation into its very op posite. Whatever is exceptional, bizarre, or conspicuous, or whatever departs from the customary norm, exercises a peculiar charm upon the man of culture, entirely independ ent of its material justification. The removal |
isolation on the other. Should one of these be absent, fashion will not be formed-its sway will abruptly end. Consequently the lower classes possess very few modes and those they have are seldom specific; for this reason the modes of primitive races are much more stable than ours. Among primitive races the socializing impulse is much more powerfully developed than the differentiating impulse. For, no matter how decisively the groups may be separated from one another, separa tion is for the most part hostile in such a way, that the very relation the rejection of which within the classes of civilized races makes fashion reasonable, is absolutely lack ing. Segregation by means of differences in clothing, manners, taste, etc., is expedient only where the danger of absorption and obliteration exists, as is the case among |
| of the feeling of insecurity with reference to highly civilized nations. Where these differ |
|
| all things new was accomplished by the progress of civilization. At the same time it may be the old inherited prejudice, [137] al though it has become purely formal and unconscious, which, in connection with the present feeling of security, produces this piquant interest in exceptional and odd things. For this reason the fashions of the upper classes develop their power of exclu sion against the lower in proportion as gen eral culture advances, at least until the |
ences do not exist, where we have an abso lute antagonism, as for example between not directly friendly groups of primitive races, the development of fashion has no sense at all. It is interesting to observe how the preva lence of the socializing impulse in primitive peoples affects various institutions, such as the dance. It has been noted quite generally that the dances of primitive races exhibit a remarkable uniformity in arrangement and |
| mingling of the classes and the leveling effect of democracy exert a counter-influence. rhythm. The dancing group feels and acts like a uniform organism; the dance forces |
|
| Fashion plays a more conspicuous rOle in | and accustoms a number of individuals, who |
| modern times, because the differences in our are usually driven to and fro without rime or |
|
| standards of life have become so much more strongly accentuated, for the more numer |
reason by vacillating conditions and needs of life, to be guided by a common impulse |
| ous and the more sharply drawn these differ and a single common motive. Even making |
|
| ences are, the greater the opportunities for emphasizing them at every turn. In innu merable instances this cannot be accom plished by passive inactivity, but only by the development of forms established by fashion; and this has become all the more |
allowances for the tremendous difference in the outward appearance of the dance, we are [138] dealing here with the same element that appears in the socializing force of fash ion. Movement, time, rhythm of the ges tures, are all undoubtedly influenced largely |
pronounced since legal restrictions prescribing various forms of apparel and modes of
life for different classes have been removed.
Two social tendencies are essential to the
establishment of fashion, namely, the need
of union on the one hand and the need of
by what is worn: similarly dressed persons
exhibit relative similarity in their actions.
This is of especial value in modern life with
its individualistic diffusion, while in the case
of primitive races the effect produced is directed within and is therefore not dependent
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FASHION 547
| upon changes of fashion. Among primitive races fashions will be less numerous and more stable because the need of new impres |
ing it. As soon as an example has been uni versally adopted, that is, as soon as any thing that was originally done only by a few |
| sions and forms of life, quite apart from their has really come to be practiced by all-as is |
|
| social effect, is far less pressing. Changes in fashion reflect the dulness of nervous im pulses: the more nervous the age, the more rapidly its fashions change, simply because |
the case in certain portions of our apparel and in various forms of social conduct-we no longer speak of fashion. As fashion spreads, it gradually goes to its [139] doom. |
| the desire for differentiation, one of the most The distinctiveness which in the early stages |
|
| important elements of all fashion, goes hand in hand with the weakening of nervous en ergy. This fact in itself is one of the reasons why the real seat of fashion is found among the upper classes. Viewed from a purely social standpoint, two neighboring primitive races furnish elo quent examples of the requirement of the two elements of union and isolation in the setting of fashion. Among the Kaflirs the class-system is very strongly developed, and as a result we find there a fairly rapid change |
of a set fashion assures for it a certain dis tribution is destroyed as the fashion spreads, and as this element wanes, the fashion also is bound to die. By reason of this peculiar play between the tendency towards univer sal acceptation and the destruction of its very purpose to which this general adoption leads, fashion includes a peculiar attraction of limitation, the attraction of a simultane ous beginning and end, the charm of novelty coupled to that of transitoriness. The attrac tions of both poles of the phenomena meet in |
| of fashions, in spite of the fact that wearing fashion, and show also here that they belong |
|
| apparel and adornments are subject to cer tain legal restrictions. The Bushmen, on the other hand, who have developed no class system, have no fashions whatsoever,-no one has been able to discover among them any interest in changes in apparel and in finery. Occasionally these negative elements have consciously prevented the setting of a fashion even at the very heights of civiliza tion. It is said that there was no ruling fash ion in male attire in Florence about the year 1390, because every one adopted a style of his own. Here the first element, the need of union, was absent; and without it, as we have seen, no fashion can arise. Conversely, the Venetian nobles are said to have set no fashion, for according to law they had to dress in black in order not to call the atten tion of the lower classes to the smallness of their number. Here there were no fashions |
together unconditionally, although, or rather because, they are contradictory in their very nature. Fashion always occupies the divid ing-line between the past and the future, and consequently conveys a stronger feeling of the present, at least while it is at its height, than most other phenomena. What we call the present is usually nothing more than a combination of a fragment of the past with a fragment of the future. Attention is called to the present less often than colloquial usage, which is rather liberal in its employment of the word, would lead us to believe. Few phenomena of social life possess such a pointed curve of consciousness as does fashion. As soon as the social consciousness attains to the highest point designated by fashion, it marks the beginning of the end for the latter. This transitory character of fashion, however, does not on the whole de |
| because the other element essential for their creation was lacking, a visible differentiation grade it, but adds a new element of attrac tion. At all events an object does not suffer |
|
| from the lower classes being purposely avoided. The very character of fashion demands that it should be exercised at one time only by a portion of the given group, the great |
degradation by being called fashionable, un less we reject it with disgust or wish to de base it for other, material reasons, in which case, of course, fashion becomes an idea of value. In the practice of life anything else |
majority being merely on the road to adoptsimilarly new and suddenly disseminated is
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548 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY
| not called fashion, when we are convinced of its continuance and its material justifica tion. If, on the other hand, we feel certain that the fact will vanish as rapidly as it came, then we call it fashion. We can dis cover one of the reasons why in these latter |
ment we envy an object or a person, we are no longer absolutely excluded from it; some relation or other has been established-be tween both the same psychic content now exists-although in entirely different cate gories and forms of sensations. This quiet |
| days fashion exercises such a powerful influ personal usurpation of the envied property |
|
| ence on our consciousness in the circum stance that the great, permanent, unques tionable convictions are continually losing strength, as a consequence of which the transitory and vacillating elements of life acquire more room for the display of their |
contains a kind of antidote, which occasion ally counter-acts the evil effects of this feel ing of envy. The contents of fashion afford an especially good chance for the develop ment of this conciliatory shade of envy, which also gives to the envied person a |
| activity. The break with the past, which, for better conscience because of his satisfaction |
|
| more than a century, civilized mankind has been laboring unceasingly to bring about, |
over his good fortune. This is due to the fact that these contents are not, as many other |
| makes the consciousness turn more and more to the present. This accentuation of the pres psychic contents are, denied absolutely to any one, for a change of fortune, which is |
|
| ent evidently at the same time emphasizes the element of change, and a class will turn to fashion in all fields, by no means only in that of apparel, in proportion to the degree in which it supports the given civilizing tendency. It may almost be considered a sign of the increased power of fashion, that it has overstepped the bounds of its original domain, which [140] comprised only person al externals, and has acquired an increasing |
never entirely out of the question, may play them into the hands of an individual who had previously been confined to the state of envy. From all this we see that fashion furnishes an ideal field for individuals with dependent natures, whose self-consciousness, however, requires a certain amount of prominence, at tention, and singularity. Fashion raises even the unimportant individual by making him |
| influence over taste, over theoretical convic the representative of a class, the embodi |
|
| tions, and even over the moral foundations of life. From the fact that fashion as such can never be generally in vogue, the individual derives the satisfaction of knowing that as |
ment of a joint spirit. And here again we observe the curious intermixture of antago nistic values. Speaking broadly, it is char acteristic of a standard set by a general body, that its acceptance by any one indi |
adopted by him it still represents something
special and striking, while at the same time
he feels inwardly supported by a set of persons who are striving for the same thing, not
as in the case of other social satisfactions, by
| a set actually doing the same thing. The fashionable person is regarded with mingled |
forms prescribed by his class, gains no con spicuousness or notoriety. The slightest in |
| feelings of approval and envy; we envy him fraction or opposition, however, is immedi |
|
| as an individual, but approve of him as a | ately noticed and places the individual in an |
| member of a set or group. Yet even this envy exceptional position by calling the attention |
|
| has a peculiar coloring. There is a shade of envy which includes a species of ideal par |
of the public to [141] his action. All such norms do not assume positive importance |
| ticipation in the envied object itself. An in structive example of this is furnished by the conduct of the poor man who gets a glimpse for the individual until he begins to depart from them. It is peculiarly characteristic of fashion that it renders possible a social |
|
| of the feast of his rich neighbor. The mo | obedience, which at the same time is a form |
vidual does not call attention to him; in
other words, a positive adoption of a given
norm signifies nothing. Whoever keeps the
laws the breaking of which is punished by
the penal code, whoever lives up to the social
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FASHION 549
of individual differentiation. Fashion does
this because in its very nature it represents
a standard that can never be accepted by all.
While fashion postulates a certain amount
of general acceptance, it nevertheless is not
without significance in the characterization
of the individual, for it emphasizes his personality not only through omission but also
through observance. In the dude the social
demands of fashion appear exaggerated to
such a degree that they completely assume
an individualistic and peculiar character. It
is characteristic of the dude that he carries
the elements of a particular fashion to an
extreme; when pointed shoes are in style, he
wears shoes that resemble the prow of a
ship; when high collars are all the rage, he
wears collars that come up to his ears; when
scientific lectures are fashionable, you cannot find him anywhere else, etc., etc. Thus
he represents something distinctly individual, which consists in the quantitative intensification of such elements as are qualitatively common property of the given set of
class. He leads the way, but all travel the
same road. Representing as he does the most
recently conquered heights of public taste,
he seems to be marching at the head of the
general procession. In reality, however, what
is so frequently true of the relation between
individuals and groups applies also to him:
as a matter of fact, the leader allows himself
to be led.
Democratic times unquestionably favor
such a condition to a remarkable degree, so
much so that even Bismarck and other very
prominent party leaders in constitutional
governments have emphasized the fact that
inasmuch as they are leaders of a group,
they are bound to follow it. The spirit of
democracy causes persons to seek the dignity and sensation of command in this manner; it tends to a confusion and ambiguity of
sensations, which fail to distinguish between
ruling the mass and being ruled by it. The
conceit of the dude is thus the caricature of
a confused understanding, fostered by democracy, of the relation between the individual and the public. Undeniably, however,
the dude, through the conspicuousness
gained in a purely quantitative way, but
expressed in a difference of quality, represents a state of equilibrium between the social and the individualizing impulses which
is really original. This explains the extreme
to which otherwise thoroughly intelligent
and prominent persons frequently resort in
matters of fashion, an extreme that outwardly appears so abstruse. It furnishes a
combination of relations to things and men,
which under ordinary circumstances appear
more divided. It is not only the mixture of
individual [142] peculiarity with social
equality, but, in a more practical vein, as it
were, it is the mingling of the sensation of
rulership with submission, the influence of
which is here at work. In other words, we
have here the mixing of a masculine and a
feminine principle. The very fact that this
process goes on in the field of fashion only in
an ideal attenuation, as it were, the fact that
only the form of both elements is embodied
in a content indifferent in itself, may lend to
fashion a special attraction, especially for
sensitive natures that do not care to concern
themselves with robust reality. From an
objective standpoint, life according to fashion consists of a balancing of destruction and
upbuilding; its content acquires characteristics by destruction of an earlier form; it
possesses a peculiar uniformity, in which the
satisfying of the love of destruction and of
the demand for positive elements can no
longer be separated from each other.
Inasmuch as we are dealing here not with
the importance of a single fact or a single
satisfaction, but rather with the play between two contents and their mutual distinction, it becomes evident that the same
combination which extreme obedience to
fashion acquires can be won also by opposition to it. Whoever consciously avoids following the fashion, does not attain the consequent sensation of individualization
through any real individual qualification,
but rather through mere negation of the social example. If obedience to fashion consists in imitation of such an example, conscious neglect of fashion represents similar
imitation, but under an inverse sign. The
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550 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY
latter, however, furnishes just as fair testimony of the power of the social tendency,
| which demands our dependence in some pos itive or negative manner. The man who con sciously pays no heed to fashion accepts its |
strength. The fact that fashion expresses and at the same time emphasizes the tendency towards |
| forms just as much as the dude does, only he embodies it in another category, the former in that of exaggeration, the latter in that of equalization and individualization, and the desire for imitation and conspicuousness, perhaps explains why it is that women, |
|
| negation. Indeed, it occasionally happens | broadly speaking, are its staunchest ad |
| that it becomes fashionable in whole bodies of a large class to depart altogether from the herents. Scientific discretion should caution us against forming judgments about woman |
|
| standards set by fashion. This constitutes a | “in the plural.” At the same time it may be |
| most curious social-psychological complica tion, in which the tendency towards individ said of woman in a general way, whether the statement be justified in every case or not, |
|
| ual conspicuousness primarily rests content | that her psychological characteristic in so |
| with a mere inversion of the social imitation far as it differs from that of man, consists in |
|
| and secondly draws in strength from ap proximation to a similarly characterized |
a lack of differentiation, in a greater simi larity among the different members of her |
| narrower circle. If the club-haters organized themselves into a club, it would not be logi sex, in a stricter adherence to the social aver age. Whether on the final heights of modern |
|
| cally more impossible and psychologically | culture, the facts of which have not yet fur |
| more possible than the above case. Similarly nished a contribution to the formation of |
|
| atheism has been made into a religion, em | this general conviction, there will be a |
| bodying the same fanaticism, the same in tolerance, the same satisfying of the needs of change in the relation between men and women, a change that may result in a com |
|
| the soul that are embraced in religion | plete reversal of the above distinction, I do |
| proper. Freedom, likewise, after having put not care to discuss, inasmuch as we are con |
|
| a stop to tyranny, frequently becomes no less tyrannical and arbitrary. So the phe |
cerned here with more comprehensive his torical averages. The relation and the weak |
| nomenon of conscious departure from fash ion illustrates [1431 how ready the funda ness of her social position, to which woman has been doomed during the far greater por |
|
| mental forms of human character are to ac cept the total antithesis of contents and to |
tion of history, however, explains her strict regard for custom, for the generally accepted |
| show their strength and their attraction in the negation of the very thing to whose ac and approved forms of life, for all that is proper. A weak person steers clear of indi |
|
| ceptance they seemed a moment before ir revocably committed. It is often absolutely impossible to tell whether the elements of personal strength or of personal weakness preponderate in the group of causes that lead to such a departure from fashion. It |
vidualization; he avoids dependence upon self with its responsibilities and the neces sity of defending himself unaided. He finds protection only in the typical form of life, which prevents the strong from exercising his exceptional powers. But resting on the |
may result from a desire not to make common cause with the mass, a desire that has
at its basis not independence of the mass, to
be sure, but yet an inherently sovereign position with respect to the latter. However, it
may be due to a delicate sensibility, which
causes the individual to fear that he will be
unable to maintain his individuality in case
he adopts the forms, the tastes, and the customs of the general public. Such opposition
is by no means always a sign of personal
firm foundation of custom, of what is generally accepted, woman strives anxiously for
all the relative individualization and personal conspicuousness that remains.
Fashion furnishes this very combination
in the happiest manner, for we have here on
the one hand a field of general imitation, the
individual floating [1441 in the broadest social current, relieved of responsibility for his
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FASHION 551
| tastes and his actions, yet on the other hand we have a certain conspicuousness, an em phasis, an individual accentuation of the personality. It seems that there exists for each class of human beings, probably for each individual, a definite quantitative rela tion between the tendency towards indi vidualization and the desire to be merged in the group, so that when the satisfying of one tendency is denied in a certain field of life, he seeks another, in which he then fulfills the measure which he requires. Thus it seems as though fashion were the valve through which woman’s craving for some measure of conspicuousness and individual prominence |
change, in order to add an attraction to her self and her life for her own feeling as well as for others. Just as in the case of individual ism and collectivism, there exists between the uniformity and the change of the con tents of life a definite proportion of needs, which is tossed to and fro in the different fields and seeks to balance refusal in one by consent, however acquired, in another. On the whole, we may say that woman is a more faithful creature than man. Now fidelity, ex pressing as it does the uniformity and regu larity of one’s nature only in the direction of the feelings, demands a more lively change in the outward surrounding spheres in order |
| finds vent, when its satisfaction is denied her to establish the balance in the tendencies of |
|
| in other fields. During the fourteenth and fifteenth cen turies Germany exhibits an unusually strong development of individuality. Great inroads were made upon the collectivistic regula tions of the Middle Ages by the freedom of the individual. Woman, however, took no part in this individualistic development: the freedom of personal action and self-improve ment were still denied her. She sought re dress by adopting the most extravagant and hypertrophic styles in dress. On the other hand, in Italy during the same epoch woman was given full play for the exercise of indi viduality. The woman of the Renaissance possessed opportunities of culture, of ex ternal activity, of personal differentiation such as were not offered her for many cen turies thereafter. In the upper classes of so ciety, especially, education and freedom of action were almost identical for both sexes. It is not astonishing, therefore, that no par ticularly extravagant Italian female fashions should have come down to us from that pe riod. The need of exercising individuality in this field was absent, because the tendency embodied therein found sufficient vent in other spheres. In general the history of woman in the outer as well as the inner life, individually as well as collectively, exhibits such a comparatively great uniformity, lev eling and similarity, that she requires a more lively activity at least in the sphere of fash ion, which is nothing more nor less than |
life referred to above. Man, [145] on the other hand, a rather unfaithful being, who does not ordinarily restrict dependence to a relation of the feelings with the same im plicitness and concentration of all interests of life to a single one, is consequently less in need of an outward form of change. Non acceptance of changes in external fields, and indifference towards fashions in outward ap pearance are specifically a male quality, not because man is the more uniform but be cause he is the more many-sided creature and for that reason can get along better without such outward changes. Therefore, the emancipated woman of the present, who seeks to imitate in the good as well as per haps also in the bad sense the whole differen tiation, personality and activity of the male sex, lays particular stress on her indifference to fashion. In a certain sense fashion gives woman a compensation for her lack of position in a class based on a calling or profession. The man who has become absorbed in a calling has entered a relatively uniform class, within which he resembles many others, and is thus often only an illustration of the conception of this class or calling. On the other hand, as though to compensate him for this absorp tion, he is invested with the full importance and the objective as well as social power of this class. To his individual importance is added that of his class, which often covers the defects and deficiencies of his purely per |
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552 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY
| sonal character. The individuality of the class often supplements or replaces that of the member. This identical thing fashion ac complishes with other means. Fashion also supplements a person’s lack of importance, his inability to individualize his existence purely by his own unaided efforts, by en abling him to join a set characterized and singled out in the public consciousness by fashion alone. Here also, to be sure, the per sonality as such is reduced to a general for mula, yet this formula itself, from a social standpoint, possesses an individual tinge, and thus makes up through the social way what is denied to the personality in a purely individual way. The fact that the demi monde is so frequently a pioneer in nlatters of fashion, is due to its peculiarly uprooted form of life. The pariah existence to which society condemns the demi-monde, pro duces an open or latent hatred against ev erything that has the sanction of law, of every permanent institution, a hatred that finds its relatively most innocent and aes |
spheres outside of mere styles of apparel, for the form of mutability in which it is pre sented to the individual is under all circum stances a contrast to the stability of the ego feeling. Indeed, the latter, through this con trast, must become conscious of its relative duration. The changeableness of those con tents can express itself as mutability and de velop its attraction only through this endur ing element. But for this very reason fashion always stands, as I have pointed out, at the periphery of personality, which regards it self as a piece de resistance for fashion, or at least can do so when called upon. It is this phase of fashion that is received by sensitive and peculiar persons, who use it as a sort of mask. They consider blind obedi ence to the standards of the general public in all externals as the conscious and desired means of reserving their personal feeling and their taste, which they are eager to reserve for themselves alone, in such a way that they do not care to enter in an appearance that is visible to all. It is therefore a feeling |
thetic expression in the striving for ever new
forms of appearance. In this continual striving for new, previously unheard-of fashions,
in the regardlessness with which the one that
| is most diametrically opposed to the existing one is passionately adopted, there lurks an |
fear of perhaps betraying a peculiarity of their innermost soul. We have here a tri |
| aesthetic expression of the desire for destruc umph of the soul over the actual circum |
|
| tion, which seems to be an element peculiar to all that lead this pariah-like existence, so long as they are not completely enslaved within. [1461 When we examine the final and most |
stances of existence, which must be consid ered one of the highest and finest victories, at least as far as form is concerned, for the reasons that the enemy himself is trans formed into a servant, and that the very |
| subtle impulses of the soul, which it is dif ficult to express in words, we find that they also exhibit this antagonistic play of the fun thing which the personality seemed to sup press is voluntarily seized, because the level ing suppression is here transferred to the ex |
|
| damental human tendencies. These latter seek to regain their continually lost balance |
ternal spheres of life in such a way that it furnishes a veil and a protection for every |
| by means of ever new proportions, and they thing spiritual and now all the more free. |
|
| succeed here through the reflection which fashion occasionally throws into the most delicate and tender spiritual processes. Fashion insists, to be sure, on treating all individualities alike, yet it is always done in such a way that one’s whole nature is never affected. Fashion always continues to be re garded as something external, even in |
This corresponds exactly to the triviality of expression and conversation through which very sensitive and retiring people, especially women, often deceive one about the individ ual depth of the soul. It is one of the pleas ures of the judge of human nature, although somewhat cruel withal, to feel the anxious ness with which woman clings to the com |
of modesty and reserve which causes many a
delicate nature to seek refuge in the leveling
cloak of fashion; such individuals do not
care to resort to a peculiarity in externals for
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FASHION 553
| monplace contents and forms of social inter course. The impossibility of enticing her beyond the most banal and trite forms of expression, [147] which often drives one to despair, in innumerable instances signifies nothing more than a barricade of the soul, an iron mask that conceals the real features |
which would have aroused unconquerable repugnance in his soul had they been sug gested to him alone. It is one of the strangest social-psychological phenomena, in which this characteristic of concerted action is well exemplified, that many fashions tolerate breaches of modesty which, if suggested to |
| and can furnish this service only by means of the individual alone, would be angrily re |
|
| a wholly uncompromising separation of the feelings and the externals of life. All feeling of shame rests upon isolation of the individual; it arises whenever stress is laid upon the ego, whenever the attention of a circle is drawn to such an individual-in reality or only in his imagination-which at the same time is felt to be in some way in congruous. For that reason retiring and weak natures particularly incline to feelings of shame. The moment they step into the |
pudiated. But as dictates of fashion they find ready acceptance. The feeling of shame is eradicated in matters of fashion, because it represents a united action, in the same way that the feeling of responsibility is ex tinguished in the participants of a crime committed by a mob, each member of which, if left to himself, would shrink from violence. Fashion also is only one of the forms by the aid of which men seek to save their inner |
| centre of general attention, the moment they freedom all the more completely by sacrific |
|
| make themselves conspicuous in any way, a painful oscillation between emphasis and withdrawal of the ego becomes manifest. In asmuch as the individual departure from a generality as the source of the feeling of shame is quite independent of the particular content upon the basis of which it occurs, one is frequently ashamed of good and noble things. The fact that the commonplace is |
ing externals to enslavement by the general public. Freedom and dependence also belong to [148] those antagonistic pairs, whose ever renewed strife and endless mobility give to life much more piquancy and permit of a much greater breadth and development, than a permanent, unchangeable balance of the two could give. Schopenhauer held that each person’s cup of life is filled with a cer |
| good form in society in the narrower sense of the term, is due not only to a mutual regard, tain quantity of joy and woe, and that this measure can neither remain empty nor be |
|
| which causes it to be considered bad taste to make one’s self conspicuous through some individual, singular expression that not ev ery one can repeat, but also to the fear of |
filled to overflowing, but only changes its form in all the differentiations and vacilla tions of internal and external relations. In the same way and much less mystically we |
| that feeling of shame which as it were forms may observe in each period, in each class, |
|
| a self-inflicted punishment for the departure | and in each individual, either a really per |
| from the form and activity similar for all and manent proportion of dependence and free |
|
| equally accessible to all. By reason of its pe culiar inner structure, fashion furnishes a departure of the individual, which is always looked upon as proper. No matter how ex |
dom, or at least the longing for it, whereas we can only change the fields over which they are distributed. It is the task of the higher life, to be sure, to arrange this dis |
| travagant the form of appearance or mnanner of expression, as long as it is fashionable, it is tribution in such a way that the other values of existence require thereby the possibility |
|
| protected against those painful reflections which the individual otherwise experiences when he becomes the object of attention. All concerted actions are characterized by the |
of the most favorable development. The same quantity of dependence and freedom may at one time help to increase the moral, intellectual, and aesthetic values to the |
| loss of this feeling of shame. As a member of highest point and at another time, without |
|
| a mass the individual will do many things | any change in quantity but merely in dis |
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554 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY
| tribution, it may bring about the exact op posite of this success. Speaking broadly, we may say that the most favorable result for the aggregate value of life will be obtained when all unavoidable dependence is trans ferred more and more to the periphery, to the externals of life. Perhaps Goethe, in his later period, is the most eloquent example of a wholly great life, for by means of his adaptability in all externals, his strict regard for form, his willing obedience to the con ventions of society, he attained a maximum of inner freedom, a complete saving of the centres of life from the touch of the unavoid able quantity of dependence. In this respect fashion is also a social form of marvelous expediency, because, like the law, it affects |
appear in the same irrational manner. We might call this a personal fashion, which forms an analogy to social fashion. The for mer is supported on the one hand by the individual demand for differentiation and thereby attests to the same impulse that is active in the formation of social fashion. The need of imitation, of similarity, of the blending of the individual in the mass, are here satisfied purely within the individual himself, namely through the concentration of the personal consciousness upon this one form or content, as well as through the imi tation of his own self, as it were, which here takes the place of imitation of others. In deed, we might say that we attain in this case an even more pronounced concentra |
| only the externals of life, only those sides of tion, an even more intimate support of the |
|
| life which are turned to society. It provides us with a formula by means of which we can unequivocally attest our dependence upon what is generally adopted, our obedience to the standards established by our time, our class, and our narrower circle, and enables us to withdraw the freedom given us in life from externals and concentrate it more and more in our innermost natures. Within the individual soul the relations of equalizing unification and individual de marcation are to a certain extent repeated. The antagonism of the tendencies which produces fashion is transferred as far as form is concerned in an entirely similar |
individual contents of life by a central uni formity than we do where the fashion is common property. A certain intermediate stage is often real ized within narrow circles between individ ual mode and personal fashion. Ordinary persons frequently adopt some expression, which they apply at every opportunity -in common with as many as possible in the same set-to all manner of suitable or uni suitable objects. In one respect this is a group fashion, yet in another respect it is really individual, for its express purpose consists in having the individual make the totality of his circle of ideas subject to this |
| manner also to those inner relations of many formula. Brutal violence is hereby com |
|
| individuals, who have nothing whatever to do with social obligations. The instances to which I have just referred exhibit the oft mentioned parallelism with which the rela tions between individuals are repeated in the correlation between the psychic elements of |
mitted against the individuality of things; all variation is destroyed by the curious su premacy of this one category of expressions, for example, when we designate all things that happen to please us for any reason whatsoever as “chic,” or “smart,” even |
| the individual himself. With more [149] or though the objects in question may bear no |
|
| less intention the individual often estab lishes a mode of conduct or a style for him self, which by reason of the rhythm of its rise, sway, and decline becomes character ized in fashion. Young people especially often exhibit a sudden strangeness in be havior; an unexpected, objectively un founded interest arises and governs their whole sphere of consciousness, only to dis |
relation whatsoever to the fields to which these expressions belong. In this manner the inner world of the individual is made subject to fashion, and thus reflects the aspects of the external group governed by fashion, chiefly by reason of the objective absurdity of such individual manners, which illustrate the power of the formal, unifying element over the objective rational element. In the |
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FASHION 555
same way many persons and circles only ask
that they be uniformly governed, without
thinking to inquire into the nature or value
of the authority. It cannot be denied that
inasmuch as violence is done to objects
treated in this way, and inasmuch as they
are all transformed uniformly to a category
of our own making, the individual really
renders an arbitrary decision with respect to
these objects, he acquires an individual feeling of power, and thus the ego is strongly
emphasized. [150]
The fact that appears here in the light of
a caricature is everywhere noticeable to a
less pronounced degree in the relation of
persons to things. Only the noblest persons
seek the greatest depth and power of their
ego by respecting the individuality inherent
in things. The hostility which the soul bears
to the supremacy, independence, and indifference of the universe gives rise-beside the
loftiest and most valuable strivings of humanity-to attempts to oppress things externally; the ego offers violence to them not
by absorbing and molding their powers, not
by recognizing their individuality only to
make it serviceable, but by forcing it to bow
outwardly to some subjective formula. To
be sure the ego has not in reality gained control of the things, but only of its own false
and fanciful conception of them. The feeling
of power, however, which originates thus,
betrays its lack of foundation and its fanciful origin by the rapidity with which such
expressions pass by. It is just as illusionary
as the feeling of the uniformity of being,
which springs for the moment from this formulating of all expressions. As a matter of
fact the man who carries out a schematic
similarity of conduct under all circumstances is by no means the most consistent,
the one asserting the ego most regularly
against the universe. On account of the difference in the given factors of life, a difference of conduct will be essential whenever
the same germ of the ego is to prevail uniformly over all, just as identical answers in a
calculation into which two factors enter, of
which one continually varies, cannot be secured if the other remains unchanged, but
only if the latter undergoes variations corresponding to the changes of the former.
We have seen that in fashion the different
dimensions of life, so to speak, acquire a peculiar convergence, that fashion is a complex
structure in which all the leading antithetical tendencies of the soul are represented in
one way or another. This will make clear
that the total rhythm in which the individuals and the groups move will exert an important influence also upon their relation to
fashion, that the various strata of a group,
altogether aside from their different contents of life and external possibilities, will
bear different relations to fashion simply because their contents of life are evolved either
in conservative or in rapidly varying form.
On the one hand the lower classes are difficult to put in motion and they develop
slowly. A very clear and instructive example
of this may be found in the attitude of the
lower classes in England towards the Danish
and the Norman conquests. On the whole
the changes brought about affected the upper classes only; in the lower classes we find
such a degree of fidelity to arrangements and
forms of life that the whole continuity of
English life which was retained through all
those national vicissitudes rests entirely
upon the persistence and immovable conservatism of the lower classes. The [151]
upper classes, however, were most intensely
affected and transformed by new influences,
just as the upper branches of a tree are most
responsive to the movements of the air. The
highest classes, as everyone knows, are the
most conservative, and frequently enough
they are even archaic. They dread every motion and change, not because they have an
antipathy for the contents or because the
latter are injurious to them, but simply because it is change and because they regard
every modification of the whole, as suspicious and dangerous. No change can bring
them additional power, and every change
can give them something to fear, but nothing to hope for. The real variability of historical life is therefore vested in the middle
classes, and for this reason the history of social and cultural movements has fallen into
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556 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY
| an entirely different pace since the tiers etat assumed control. For this reason fashion, which represents the variable and contrast |
also because even the higher circles of so ciety could not afford to adopt the rapid changes in fashion forced upon them by the |
| ing forms of life, has since then become much imitation of the lower circles, if the objects |
|
| broader and more animated, and also be cause of the transformation in the immedi ate political life, for man requires an ephem |
were not relatively cheap. The rapidity of the development is of such importance in actual articles of fashion that it even with |
| eral tyrant the moment he has rid himself of draws them from certain advances of econ |
|
| the absolute and permanent one. The fre quent change of fashion represents a tre mendous subjugation of the individual and in that respect forms one of the essential complements of the increased social and po litical freedom. A form of life, for the con tents of which the moment of acquired height marks the beginning of decline, be longs to a class which is inherently much more variable, much more restless in its rhythms than the lowest classes with their dull, unconscious conservatism, and the highest classes with their consciously desired conservatism. Classes and individuals who demand constant change, because the rapid ity of their development gives them the ad vantage over others, find in fashion some thing that keeps pace with their own soul movements. Social advance above all is fa |
omy gradually won in other fields. It has been noticed, especially in the older branches of modern productive industry, that the speculative element gradually ceases to play an influential rolc. The movements of the mnarket can be better overlooked, require ments can be better foreseen and production can be more accurately regulated than be fore, so that the rationalization of produc tion makes greater and greater inroads on chance conjunctures, on the aimless vacilla tion of supply and demand. Only pure ar ticles of fashion seem to prove an exception. The polar oscillations, which modern eco nomics in many instances knows how to avoid and from which it is visibly striving towards entirely new economic orders and forms, still hold sway in the field immedi ately subject to fashion. The element of |
| vorable to the rapid change of fashion, for it feverish change is so essential here that fash |
|
| capacitates lower classes so much for imita tion of upper ones, and thus the process characterized above, according to which ev ery higher set throws aside a fashion the moment a lower set adopts it, has acquired a breadth and activity never dreamed of before. This fact has important bearing on the |
ion stands, as it were, in a logical contrast to the tendencies for development in modern economics. In contrast to this characteristic, how ever, fashion possesses this peculiar quality, that every individual type to a certain ex tent makes its appearance as though it in tended to live forever. When we furnish a |
| content of fashion. Above all else it brings in house these days, intending the articles to |
|
| its train a reduction in the cost and ex travagance of fashions. In earlier times there was a compensation for the costliness of the first acquisition or the difficulties in trans forming conduct and taste in the longer du ration of their sway. The more an article |
last a quarter of a century, we invariably in vest in furniture designed according to the very latest patterns and do not even con sider articles in vogue two years before. Yet it is evident that the attraction of fashion will desert the present article just as it left |
| becomes subject to rapid changes of fashion, the greater the demand for cheap products of the earlier one, and satisfaction or dissatis faction with both forms is determined by |
|
| its kind, not only because the larger and therefore poorer classes nevertheless have enough purchasing power to regulate indus |
other material criterions. A peculiar psycho logical process seems to be at work here in addition to the mere bias of the moment. |
| try and demand objects, which [152] at least Some fashion always exists and fashion per |
|
| bear the outward semblance of style, but | se is indeed immortal, which fact seems to |
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FASHION 557
| affect in some manner or other each of its manifestations, although the very nature of each individual fashion stamps it as being transitory. The fact that change itself does not change, in this instance endows each of the objects which it affects with a psycho logical appearance of duration. This apparent duration becomes real for the different fashion-contents within the change itself in the following special manner. Fashion, to be sure, is concerned only with change, yet like all phenomena it tends to conserve energy; it endeavors to attain its objects as completely as possible, but never theless with the relatively most economical means. For this very reason, fashion repeat edly returns to old forms, as is illustrated particularly in wearing-apparel; and the course of fashion has been likened to a |
them for that very purpose, while others, as though wilful and supported by nature, avoid all transformation into the given forms of art. The sovereignty of art over real ity by no means implies, as naturalism and many theories of idealism so steadfastly maintain, the ability to draw all the contents of existence uniformly into its sphere. None of the forms by which the human mind mas ters the material of existence and adapts it to its purpose is so general and neutral that all objects, indifferent as they are to their own structure, should uniformly conform to it. Thus fashion can to all appearances and in abstracto absorb any chosen content: any given form of clothing, of art, of conduct, of opinion may become fashionable. And yet many forms in their deeper nature show a |
| circle. [153] As soon as an earlier fashion has special disposition to live themselves out in |
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| partially been forgotten there is no reason why it should not be allowed to return to favor and why the charm of difference, which constitutes its very essence, should not be permitted to exercise an influence similar to that which it exerted conversely some time before. The power of the moving form upon which fashion lives is not strong enough to subject every fact uniformly. Even in the fields governed by fashion, all forms are not equally suited to become fashion, for the pe culiar character of many of them furnishes a certain resistance. This may be compared with the unequal relation that the objects of external perception bear to the possibility of their being transformed into works of art. It is a very enticing opinion, but one that can not hold water, that every real object is equally suited to become the object of a work of art. The forms of art, as they have developed historically-constantly deter mined by chance, frequently one-sided and affected by technical perfections and imper fections-by no means occupy a neutral height above all world objects. On the con trary, the forms of art bear a closer relation to some facts than they do to others. Many objects assume artistic form without appar ent effort, as though nature had created |
fashion, just as others offer inward resist ance. Thus, for example, everything that may be termed “classic” is comparatively far removed from fashion and alien to it, although occasionally, of course, the classic also falls under the sway of fashion. The na ture of the classic is determined by a concen tration of the parts around a fixed centre; classic objects possess an air of composure, which does not offer so many points of at tack, as it were, from which modification, disturbance, destruction of the equilibrium might emanate. Concentration of the limbs is characteristic of classic plastics: the tout ensemble is absolutely governed from within, the spirit and the feeling of life governing the whole [154] embrace uniformly every single part, because of the perceptible unity of the object. That is the reason we speak of the classic repose of Greek art. It is due ex clusively to the concentration of the object, which concentration permits no part to bear any relation to any extraneous powers and fortunes and thereby incites the feeling that this formation is exempt from the changing influences of general life. In contrast to this everything odd, extreme and unusual will be drawn to fashion from within: fashion does not take hold of such characteristic things as an external fate, but rather as the historical |
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558 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY
| expression of their material peculiarities. The widely projecting limbs in baroque statues seem to be in perpetual danger of |
existence. Thus Elizabeth Charlotte of the Palatinate, a sister-in-law of Louis XIV, ex ceedingly masculine in her ways, inspired |
| being broken off, the inner life of the figure the fashion at the French Court of women |
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| does not exercise complete control over them, but turns them over a prey to the chance influences of external life. Baroque forms in themselves lack repose, they seem ruled by chance and subjected to the mo mentary impulse, which fashion expresses as a form of social life. But still another factor confronts us here, namely, that we soon grow tired of eccentric, bizarre or fanciful |
acting like men and being addressed as such, whereas the men conducted themselves like women. It is self-evident that such behavior can be countenanced by fashion only be cause it is far removed from that never absent substance of human relations to which the form of life must eventually re turn in some way, shape, or manner. We cannot claim that all fashion is unnatural, |
| forms and from a purely physiological stand because the existence of fashion itself seems |
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| point long for the change that fashion out lines for us. I have had occasion to point out above that the tempo of fashion depends upon the loss of sensibility to nervous incitements which are formed by the individual disposi tion. The latter changes with the ages, and combines with the form of the objects in an inextricable mutual influence. We find here also one of the deep relations which we thought to have discovered between the classical and the “natural” composition of things. The conception of what is included in the term natural is rather vague and mis leading, for as a rule it is merely an expres sion of value, which is employed to grace values prized for different reasons, and which has therefore been uniformly sup ported by the most antagonistic elements. At the same time, we may limit the term “natural” from a negative standpoint by a process of exclusion, inasmuch as certain forms, impulses and conceptions can cer tainly lay no claim to the term; and these are the forms that succumb most rapidly to the changes of fashion, because they lack |
perfectly [155] natural to us as social beings, yet we can say, conversely, that absolutely unnatural forms may at least for a time bear the stamp of fashion. To sum up, the peculiarly piquant and suggestive attraction of fashion lies in the contrast between its extensive, all-embrac ing distribution and its rapid and complete disintegration; and with the latter of these characteristics the apparent claim to per manent acceptance again stands in contrast. Furthermore, fashion depends no less upon the narrow distinctions it draws for a given circle, the intimate connection of which it expresses in the terms of both cause and ef fect, than it does upon the decisiveness with which it separates the given circle from others. And, finally, fashion is based on adoption by a social set, which demands mu tual imitation from its members and thereby releases the individual of all responsibility ethical and aesthetic-as well as of the pos sibility of producing within these limits indi vidual accentuation and original shading of the elements of fashion. Thus fashion is shown to be an objective characteristic |
that relation to the fixed centre of things and
of life which justifies the claim to permanent
grouping upon equal terms by social expediency of the antagonistic tendencies of life.
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