For us and for our loyal customers, the motorcycles we build aren’t just motorcycles.
They are living pieces of American history, mystique on two wheels. They are
the vehicle with which our riders discover the power, the passion, and the people
that define the Harley-Davidson Experience.
represented? Moreover, with consumer spending weak in both North America and
Europe—Harley’s two biggest markets—the demand for luxury leisure products
costing between $7000 and $38,000 was likely to be subdued.
The History of Harley-Davidson
From Birth to Maturity, 1903–1981
Harley-Davidson, Inc. was founded in 1903 by William Harley and the three Davidson
brothers: William, Arthur, and Walter. In 1909, Harley introduced its two-cylinder,
V-twin engine with its deep, rumbling sound: this engine type would be the characteristic
feature of Harley-Davidson motorcycles for the next hundred years. At that
time there were about 150 US motorcycle producers in the US; by 1953, Harley-
Davidson was the sole survivor.
The postwar affluence and the rise of youth culture created a growing demand for
motorcycles. This was satisfied primarily by imports: first the British (BSA, Triumph,
and Norton) and then the Japanese (led by Honda). Harley benefitted from the
rebirth of motorcycling as a leisure activity. However, its acquisition by the leisure
conglomerate AMF in 1969 was followed by quality problems and financial losses.
Rebirth, 1981–2008
In 1981, Harley’s senior managers led a leveraged buyout of the company. Despite
a perilous financial condition, the management team embarked upon rebuilding
production methods and working practices. Managers visited Japanese automobile
plants and introduced their own version of Toyota’s just-in-time ( JIT) system called
“MAN” (materials-as-needed). Harley’s manufacturing plants adopted collaborative
processes of quality management.
The 1986 initial public offering of Harley-Davidson’s shares fueled investment in
new models, plants, and dealerships. Harley’s share of the market for heavyweight
motorcycles (over 500cc) grew steadily. During the 1990s, Harley’s biggest challenge
was satisfying the surging demand for its products. In 1996, Harley announced its
Plan 2003 to dramatically increase production capacity in the period preceding its
100th anniversary in 2003. In 2004, Harley sold more than 300,000 motorcycles,
a tenfold increase on 1983. From 1984 to 2008, Harley’s output and revenue had
grown in every single year (Figure 1).
Downturn and Readjustment, 2008–2014
The financial crisis of 2008 put an abrupt end to growth. After decades of customer
waiting lists and a shortage of production capacity, Harley faced plummeting sales,
excess inventory, and problems of bad debts as customers defaulted on their loan
repayments. In the shrinking motorcycle markets of North America and Europe,
Harley—with the highest average retail price of any major manufacturer—suffered
disproportionately. Amidst the credit crunch, Harley-Davidson Financial Services
(HDFS), which supplied credit, insurance, and extended warranties to Harley dealers
and customers, was unable to securitize its customer loans and was forced to
retain them on its own books.
When Keith Wandell took over as Harley’s CEO in May 2009, his priorities were
to restore funding for Harley’s consumer lending, align production and employment
with lower demand, and refocus on the core Harley-Davidson brand—which
involved closing Buell Motorcycles3 and selling Italian subsidiary MV Agusta.4 In
2009, Harley posted a net loss for the year—its first as a public company. (Appendix
Table A1 provides details of Harley-Davidson’s financial performance.)
During 2010–2014, Wandell established “a bold, clear strategic direction that
would maximize our opportunities going forward and restore the company as a
strong business that could consistently grow over the long haul.”5 The resulting
transformation of Harley included:
● Rethinking and restructuring of manufacturing operations including reducing
capacity and increasing flexibility to allow a wider range of models to be
produced and to match production to seasonal fluctuations in demand—what
Harley called its “surge production system.”
● Expanding international sales. The primary focus for Harley’s overseas sales
had been Europe—the world’s biggest market for heavyweight motorcycles.
With Europe mired in recession, emphasis shifted to building distribution and
growing sales in the emerging markets of Asia and Latin America. In 2011,
Harley opened an Asia-Pacific regional headquarters in Singapore, and an
assembly plant in India.6
● Expanding the customer base. To reestablish growth in North America,
Harley needed to broaden its customer base from its core demographic of
white males of 45 years or more. Targeted groups included: women riders,
“Harlistas” (Latino riders), “Iron Elite” (African-American riders), “Harley’s
Heroes” (military and veteran riders), and, most of all, younger riders through
new models. The result was a major investment in new product development.
During 2013, Harley launched its “Project Rushmore” motorcycles: “The first to
come through our new, world-class product development pipeline and introduce
major innovation and design improvements. They were developed with
FIGURE 1 Annual shipments of motorcycles by Harley-Davidson
Sources: Harley Davidson annual reports and Harley-Davidson archives.
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
1900 1920 1940 1960
Year
Thousands of units
1980 2000 2020
a level of consumer input that brought the voice of the customer to product
design in an unparalleled way for us.”7 They were followed by the “Street”
models—lighter, sports motorcycles featuring new, liquid-cooled 500cc and
750cc engines.
The Heavyweight Motorcycle Market
Until the financial crisis of 2008–2009, the heavyweight segment had been the most
rapidly growing part of the world motorcycle market, with the US accounting for a
major portion of this growth. Worldwide sales of heavyweight motorcycles trebled
between 1990 and 2008. However, during 2008–2010, sales dropped sharply in North
America and Europe and the subsequent recovery has been slow.
In North America, Harley was the leader in heavyweight bikes, with over half the
market (Table 1). Overseas, Harley had been unable to replicate this market dominance,
despite strong sales in a few markets. Harley achieved the remarkable feat of
becoming heavyweight market leader in Japan. It held similar leadership in Australia
and Brazil. The European market was more fragmented, with Harley one among a
leading group that included Honda, BMW, Suzuki, Yamaha, Kawasaki, and Triumph,
each with market shares in heavyweight motorcycles of between 8 and 15%.
The heavyweight motorcycle market comprised three segments:
● Cruiser motorcycles: These were “big, noisy, low riding, unapologetically
macho cycles,”8 typically with V-twin, large displacement engines and an
TABLE 1 Retail sales (registrations) of heavyweight motorcycles (601+ cc), 2005–2014
(thousands of units)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
North America
Total market 554 579 555 477 304 260 271a 299a 306a 316a
Harley-Davidson 265 282 267 235 174 154 152a 161a 168a 167a
Market share (%) 47.8 48.6 48.7 49.3 53.2 54.9 55.7 53.8 54.9 52.8
Europe
Total market 351 377 372 384 314 301 293 300 282 320
Harley-Davidsonb 30 34 42 45 40 41 44 36 36 39
Market share (%) 8.5 9.1 11.3 11.7 12.0 12.7 13.7 12.1 12.8 12.0
Asia-Pacific
Harley-Davidson 11 13 23 25 23 21 21c 25c 27c 30c
Latin America
Harley Davidson n.a. n.a. 3 8 6 6 7 9 11 12
Notes:
aUS only.
bIncludes Middle East and Africa for 2005–2011.
cIn each year, sales in Japan were between 10,000 and 11,000.
n.a. = not available.
Source: Harley-Davidson 10-K reports.
upright riding position. Their design reflected the dominance of styling over
either comfort or speed. For the urban males (and some females) in congested
cities such as Los Angeles, New York, Paris, and Tokyo, the cruiser
motorcycle, while a practical mode of transportation, was primarily a statement
of style. The cruiser segment was practically created by Harley and
represented over two-thirds of the heavyweight market in the US. Most of
Harley’s competitors in this segment had imitated the main features of the traditional
Harley design.
● Touring motorcycles: These included cruisers especially equipped for longerdistance
riding and bikes especially designed for comfort over long distances
(including the Honda Goldwing and the bigger BMWs). These tourers featured
luxuries such as audio systems, two-way intercoms, and heaters. While
Harley led this segment on the basis of style and image, Honda and BMW
had engineered their motorcycles for greater smoothness and comfort over
long distances through the use of multi-cylinder, shaft-drive engines and
advanced suspension systems.
● Performance motorcycles: These were based on racing bikes, with hightechnology,
high-revving engines offering speed, acceleration, race-track styling,
and minimal concessions to rider comfort. The segment was the most
important in the European and Asia-Pacific markets, representing 62 and 65%
of total heavyweight bike sales respectively. The segment was dominated by
Japanese motorcycle companies, with a strong representation of European
specialists, such as Ducati and Triumph. Harley had competed in this segment
during 1993–2010 through Buell Motorcycles.
Unlike its Japanese competitors, Harley was highly market focused: its Harley’s
models were concentrated on the “super-heavyweight” segment (over 850cc) and
within this on cruiser and touring motorcycles.
Harley-Davidson in 2015
The Brand
Harley-Davidson’s image and the loyalty the company engendered among its customers
were seen as its greatest assets. The famed spread eagle signified not just
the brand of one of the world’s oldest motorcycle companies but also an entire
lifestyle with which it was associated. Harley has been described as “the ultimate
biker status symbol … a quasi religion, an institution, a way of life.”9 Harley had a
unique relationship with American culture. The values that Harley represented—
individuality, freedom, and adventure—could be traced back to the cowboy and
frontiersman of yesteryear, and before that to the quest that brought people to
America in the first place. As the sole surviving indigenous motorcycle company,
Harley-Davidson represented a once-great tradition of American engineering and
manufacturing.
The Harley brand was central not just to the company’s marketing but also to its
strategy as a whole. The central thrust of the strategy was reinforcing and extending
the relationship between the company and its consumers. Harley-Davidson had long
recognized that it was not selling motorcycles: it was selling the Harley Experience,
which formed the central theme in almost all its external communications:
A chill sweeps through your body, created by a spontaneous outburst of pure,
unadulterated joy. You are surrounded by people from all walks of life and every
corner of the globe. They are complete strangers, but you know them like your
own family. They were drawn to this place by the same passion—the same dream.
And they came here on the same machine. This is one place you can truly be yourself.
Because you don’t just fit in. You belong.10
Customers and Customer Relations
If the appeal of the Harley motorcycle was the image it conveyed and the lifestyle
it represented, the company’s challenge was to ensure that the experience matched
the image. Harley’s involvement in its consumers’ riding experience was through the
Harley Owners’ Group (HOG), which organized social and charity events. Employees,
from the CEO down, were encouraged to take an active role in attending HOG
shows, rallies, and rides. “The feeling of being out there on a Harley-Davidson motorcycle
links us like no other experience can. It’s made HOG like no other organization
in the world … more family reunion than organized meeting.”11 Customer loyalty led
to their continuing reinvesting in Harley products: Harley-branded accessories and
apparel, customizing their bikes, and eventually trading them in for a new (typically
more expensive) model. About half of bike sales were to repeat customers.
Financial success involved Harley’s repositioning from blue-collar youngsters to
middle-aged and upper-income buyers, many of whom had never ridden a motorcycle
before. Harley’s core demographic was Caucasian males aged 35 and over. The average
age of Harley’s customers was believed to be 47.12 In his final letter to shareholders,
retiring CEO Keith Wandell reported success in expanding Harley’s customer base:
For the third straight year, Harley-Davidson grew U.S. retail sales to outreach customers,
which includes young adults, women, African Americans and Hispanics,
at more than twice the rate of the growth in sales to core customers. International
retail sales of new Harley-Davidson motorcycles grew more than 5 percent and
accounted for more than 36 percent of total retail Harley-Davidson motorcycle
sales, with dealers in the Asia Pacific, EMEA and Latin America regions posting
their highest new retail motorcycle sales on record for each region.13
The Products
Broadening Harley’s market appeal had major implications for product policy and
design. Ever since its disastrous foray into small bikes during the AMF years, Harley
had recognized that its competitive advantage lay with super-heavyweight bikes.
Here it stuck resolutely to the classic styling that had characterized Harleys since
the company’s early years. At the heart of the Harley motorcycle was the air-cooled
V-twin engine that had been Harley’s distinctive feature since 1909. Harley’s frames,
handlebars, fuel tanks, and seats also reflected traditional designs.
Harley’s commitment to traditional design features may be seen as making a virtue
out of necessity. Its smaller corporate size and inability to share R & D across cars
and bikes (unlike Honda and BMW) limited its ability to invest in technology and
new products. As a result, Harley lagged far behind its competitors in the application
of automotive technologies: not only did its motorcycles look old-style, much of
their technology was old-style. Since the Evolution engine launched in 1984, Harley
has introduced just four entirely new engines.
Yet, even in its 2015 models, Harley’s commitment to tradition was clear. Long
after other manufacturers had moved to multiple valves per cylinder, overhead camshafts,
liquid cooling, and electronic ignition, most Harley bikes featured air-cooled
push-rod engines with two valves per cylinder. In suspension systems, braking systems,
and transmissions, Harley was also a laggard.
Nevertheless, Harley was engaged in constant upgrading—principally incremental
refinements to its engines, frames, and gearboxes—aimed at improving power
delivery and reliability, increasing braking power, and reducing vibration. Harley
automotive technology alliance partners included Porsche, Ford, and Gemini Racing.
Although technological innovation was limited, Harley was very active in new product
development. By 2015, Harley offered 38 different models. Its Product Development
Center and Prototyping Lab were among the most important units within the company.
Most of Harley’s product development efforts were limited to style changes, new
paint designs, and engineering improvements; however, after 2000, Harley accelerated
technological development. Milestones included the V-Rod model introduced in
October 2001, which featured innovative styling and an all-new liquid-cooled engine;
the Twin Cam 96 engine in 2006, which featured electronic ignition and a six-speed
gearbox; the Street models in 2015; and Harley’s prototype all-electric motorcycle.
Among the 218 US patents awarded to Harley during 2000–2014, a large proportion
related to the design of peripheral items: saddlebag mounting systems, footpegs, seats,
backrests, electrical assemblies, and motorcycle music systems. Over the same period
Honda was awarded 10,982 US patents, Kawasaki 2002, and Suzuki 625.
Central to Harley’s product strategy was the belief that every Harley rider should
own a unique, personalized motorcycle—hence the offer of a wide range of pre-sale
and post-sale customization opportunities. New bikes offered multiple options for
seats, bars, pegs, controls, and paint jobs, with over 7000 accessories, and special
services such as “Chrome Consulting.”
TABLE 2 Harley-Davidson shipments of motorcycles, 2003–2014
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
USa 237.7 260.6 266.5 273.2 241.5 206.3 144.4 131.6 152.2 160.5 167.0 174.0
Internationala 53.5 56.7 62.5 76.0 89.1 97.2 78.5 78.8 80.9 87.1 93.4 96.7
Product mixb
Sportsterc 19.7 22.0 21.3 18.5 21.8 20.0 21.4 19.5 21.3 20.5 19.3 21.0
Custom 52.0 48.6 45.2 46.2 43.7 46.4 40.9 41.4 39.2 39.1 39.5 33.8
Touring 28.4 29.4 33.5 35.4 34.5 33.6 37.7 39.0 39.5 40.4 41.2 45.2
Buell 10.0 9.9 11.2 12.5 11.5 13.1 9.5 2.6 0.2 — — —
Company totala 301.2 327.2 340.2 361.6 342.1 316.4 232.4 213.0 233.2 247.6 260.5 270.7
Note:
aThousands of units.
bPercentage of total shipments.
cIncludes sales of Street motorcycles for 2014.
Source: Harley-Davidson 10-K reports.
Reconciling product differentiation with scale economies was a continuing challenge
for Harley. The solution was to offer a wide range of customization options while standardizing
key components. Thus, Harley’s broad model range involved “permutations of
four”: four engine types, four basic frames, four styles of gas tank, and so on.
The Harley product line also covered a wide price range. The Street 500 model was
priced as an entry-level bike, beginning at $6799, less than one-fifth of the price of the
CVO Limited, at $39,349. Table 2 shows Harley’s motorcycle output by product type.
Distribution
Upgrading Harley’s distribution network was central to its resurgence during the
1980s and 1990s. At the time of the buyout, many of Harley’s 620 US dealerships
were operated by enthusiasts, with erratic opening hours, a poor stock of bikes and
spares, and indifferent customer service. If Harley was in the business of selling
a lifestyle and an experience, then dealers played a pivotal role in delivering that
experience. Moreover, if Harley’s target market had shifted toward mature, upperincome
individuals, Harley needed to provide a retail experience commensurate
with the expectations of this group.
Harley’s dealer development program increased support for dealers while imposing
higher standards of pre- and after-sales service, and requiring better dealer
facilities. Dealers were obliged to carry a full line of Harley replacement parts and
accessories and to offer an expanding range of services: in addition to traditional
services such as service and repair and financing, dealers offered test ride facilities,
rider instruction classes, motorcycle rental, consulting services for customizing bikes
through dealer-based design centers and Chrome Consultants, and insurance services.
Harley-Davidson Authorized Tours offered vacation packages with bikes supplied
by Harley dealers. Over 90% of Harley dealerships in the US were exclusive:
most other motorcycle manufacturers sold through multi-brand dealerships.
Dealer relations were a continuing strategic priority for Harley. Its Retail
Environments Group established a meticulous set of performance standards and
guidelines for dealers that covered every aspect of managing the showroom and
interacting with actual and potential customers. Harley-Davidson University was
established to “enhance dealer competencies in every area, from customer satisfaction
to inventory management, service proficiency, and front-line sales.”14
Expanding international sales required Harley to extend its dealer network into
countries where it had little or no distribution presence. As Table 3 shows, emerging
TABLE 3 Harley-Davidson’s dealership network, 2008–2014
US Canada EMEA Asia-Pacific Latin America
2008 2014 2008 2014 2008 2014 2008 2014 2008 2014
Full-service
dealerships
686 669 71 69 383 369 201 273 32 55
Note:
In addition, there were 152 non-traditional dealerships in 2014: US 96, Canada 4, EMEA 11, Asia-Pacific 12, and Latin America 29.
Source: Harley Davidson 10-K reports.
markets accounted for the whole of the increase in Harley’s dealerships between
2008 and 2014.
Other Products and Services
Sales of parts, accessories, “general merchandise” (clothing and collectibles), and
financial services represented 28% of Harley’s total revenue in 2014 (Table 4)—much
higher than for other motorcycle companies. Clothing sales included not just traditional
riding apparel but also a wide range of men’s, women’s, and children’s leisure
apparel.
Most of the “general merchandising” business represented licensing of the Harley-
Davidson name and trademarks to third-party manufacturers of clothing, giftware,
jewelry, toys, and other products. Most of these were sold through channels other
than the Harley dealership network. To expand sales of licensed products, Harley
opened “non-traditional” dealerships: retail outlets selling clothing, accessories, and
giftware but not motorcycles.
Manufacturing
As already noted, Harley-Davidson’s development during the 1980s and 1990s
focused heavily on upgrading its manufacturing operations: capacity expansion
permitted investment in new plants and equipment and the introduction of more
advanced process technologies. Particular emphasis was placed on developing
manufacturing capabilities through total quality management, JIT scheduling,
CAD/CAM, and the devolution of responsibility and decision making to the
shop floor.
Despite the constant development of its manufacturing facilities and operational
capabilities, Harley’s low production volume relative to Honda and the other
Japanese manufacturers imposed significant cost disadvantages, especially in the
purchase of components. Despite this lack of bargaining muscle, Harley sought
close, collaborative relations with key suppliers. Its Supplier Advisory Council (SAC)
served “not only to improve purchasing efficiency, but also to provide a forum to
share information, ideas, and strategy.”15
Harley’s capacity for efficiency was also limited by its dispersed manufacturing
operations: engine manufacture in Milwaukee, Wisconsin and assembly in York,
Pennsylvania and Kansas City, Missouri. During 2009–2014, Harley reorganized its
manufacturing plants and manufacturing systems. A program of plant consolidation
involved combining the two Milwaukee-area powertrain plants into a single
facility and merging the separate paint and frame operations at York, Pennsylvania.
TABLE 4 Harley-Davidson’s non-motorcycle sales, 2005–2014 ($million)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Parts and accessories 815.7 862.3 868.3 858.7 767.2 749.2 816.5 836.7 873.1 875.0
General merchandise 247.9 277.5 305.4 313.8 282.2 259.1 274.1 282.5 295.9 284.8
Financial services 331.6 384.9 416.2 377.0 494.7 682.7 649.4 650.1 641.6 660.8
Source: Harley Davidson 10-K reports.
New agreements negotiated with unions allowed for more flexible employment
arrangements and working practices, which supported the introduction of a new
enterprise resource planning (ERP) system at the York plant. Combined with Harley’s
“surge production,” the new system meant customer demand would drive manufacturing,
every production line would have the flexibility to build every model, and
inventories could be reduced.
Human Resource Management
Central to Harley-Davidson’s remarkable growth between 1981 and 2007 was the
creation of a new relationship between management and employees that was forged
following the buyout from AMF. The new approach to human resource management
was built on participation, self-management, open communication, and team-based
organization. Team-based organization extended from eight- to 15-member work
groups at plant level right up to senior management where three functional teams—
the Create Demand Circle (CDC), the Produce Product Circle, and the Provide
Support—were coordinated by the Strategic Leadership Council.16
Despite Harley’s commitment to employee participation and development,
the production cutbacks and cost-cutting pressures during 2009–2012 created
tensions between the company and its employees. These were resolved
by the 2012 labor agreement, which created a new framework for workplace
flexibility.17
Competition
Despite Harley’s insistence that it was supplying a unique Harley experience rather
than competing with other motorcycle manufacturers, the more it took market
share from other manufacturers and expanded its product range and geographical
scope, the more it came into direct competition with other producers. The clearest
indication of direct competition was imitation: Honda, Suzuki, Yamaha, and
Kawasaki had long been offering V-twin cruisers styled closely along the lines
of the classic Harleys, but at lower prices and with more advanced technologies
(Table 5). In competing against Harley, the Japanese manufacturers’ key advantage
was the scale economies that derived from vastly greater volume. However,
despite their price premium, Harley-Davidson motorcycles benefitted from a lower
rate of depreciation than other brands.
Almost all of Harley’s competitors were, compared to Harley, highly diversified.
Honda, BMW, and Suzuki were important producers of automobiles, and more than
one-third of Yamaha’s turnover came from boats and snowmobiles. These companies
could share technologies, engineering capabilities, distribution, and brand
awareness across their different vehicle divisions. Moreover, sheer size conferred
purchasing power.
Imitators of Harley’s retro-styled, V-twin cruisers were not only the Japanese
motorcycle companies but also domestic competitors—including new entrants
Excelsior, Polaris (Victory), and a resuscitated Indian. Their heavyweight cruisers
typically sold at prices exceeding those of Harley.
Appendix Table A2 compares the financial performance of leading motorcycle
companies.
Meeting the Challenges of Tomorrow
Harley’s first-half results for 2015 reinforced fears over the sustainability of Harley’s
top-line growth. Profits were 8% lower than in the year-ago period, sales revenue was
6% lower, and unit sales were down by 1.4%. Wandell’s strategy had been strongly
orientated around expanding sales to “non-core” customer segments. Among these
were younger riders in the US and potential customers in overseas markets.
The need to attract younger riders was driven by unfavorable US demographic
trends—the aging of the baby boomers and the smaller number of white males
entering the 40–55 age band. However, would the Harley Experience have the same
appeal for Generation X and Y as it did for the baby-boomers? As the New York
Times noted, “BMW, Honda and Yamaha are attracting younger customers who
seem less interested in cruising on what their old man rides.”18
International markets also presented a major challenge: should Harley adapt to
the different requirements of these markets or should it remain faithful to the traditional
Harley image? “The US and Harley are tied together,” observed Britain’s Bike
magazine, “the guy who’s into Harleys here is also the guy who owns cowboy boots.
You get a Harley and you’re buying into the US mystique.”19
Harley claimed that its new Street 500 and Street 750 models had met with an
enthusiastic response both in the US and in India (the two countries where this
model was manufactured). However, Harley’s previous incursions into smaller
motorcycles—including Buell—had not been successful.
TABLE 5 Recommended retail prices for V-twin, cruiser motorcycles, 2015
Model Specifications Price ($)
Harley-Davidson
Sportster 883 Low V-twin, air-cooled, 883cc 8,249
VRSC V-Rod Muscle V-twin, liquid-cooled, OHC, 1247cc 16,649
Fat Boy V-twin, air-cooled, 1690cc 17,699
Heritage Softail Classic V-twin, air-cooled, 1690cc 18,349
Honda
Shadow 750 Aero V-twin, liquid-cooled, OHC, 745cc 7,499
Fury V-twin, liquid-cooled, OHC, 1312cc 9,999
Interstate ABS V-twin, liquid-cooled, OHC, 1312cc 10,999
Suzuki
C50 V-twin, liquid-cooled, OHC, 805cc 8,199
C90T V-twin, liquid-cooled, OHC, 1462cc 12,899
Boulevard C90 B.O.S.S. V-twin, liquid-cooled, 1462cc 12,389
Kawasaki
Vulcan 900 Classic V-twin, liquid-cooled, 8-valve, OHC, 903cc 7,499
Vulcan 900 Custom 8,499
Yamaha
V-Star Custom V-twin, OHC, 4-valve, air-cooled, 649cc 6,990
Stryker V-twin, OHC, 8-valve, liquid-cooled, 1304cc 11,690
Polaris
Victory Vegas 8-Ball V-twin, 8-valve, air-cooled, 1731cc 14,999
Victory Hammer 8-Ball 17,899
Note:
OHC = overhead camshaft.
Source: Websites of different motorcycle manufacturers.
A Milwaukee blogger summarized Harley’s dilemma:
So what does Harley do? One tack would be to stay focused on what it does best:
big bikes. While that strategy may make sense on some fronts (focus on what
you know, stay loyal to the brand identity, etc.), that approach will mean greatly
reduced growth prospects and could doom it if the current consumer spending
environment holds out long term. And meanwhile its core audience just gets older.
Or it could do what people have been saying what it should do for years: Make
smaller, more affordable bikes. That’s harder than it sounds, as it would force
Harley to compete against the Japanese manufacturers on their own turf. But if the
market is moving away from Harley, does it have a choice?20
The post Case 7 Harley-Davidson, Inc., May 2015 appeared first on My Assignment Online.
