Case of Polish Community Fund

179
DOI: 10.17573/cepar.2018.2.09 1.01 Original scientifc article
Can Top Down Participatory
Budgeting Work? The Case of
Polish Community Fund
Dawid Sześciło
Public Administration Research Unit, Faculty of Law and Administration,
University of Warsaw, Poland
dawid.szescilo@uw.edu.pl
Bartosz Wilk
Public Administration Research Unit, Faculty of Law and Administration,
University of Warsaw, Poland
b.wilk@wpia.uw.edu.pl
ABSTRACT
The article addresses the participatory budgeting (PB), which is one of
the most recognised governance innovations of recent decades. This global phenomenon represents in practice a shift towards participatory and
collaborative management of public resources at the local level. The purpose of this article is to determine when top down approach to PB might
be welcomed, taking into account the characteristics of PB schemes all
around the world that they emerged as local initiatives, instigated either
by civil society groups or local governments. The analysis is based on the
description of the PB example as introduced via country-wide legislation,
exhaustively regulating PB procedure. The article examines Polish experience in the feld of functioning top down approach to PB. It demonstrates that top down PB can effectively work, if it is accompanied with
signifcant incentives and grants, as well as the extensive autonomy and
flexibility of local communities. Polish experience suggests that such an
initiative might be relatively successful, yet there is a number of conditions that has to be met in order to ensure the dissemination of legislative
model of participatory budgeting. The results have practical implications
to central government institutions that consider introduction of some
legislative framework for participatory budgeting at the local level. The
originality of the research is in the analysis of one of successful stories
of the PB introduced via country-wide legislation, and determining when
this approach can work, also in other countries
Keywords: community fund, participatory budgeting, participatory governance,
local government, local budget, civil society, citizen participation, Poland
JEL: K23
Sześciło, D., Wilk, B. (2018). Can Top Down Participatory Budgeting Work? The Case
of Polish Community Fund.
Central European Public Administration Review, 16(2), pp. 179–192
180 Central European Public Administration Review, Vol. 16, No. 2/2018
Dawid Sześciło, Bartosz Wilk
1 Introduction
Participatory budgeting (PB) is an umbrella term for wide array of governance
experiments characterized by greater and more direct involvement of citizens
in budgets formulation, setting spending priorities, expenditure monitoring
and evaluation (Allegretti and Herzberg, 2004; Cabannes, 2004; Wampler,
2007). Numerous technical and institutional arrangements could be applied
in PB processes, including public hearings, citizen surveys, advisory boards, forums, workshops, voting (budget referenda), citizen panels and focus groups
(Zhang and Liao, 2011; Kim and Schachter, 2013).
Since Porto Alegre experiment in late 80s’ PB became a global phenomenon
in local governance and one of the most tangible signs of shift „from local
government to local governance” and expansion of participatory governance, co-governance or collaborative governance (Bevir, 2012; Hordijk, 2012;
Donaghy, 2013). It develops in polycentric manner (Dias 2014), yet we could
distinguish some common denominator for most of its forms – PBs are local initiatives launched and elaborated by local governments, grass-roots activists and civil society groups. Only few countries (Peru, Bolivia, Dominican
Republic) introduced top down PB, i.e. PB imposed by national legislation as
mandatory arrangement for local governments (McNulty, 2004). Only Peruvian experience has been evaluated by Mc Nulty (2004) who provided rather
mixed picture regarding the outcomes of this approach.
The article presents Polish experience connected with the introduction of topdown PB and the functioning of this mechanism, which is the community fund.
This is to determine if the example of a community fund is a successful story,
and if so, what data is the basis for the claim. In addition, the aim of the research is to determine the recommendation to be used in this approach to PB.
2 Methods
This article aims at general assessment of the top down PB introduced by
national legislation in Poland, known as community fund for rural areas. Key
element of this model is empowering the residents of rural areas (villages)
to directly and conclusively decide on distribution of the part of communal
budget, calculated according to national legislation and according to the procedure specifed in this law.
The effectiveness of PB depends on various factors, which in the literature
of the subject are divided into the governmental environment, the design of
the process, the mechanisms used for elicit participation (Memeti and Kreci,
2016). In this article, the community fund’s legal regulations will be analyzed
in terms of factors that contribute to the development of PB, such as the
governmental environment, the design of the process, the mechanisms used
for elicit participation.
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Can Top Down Participatory Budgeting Work? The Case of Polish Community Fund
The frst step in the evaluation of the PB is to determine whether it is an instrument that is willingly used by citizens and public authorities, especially in case
of top down PB. Introduction of community fund requires autonomous of each
communal council, yet national legislation provides some fnancial incentives
for that. Review of this arrangement is conducted with the use of statistical
data regarding primarily the share of communal councils that introduced community fund and the total expenditure distributed according to this mechanism.
Those quantitative indicators are complemented with literature review providing broader context of the reception of top down approach to PB in Poland.
3 Results
3.1 Global expansion of participatory budgeting
The idea of PB originated in Porto Alegre in late 80s’, where advanced model
of participation in budgetary process has been developed by the local government and over years became a global reference model (Ganuza and Baiocchi, 2014). Recommendations made by citizens in PB process are not formally
binding, but there is strong pressure to include them, without modifcations,
into budgets adopted by appropriate local government bodies (Souza, 2001;
Novy and Leubolt, 2005). Porto Alegre model offers direct and meaningful
participation, yet PB covers also arrangements where local authorities save
unrestricted and exclusive decision-making powers and citizens are only consulted (Sintomer, Herzberg and Röcke, 2008).
All models aim at enabling citizens to influence the allocation of public resources and educating them, enhancing transparency and accountability
(Shah, 2007). However, the evaluation of efciency and effectiveness of public resources allocation via PB is extremely difcult. One reason is lack of uniformed and homogenous model of PB. Another challenge is lack of agreement
on the set of indicators for measuring success of PB. Outcomes and impacts
of PB are reviewed most extensively in case of Porto Alegre, where PB is associated with improving access to public services for disadvantaged groups
and reducing corruption in local government (World Bank, 2003; Baiocchi and
Lerner, 2007; Cabannes, 2004; Sintomer Herzberg and Röcke, 2008).
PB is not by defnition reserved only to local (municipal) budgets. However,
both theoretical discourse and the practice of PB implementation focus on
local government, including cities of all sizes, from small communes (below
20,000 inhabitants) to mega-cities (Cabannes, 2004). There are only few examples from higher level of government considered in the literature, including the state of Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil (Goldfrank and Schneider, 2006)
or in the provinces of Chucampas, Celendín or Moropon Chulucanas, Peru
(Cabannes, 2004).
Participatory budgeting is now global phenomenon, yet the scale of its diffusion is difcult to estimate. Sintomer et al. roughly calculated that there were
182 Central European Public Administration Review, Vol. 16, No. 2/2018
Dawid Sześciło, Bartosz Wilk
between 1,269 and 2,778 participatory budgets in 2013 (Sintomer, Herzberg
and Röcke, 2014). However, those estimations needs to be considered with
special reservations, not only because of huge variety of models interpreted
as PB. As PB emerges usually as local initiative, country-wide statistics are not
always available.
3.2 Participatory budgeting in Poland. Between bottom up and
top down approach
Participatory budgeting arrived to Poland only few years ago, yet it evolved rapidly into one of the most popular innovations in local governance. It has developed in two, parallel forms: 1) as bottom-up initiative promoted by civil society
groups that managed to disseminate this concept among local authorities; and
2) as uniform, country-wide model established by national legislation. In 2018,
from the new term of local self-government, come in force new legislation of
PB in municipalities. PB will be mandatory in large local government units.
The former model is applied primarily in urban communes that are not allowed
to apply the legislative arrangement („urban PB”). Urban PB until 2018 was not
regulated in the national legislation at all and all procedures are established
by local councils and mayors. National legislation does not require any public
participation in planning public spending, both in a one-year perspective (annual budgets) and long-term planning (multi-year fnancial prognosis). Despite
lack of uniform model, urban PB in vast majority of the Polish municipalities is
implemented in very similar version, characterized by citizens’ engagement restricted to a very minor part of local budget (less then 2% of planned expenditure), poor range of deliberation tools for engaging citizens in a dialogue on
local budget, and procedure resembling local referendum (Sześciło, 2015). Urban PB is distributed via popular vote on the projects previously submitted by
individual residents or civil society organizations. Vote is not formally binding
to local council, yet it is usually reflected in the councils’ decisions. This form of
PB has been already implemented in over 80 municipalities (Kębłowski, 2014),
while in 2011 there was only city (Sopot) experimenting with this method
(Kębłowski, 2013). One of the Polish non-governmental organizations gathered in 2018 data on examples of 186 PB in Polish municipalities (Pracownia
Badań i Innowacji Społecznych “Stocznia” 2018).
The provisions of the Act of 11 January 2018 on amending certain laws to
increase the participation of citizens in the process of selecting, operating
and controlling certain public bodies, introduced the concept of a PB at every
level of self-government units. These provisions will come into force in the
autumn of 2018, when the next, 5-year term of the local self-government authorities will start. The PB instrument has been included in the existing provisions regarding public consultations.
According to the new regulations, a PB is understood as a special form of
public consultations, deciding on a part of budget expenditures in direct vot
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Can Top Down Participatory Budgeting Work? The Case of Polish Community Fund
ing. In the case of large local self-government units the obligation to separate
the PB was introduced. PBs established in large cities in accordance with this
obligation can not be less than 0.5% of the commune’s expenditure included
in the last report on the implementation of the budget.
The tasks of the council of the local government unit include defning, in the
resolution, the requirements that the proposals for the PB should meet. This
applies in particular: formal requirements that the submitted projects should
respond to, the required number of signatures of residents supporting the
project, rules for the assessment of submitted projects as to their compliance
with the law, technical feasibility, formal requirements they meet and the procedure of appeal against the decision not to allow the proposal for voting, the
rules governing the voting, determining the results and making them public.
Top down, legislative model of PB in the form of community fund has been
adopted in February 2009 with the effect to local budgets for 2010. Law on the
Community Fund1 has limited scope of application. Community funds might be
introduced only in rural or urban-rural communes2 that created special auxiliary units for rural areas, called communities or villages (sołectwa). Communities does not enjoy any formal autonomy from communal authorities and do
not have their own budgets and functions to be performed independently.
They have no capacity to get into contractual relations. Decision on establishment of communities and specifying scope of their tasks is under exclusive
competence of communal council. Typical functions delegated to communities includes organization of cultural or sports events, local roads improvement or flood protection. Traditionally, the elected representatives of communities supported communal administration in collecting local taxes (Kulesza
and Sześciło, 2012). Currently, there are over 40,000 of communities in 2173
rural and urban-rural communes (Central Statistical Ofce of Poland, 2015).
Communities are managed according to the bylaws adopted by communal
councils, yet the national legislation established community gathering of
all residents as decision-making body for community and community mayor
(sołtys) as executive organ appointed by the gathering. Hence, communities
might be perceived as a form of traditional direct democracy. It is feasible
thanks to the size and population of communities that predominantly cover
single village area.
Taking into account the formal status of community, community fund cannot
be regarded as separate budget of this unit (Paczocha, 2009; Augustyniak,
2010). Extracting community fund from the communal budget is not mandatory. However, if the communal council once decided on establishing the fund
for a given year, this decision remains valid also for subsequent years, until it
1 Law of 20 February 2009 on the Community Fund, Journal of Laws, No. 52, pos. 420. This
law has been replaced by the Law of the Community Fund, Journal of Laws, pos. 301 that
entered into force on 20 March 2014.
2 Rural communes covers only rural areas (villages), while urban-rural communes consists
of town and surrounding rural areas (villages).
184 Central European Public Administration Review, Vol. 16, No. 2/2018
Dawid Sześciło, Bartosz Wilk
is repealed by special resolution of the council. On the other hand, the resolution on the non-separation of the community fund may cover only one year.
This means that in the next year local authorities will have to reconsider the
creation of the community fund. This contributes to greater stability of this
arrangement and minimizes the risk of its abandoning.
If the community was created, it must be implemented in accordance with
the standards and procedures specifed in the Law on the Community Fund.
First of all, the minimal amount of the fund needs to be calculated according
to statutory formula. This amount might be increased by the communal council. This formula takes into account two variables relating to population and
income capacity of the commune: 1) number of residents of each community;
and 2) communal budget income per capita.
Although community fund is covered entirely from communal budget, the
Law on the Community Fund contains partial refund scheme addressed to
the communes. They are entitled to receive from the state budget reimbursement of up to 40% of their expenditure on the community fund. The highest
refund might be granted to the communes with the budget income per capita
below the national average. This mechanism plays crucial role in incentivizing
communes to introduction of the community fund.
The decision-making process on distribution of already calculated amount of
community fund is set out in the Law on the Community Fund. It includes four
main stages described below.
Figure 1. Management of the community fund

Central European Public Administration Review, Vol. 16, No. 2/2018 185
Can Top Down Participatory Budgeting Work? The Case of Polish Community Fund

Source: based on 2014 Law on the Community Fund.
In practice, the community funds are allocated primarily to the investments
in local transport and communication infrastructure (36% of total allocation
in 2014), culture, e.g. running community cultural centers (25,7% in 2014)
and maintenance of public utilities (13,9% in 2014), including parks, streets,
squares and green areas (Council of Ministries of the Republic of Poland,
2015). For comparison, in 2017 expenditures made under the community
fund were mainly related to transport and communication (32.6%, and especially to municipal roads), culture and protection of national heritage (24.6%
and especially for houses and cultural centers), municipal economy and environmental protection (17.2%, and in this mainly for lighting of streets,
squares and roads, and maintenance of greenery), or fnally physical culture
(9.6%, and mainly on sports facilities; Council of Ministries of the Republic of
Poland, 2018).
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4 Discussion
Introducing PB as top down initiative, driven by national legislation was a risky
endeavor, taking into account the dominant approach to PB as locally, bottom up instigated governance innovation. The main question is, therefore, if
the local communities approved and absorbed this uniform and regulated in
detail scheme. Considering the key elements of the model set by the Law on
the Community Fund, the following indicators might be used in order to assess the reception of the community fund at the local level:
– The number (share) of communes that adopted the community fund;
– The total expenditure on the community fund that was realized (not only
planned).
Data for this research has been provided by the Ministry of Public Administration, Council of Ministers of the Republic of Poland, Central Statistical Ofce
of Poland, National Community Mayors’ Association and Watchdog Polska
(non-governmental organization monitoring the implementation of community funds across the country).
The number (share) of communes that – via resolutions of communal councils
– decided to introduce community fund is the main indicator of the reception
of this mechanism among local communities. As the decision in this matter is
absolutely voluntary, this indicator explicitly reflects the level of acceptance
and legitimacy of top down PB in the form of community fund. The fgure below illustrates the dissemination of community fund among rural and urban
rural communes since the introduction of this mechanism in the local budgets
for 2010.
Figure 2. The number of communes that introduced the community fund (total
number of rural and urban-rural communes: 2173)

1000
1100
1200
1300
1400
1500
1600
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Communes that introduced the community fund
Source: Ministry of the Interior and Administration 2018, <http://administracja.mswia.
gov.pl/adm/fundusz-solecki/statystyka/10370,Fundusz-solecki-w-liczbach.html>.
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Can Top Down Participatory Budgeting Work? The Case of Polish Community Fund
Broad dissemination the community fund over the years is evident. In 2015 it
functioned in 64% of the communes, and in 2017 – 71,31%. Rapid expansion
of this instrument occurred in 2014 when the new Law on the Community
Fund entered into force, providing some technical arrangements facilitating
implementation and management of the funds3. Six years’ experience is long
enough to conclude that the community fund gained stable and noticeable
position in the local landscape of Poland. In terms of number (share) of communes that implemented PB, community fund appeared to be much more
popular than urban PB adopted according to rules and procedures set out
entirely by local government. Community fund was not rejected as a formula
contradictory to the idea of local governments’ autonomy and inconsistent
with the global trends in PB’s development. Top down, essentially bureaucratic approach has been approved the majority of the local government and
the level of acceptance remained high over the years.
Figure 3. Share of communes in which the community fund was established,
to the number of all communes in which there are auxiliary units for rural
areas (sołectwa)

0,00%
10,00%
20,00%
30,00%
40,00%
50,00%
60,00%
70,00%
80,00%
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Source: Reply of the deputy Minister of the Interior and Administration to
interpellation No. 24306 on the scope of dissemination of the community fund.
What is more, the total share of community fund in the budgets of rural and
urban-rural communes increases faster than the number of communes using
this mechanism (fgure 3). While the number of communes applying community fund increased by 4% between 2010 and 2014, the share of budgets allocated to the community fund grew by 53% in case of rural communes and
3 For instance, the available refund from central budget was increased and joint applications from more communities were allowed.
188 Central European Public Administration Review, Vol. 16, No. 2/2018
Dawid Sześciło, Bartosz Wilk
by 52% in case of urban-rural communes. This means that increasing number
of communes decided to set allocations for community funds above statutory
minimum. However, there are no comprehensive statistics on the share of
communes, where the extra allocation has been provided.
Figure 4. Share of budgets of rural and urban-rural communes allocated
to the community fund

0,37%
0,00%
0,10%
0,20%
0,30%
0,40%
0,50%
0,60%
0,70%
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Rural communes Urban-rural communes
Source: Council of Ministers of the Republic of Poland, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018,
Central Statistical Ofce of Poland, 2014.
This effect cannot be linked only with the fnancial incentive for community fund’s implementation. Firstly, the refund scheme activates ex post. This
means for the municipality that the refund will take place in the next budget
year in relation to the year in which the expenditure was made.. Furthermore,
the amount of available refund is strictly limited, as mentioned above. What
are the other factors that contributed to high reception of the community
fund among local governments? First of all, it is crucial to take into account
the historical context. Law on the Community Fund did not introduce completely new instrument, yet institutionalize and developed the mechanism
that has been already applied in some communes. It needs to be reminded,
the Communal Government Act contained (and still contains) provisions enabling local governments to empower communities to manage specifed share
in communal budget (Trykozko, 2014). Detailed procedures for setting this
share and disposing it should be established in the commune’s bylaws. Traditionally, one of the most popular instruments adopted locally were so called
“community deductions” – mechanism very similar to the community fund, i.e.
based on authorizing the community to dispose the share of local budget cal
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Can Top Down Participatory Budgeting Work? The Case of Polish Community Fund
culated primarily with reference to community population. Sobiesiak-Penszko
(2012) claim that the community fund has been introduced most extensively
in the regions where the practice of community deductions or other similar
instruments was most disseminated.
It is clear, therefore, why the Law on the Community Fund has been contested by the Polish Association of Rural Governments as limiting the communal
autonomy (Swianiewcz, 2011). The introduction of uniform legislative model
interfered with well established and developed locally practices. On the other
hand, this law secures wide scope of autonomy for communal councils in determining key elements of community funds on their territory. What is essential, the communal councils are allowed not to introduce community fund
in the formula imposed by the legislation and may continue to use their own
scheme. Obviously, fnancial incentives made the legislative model of community fund more attractive, yet regulatory approach reflected in the Law on
the Community Fund is relatively flexible and general. It focuses on setting
minimum standards and protecting communities against arbitrary decisions
of the communal councils or mayors. Communal councils are still authorized
to make fnal decision on the allocation of funds to the communities and under circumstances that are broadly defned (see: fgure 1) it may reject the
community’s proposal. The mayor has supervisory powers over the activities
of community bodies and is entirely responsible for implementation of the
projects selected by the communities.
Hence the communal autonomy is not undermined by the Law on the Community Fund. The major drawback of this law is rather lack of sufcient guarantees for empowerment of communities, primarily in the phase of projects
implementation. The role of the communities ends up when the list of projects is submitted to the communal authorities. They are not provided with
any rights to participate in the fnal decision-making and or realization of
the projects. The same disadvantages have also introduced in 2018 PB and
mentioned above regulation of PB, based on the mechanism of public consultations. As they do not enjoy judicial capacity, they cannot challenge in the
administrative courts any decisions and actions undertaken by the commune
with regard to the community fund. They need to rely on, in this matter, central government’s bodies performing supervision over local governments.
Therefore, introduction of the community fund might be perceived as an important, yet cautious step towards communities’ empowerment.
As previously mentioned, in 2018, from the new term of local self-government, come in force in Poland new legislation of PB in municipalities. PB will
be mandatory in large local government units. These regulations are questionable, because the legislator did not react to raised doubts about the organization of the former PB in the construction of public consultations (consultations do not constitute a decision). In addition, the adopted regulations
do not correspond to new trends, in which votes are changed to discuss the
best solutions in small groups (this is also characteristic for community fund).
190 Central European Public Administration Review, Vol. 16, No. 2/2018
Dawid Sześciło, Bartosz Wilk
Next years will show the functioning of this type of top down PB, presented
different approach than in the case of community fund.
5 Conclusion
The case of Polish community fund proves that participatory budgeting might
be effectively introduced via national legislation, yet specifc conditions needs
to be met in order to ensure acceptance of this approach among local communities. Firstly, the fnal decision on applying the legislative model of PB
should be reserved to the competence of local governments. Autonomy of
local governments needs to be combined with stimulants and incentives encouraging communities to follow the model set out in the legislation, primarily incentives of fnancial nature. What is also crucial, is to limit the legislative
framework to setting minimum standards for the PB’s procedure and leaving
enough room for local governments to control detailed elements of the process. Finally, the historical context also matters. Success of the community
fund was enhanced by the past experience with similar arrangements initiated and applied at local level. Law on the Community Fund institutionalized
and disseminated those practices.
Important reservations need to be made to the general claim of the success
of the community fund. Although the community fund became signifcant element of local governance and got absorbed „internalized” by the communities, more in-depth analysis is required in order to assess its impact on the
quality of life and public services in rural areas or efciency of the allocation
of public resources via this mechanism.
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Can Top Down Participatory Budgeting Work? The Case of Polish Community Fund
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planowania i wykonywania budżetu gminy, Warsaw.
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Review, 35(2), pp. 281–302.
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Povzetki
predlaga, da bi madžarska vlada preučila problematiko racionalizacije nadzornih postopkov, na primer prek vzorčnega preverjanja ali osredotočanja na najbolj tvegane postopke. Raziskava prinaša prvo akademsko analizo podatkov
v zvezi z nadzorom javnega naročanja na Madžarskem. Hkrati želi spodbuditi
madžarsko in druge vlade k preverjanju učinkovitosti tovrstnih postopkov in
čim večji odpravi administrativnih bremen, s katerimi se soočajo javne oblasti.
Ključne besede: javna naročila, administrativno breme, revizija, ex ante nadzor,
sredstva EU, Madžarska
8. Analiza obdavčitve nepremičnin v Bosni in Hercegovini
Lejla Lazović-Pita, Amina Močević
Namen tega članka je zapolniti vrzel pomanjkanja literature na področju analize obdavčitve nepremičnin v Bosni in Hercegovini (BIH) in rezultate kot študijo primera dati na razpolago podobnim državam. Na temelju metodologije
IMF in OECD za davke na nepremičnine najina raziskava vključuje primerjavo
davka na nepremičnine v dveh entitetah BIH, upoštevaje mednarodno prakso
na tem področju. Rezultati kažejo, da je v BIH najti nedoslednosti, kar se tiče
mednarodne klasifkacije davkov na nepremičnine in da se obdavčitev nepremičnin v dveh entitetah BIH (RS in FBIH) razlikuje. Uveljavljene so tri vrste nepremičninskega davka, to so davek na nepremičnine v RS, davek na promet z
nepremičninami in davek na nepremičnine v FBIH. Ugotovljene razlike vplivajo
na obseg in delež prihodkov iz obdavčitve nepremičnin v obeh entitetah, kar
vpliva na lokalne skupnosti in njihove prihodke. Zato sva se osredotočili na
davke na nepremičnine v FBIH, ki so v pristojnosti kantonov. Raziskava je pokazala, da večina prihodkov iz naslova nepremičninske obdavčitve izvira iz kantona Sarajevo in obdavčitve prometa z nepremičninami v štirih občinah, ki sodijo
pod Sarajevo kot mesto. Ob upoštevanju pomanjkanja dolgoročnih zanesljivih
podatkov v obeh entitetah BIH sva zaključili z nekaj priporočili glede reform
politike na področju nepremičnin v FBIH v prihodnosti.
Ključne besede: obdavčitev, lokalne skupnosti, nepremičninski davek, davek na
promet z nepremičninami, BIH, mednarodna primerjava
9. Je lahko participativna priprava proračuna od zgoraj
navzdol učinkovita? Primer poljskega skupnostnega sklada
Dawid Sześciło, Bartosz Wilk
Članek vsebuje priporočila glede participativnega proračuna (PP), kar je ena
od najbolj priznanih upravljavskih inovacij v zadnjih desetletjih. Ta globalni
pojav v praksi predstavlja premik v smeri participativnega in sodelovalnega
managementa javnih sredstev na lokalni ravni. Namen članka je določiti, kdaj
je lahko pristop od zgoraj navzdol k PP dobrodošel, kajti za PP sheme po svetu je značilno, da se pojavljajo v obliki lokalnih iniciativ, ki jih sprožajo bodisi
222 Central European Public Administration Review, Vol. 16, No. 2/2018
Povzetki
civilne iniciative bodisi lokalne oblasti. Analiza temelji na opisu primera PP, ki
ga uvajajo predpisi na ravni države in ki podrobno ureja postopke PP. Članek
preučuje poljske izkušnje na področju učinkovitosti pristopa od zgoraj navzdol
pri PP. Dokazuje, da ta pristop lahko učinkovito deluje, če PP spremljajo občutne spodbude in lokalnim skupnostim nudi široko polje avtonomije in fleksibilnosti. Poljska izkušnja kaže, da takšna iniciativa lahko postane razmeroma
uspešna, pri čemer pa mora biti izpolnjena cela vrsta pogojev, da lahko pride
do širše uporabe zakonodajnega modela participativne priprave proračuna.
Rezultati so v praksi uporabni za osrednje vladne institucije, ki razmišljajo o
uvedbi določenega normativnega okvirja za participativno upravljanje na lokalni ravni. Izvirnost raziskave je v tem, da analizira zgodbo o uspehu na področju PP, ki je bila uvedena s pomočjo državnih predpisov, in ugotavlja, kdaj
je lahko takšen pristop učinkovit.
Ključne besede: skupnostni sklad, participativni proračun, participativno upravljanje, lokalna uprava, lokalni proračun, civilna družba, participacija
državljanov, Poljska
10. Analiza prilagoditve storitev e-uprave in njihove uporabe
v slovenski informacijski družbi med 2014 in 2017
Mitja Dečman
Ob naraščajoči družbeni vlogi informacijsko-komunikacijske tehnologije (IKT),
IKT pridobiva pomen tudi z vidika zagotavljanja in uporabe spletnih storitev
javnega sektorja za državljane. V teku let je bilo izvedenih veliko aktivnosti z
namenom promocije IKT, še posebej znotraj EU, zlasti na temelju Evropske
digitalne agende (EDA). Ta poudarja ključno vlogo IKT pri prizadevanjih za
doseganje njenih strateških ciljev. Slovenija kot država članica EU sledi tem
usmeritvam, vendar se uvršča v manj uspešne države v EU. Na osnovi znanega evropskega kazalnika digitalnega gospodarstva in družbe (European Digital
Economy and Society Index) se Slovenija uvršča v spodnjo polovico držav članic,
kar kaže na možnosti za napredek. Čeprav odmislimo ponudnike storitev kot
akterje, se ta članek osredotoča na uporabnike, še posebej pa na digitalno
neenakost med njimi. V raziskavi so uporabljeni podatki iz slovenskega letnega poročila Uporaba IKT v gospodinjstvih in pri posameznikih za zadnja štiri
leta. Analiza podatkov, ki so predstavljeni v tej raziskavi, izpostavlja, da je v
slovenski družbi moč opaziti spremembe na bolje, kar pa na področju storitev
javnega sektorja velja le v omejenem obsegu. Rezultati prav tako kažejo, da je
prisotna digitalna neenakost, ki je pri gospodinjstvih povezana z ravnijo njihovih prihodkov, pri posameznih uporabnikih pa s stopnjo njihove izobrazbe. Sinteza podatkov prikaže, da morajo slovenska vlada in posamezna ministrstva
zastavljenim strategijam dodati oprijemljive ukrepe, če želi Slovenija dohiteti
vodilne države članice EU in uresničiti cilje v okviru digitalne agende kot enega
od sedmih stebrov Strategije Evropa 2020.
Ključne besede: digitalna neenakost, digitalni razkorak, e-upravljanje, uporaba e-
-storitev, informacijska družba, Slovenija
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