Respond to each item below in 2–3 paragraphs. Use Learning Resources,
o Please copy and number each question. Put your answer below each question.
First:
o (1) What is moral relativism? How is moral relativism generally viewed today? Why?
o (2) What is natural law theory? In particular, how does it determine whether an action is good or bad? How have ethicists’ opinions of this theory changed over time? Why?
o (3) What was Aristotle’s view of the world and humanity’s place in it? Do you agree or disagree? Why?
o (4) What is social contract theory? How is social contract theory viewed today? Why?
o (5) What is utilitarianism? Name and explain three features and criticisms of it.
Second:
• Identify and explain one major objection to utilitarianism. What are the strengths and weaknesses of utilitarianism?
• Identify and explain one major objection to Kantianism. What are the strengths and weaknesses of Kantianism?
• What are the five aims of torture? Which aim can the liberal (in theory) accept and why? Why must the liberal reject the four others? [Remember: The word liberal here refers to any believer in liberty—that is, in a free society that respects human rights. The opposite of liberal in this context is illiberal or unfree, not conservative.] How is this liberal ideology expressed in the ticking time bomb experiment?
• What are the psychological effects of prolonged solitary confinement? Is solitary confinement an effective tool for rehabilitation? Why? Refer to both Harlow’s experiments with monkeys and to research and experiences involving adult humans.
Third:
• In Chapter 38, why does Bright think that it would be harmful to society’s morals if we were to murder murderers, rape rapists, and torture torturers? Why does Bright think that the use of the death penalty undermines the standing and moral authority of the United States? Do you agree or disagree? Why?
• Which nations are the top executors in the world? How many citizens does the United States execute each year? What percentage of murders are punished with the death penalty? Is there a correlation between lower murder rates and greater use of the death penalty in the regions of the United States? Do people convicted of war crimes like genocide receive the death penalty?
• In Chapter 16, Huemer argues that one has a right to use drugs. He also declares that this right is not absolute or exceptionless. Explain the author’s argument with support from your readings. Do you think this argument supports or refutes the war on drugs? Why?
Forth:
• Identifies the three main ideas that guide the conduct during a just war. What are they? Additionally, what are the rules of last resort and just peace?
• Explain how religions or other organized groups have applied the concept of a just war throughout history.
• What reasons for going to war are considered just causes today? Which are not?
• In Chapter 41, why does Rawls consider the fire-bombing and atomic bombing of Japanese cities during WWII to be deeply immoral? What is his view on utilitarian calculation? Do you agree with Rawls or not? Why?
Fifth:
• What are reasons people do or do not turn to religion to resolve moral dilemmas? Why?
• Why does Sullivan hold that a free society (or “a liberal state”) is obligated to allow gays to marry?
• Evaluate Leiser’s argument when natural is interpreted to mean: (1) following the descriptive laws of nature, (2) not artificial, and (3) common/statistically normal.
• Evaluate Leiser’s argument when natural is defined as good and anything unnatural is defined as bad.
Sixth:
You are on a lifeboat with 11 people (including you) aboard. The water surrounding the lifeboat is freezing such that no one would survive in the water. There is no rescue ship in sight and worse yet, the lifeboat is sinking. You notice a sign posted on the lifeboat that reads ”Capacity 10 normal-sized persons.” Looking around you notice 10 normal-sized persons (including you) and one 400-pound man. No one wants to jump out of the boat, and if nothing is done it will sink leaving all 11 to die.
Would You:
A. Push the 400-pound man out of the boat to save everyone else. (Achieving the greater good).
B. Refuse to push the 400-pound man-or anyone else-out of the boat and hope for a miracle.
• In a 1- to 2-page paper, do the following:
• For Part One, take the consequentialist viewpoint. What would the consequentialist say was the right answer for the 400-pound man in the lifeboat? Does he live or die? Defend your answer as would a consequentialist, explaining whether you decided to push the 400-pound man overboard or let him stay in the boat.
• For Part Two, take the nonconsequentialist viewpoint. How does the nonconsequentialist approach to ethics bode for the passengers on the lifeboat? Put on your nonconsequentialist-colored lenses and share your thoughts on the passengers’ hope for survival. Defend your answer as would a nonconsequentialist, explaining whether you decided to push the 400-pound man overboard or let him stay in the boat.
• Look back at your personal decision about what you would do in the situation and say whether your decision remains unchanged with the new knowledge you’ve gained from this lesson or if it has changed. Explain why or why not.
Ethics: Lecture Notes: “Why Ethicists—Even Religious Ones—Do Not Appeal to Religion”
In our society, religion is viewed as very closely tied with ethics. Often, ethical rules are viewed as divinely given. And religious views often profoundly shape and impact our moral debates on homosexuality, euthanasia, abortion, and the death penalty.
However, as a rule, professional ethicists do not appeal to religion in trying to address these issues. Why? Well, one explanation could be that many ethicists just aren’t that religious. While it’s true that ethicists, along with scholars and scientists more generally, are less religious than the general U.S. population, there are far deeper reasons. In fact, even ethicists who are religious do not invoke religion when trying to resolve a moral dispute.
One core reason is that philosophers, which ethicists are (ethics is a branch of philosophy), are committed to the use of reason to resolve a controversy. The use of reason (as opposed to feeling) to resolve a dispute is the defining feature of philosophy. And reason, as Catholic philosophers have always agreed, is a tool available to all. (The relationship of Protestantism to reason is more vexed.) Ideally, philosophers want to produce arguments that can convince anyone of any religion. It’s no use to quote the Bible or the Koran to a Buddhist!
Another reason goes all the way back to Plato. These reasons were examined under the heading of Divine Command Theory in your reading for the first week, which introduced moral theory. Essentially, the idea is that if God (or the gods, for Plato, a pagan) exists, then if God issues moral commands, he/she does not just make them up. God does not just arbitrarily issue moral commands. No, God issues commands based on reasons. God wouldn’t issue a silly command like, “Thou Shalt Not Eat Cheetos … Only Doritos.” Any commandment has reasoning behind it. And those are the reasons philosophers are after. So assume God says, “Don’t Kill.” God didn’t just make that up for no reason. The idea would be that God prohibited killing for the good and happiness of society (a utilitarian justification) or that God prohibited killing because we are made in his image and, thus, have dignity and rights (a Kantian justification).
A final reason is more controversial. Many philosophers, even religious ones, just don’t think religious texts are infallible moral guides. For example, the Old Testament not only forbids homosexuality but commands that homosexuals (and many, many others) be stoned and some even burned alive. Even the most conservative among us wouldn’t think it appropriate to execute gays and lesbians even if we happen to disapprove of homosexuality. (Though unfortunately, there are countries like Iran, and some American pastors, who disagree.) And the New Testament, which likewise condemns homosexuality, contains passages explicitly condoning slavery. For example, Ephesians 6:5 says, “Slaves, obey your earthly masters with respect and fear, and with sincerity of heart, just as you would obey Christ.” (These passages and others like it were used to justify slavery in the American South.”)
Elsewhere the New Testament admonishes (Corinthians 14:34): “Women should remain silent in the churches. They are not allowed to speak, but must be in submission, as the Law says.” And so, even if one accepts a religious text as a moral guide, it is hard to know what parts should be heeded. One thing is certain; it isn’t justified to simply cherry-pick texts with which one agrees. For example, Jesus explicitly forbids divorce, but he makes no mention of homosexuality. It would seem easier to permit homosexuality than divorce. Additionally, religious texts do not, in general, offer fully worked out moral theories that we can apply to all situations. This is especially clear when we consider new technologies like genetic engineering.
So, in sum, this is why ethicists, even religious ones, do not appeal to religion in resolving ethical dilemmas.
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Burton Leiser, “Homosexuality and the “Unnaturalness Argument”
[The alleged “unnaturalness” of homosexuality] raises the question of the meaning of nature, natural, and
similar terms. Theologians and other moralists have said that … [homosexual acts] violate the ,.natural law:’
and that they are therefore immoral and ought to be prohibited by the state.
The word nature has a built-in ambiguity that can lead to serious misunderstandings. When something is
said to be “natural” or in conformity with Anatural law” or the “law of nature, this may mean either (1) that
it is in conformity with the descriptive laws of nature, or (2) that it is not artificial, that man has not
imposed his will or his devices upon events or conditions as they exist or would have existed without such
interference.
I The Descriptive laws of Nature
The laws of nature, as these are understood by the scientist, differ from the laws of man. The former are
purely descriptive,,whereas the latter are prescriptive. When a scientist says that water boils at 212′
Fahrenheit or that the volume of a gas varies directly with the heat that is applied to it and inversely with
the pressure, he means merely that as a matter of recorded and observable fact, pure water under standard
conditions always boils at precisely 212′ Fahrenheit and that as a matter of observed fact, the volume of a
gas rises as it is heated and falls as pressure is applied to it. These “laws” merely describe the manner in
which physical substances actually behave. They differ from municipal and federal laws in that they do not
prescribe behaviour. Unlike manmade laws, natural laws are not passed by any legislator or group of
legislators; they are not proclaimed or announced; they impose no obligation upon anyone or anything; their
“violation” entails no penalty, and there is no reward for “following” them or “abiding by” them. When a
scientist says that the air in a tire “obeys” the laws of nature that “govern” gases, he does not mean that the
air, having been informed that it ought to be- have in a certain way, behaves appropriately under the right
conditions. He means, rather, that as a matter of fact, the air in a tire will behave like all other gases. In
saying that Boyle’s law “governs” the behavior of gases, he means merely that gases do, as a matter of fact,
behave in accordance with Boyle’s law, and that Boyle’s law enables one to predict accurately what will
happen to a given quantity of a gas as its pressure is raised; he does not mean to suggest that some heavenly
voice has proclaimed that all gases should henceforth behave in accordance with the terms of Boyle’s law
and that a ghostly policeman patrols the world, ready to mete out punishments to any gases that “violate”
the heavenly decree. in fact, according to the scientist, it does not make sense to speak of a natural law
being violated. For if there were a true exception to a so called law of nature, the exception would re- quire
a change in the description of those phenomena, and the “law”.would have been shown to be no law at all.
The laws of nature are revised as scientists discover new phenomena that require new refinements in their
descriptions of the way things actually happen. In this respect they differ fundamentally from human laws,
which are revised periodically by legislators who are not so interested in describing human behavior as they
are in prescribing what human behavior should be.
2 The Artificial as a Form of the Unnatural
On occasion when we say that something is not natural, we mean that it is a product of human artifice. My
typewriter is not a natural object, in this sense, for the substances of which it is composed have been
removed from their natural state-the state in which they existed before men came along-and have been
transformed by a series of chemical and physical and mechanical processes into other substances. They
have been rearranged into a whole that is quite different from anything found in nature. In short, my
typewriter is an artificial object. In this sense, the clothing that I wear as I lecture before my students is not
natural, for it has been transformed considerably from the state in which it was found in nature; and my
wearing of clothing as I lecture before my students is also not natural, in this sense, for in my natural state,
before the application of anything artificial, before any human interference with things as they are, I am
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quite naked. Human laws, being artificial conventions designed to exercise a degree of control over the natural inclinations and propensities of men, may in this sense be considered to be unnatural.
Now when theologians and moralists speak of homosexuality contraception, abortion, and other forms of
human behavior as being unnatural, and say that for that reason such behavior must be considered to be
wrong, in what sense are they using the word unnatural? Are they saying that homosexual behavior and the
use of contraceptives are contrary to the scientific laws of nature, are they saying that they are artificial
forms of behavior, or are they using the terms natural and unnatural in some third sense?
They cannot mean that homosexual behavior (to stick to the subject presently under discussion) violates the
laws of nature in the first sense, for, as we have pointed out, in the sense it is impossible to violate the laws
of nature. Those laws, being merely descriptive of what actually does happen, would have to include
homosexual behavior if such behavior does actually take place. Even if the defenders of the theological
view that homosexuality is unnatural were to appeal to a statistical analysis by point- ing out that such
behavior is not normal from a statistical point of view, and therefore not what the laws of nature require, it
would be open to their critics to reply that any descriptive law of nature must account for and incorporate
all statistical deviations, and that the laws of nature, in this sense, do not require anything. These critics
might also note that the best statistics available reveal that about half of all American males engage in
homosexual activity at some time in their lives, and that a very large percentage of American males have
exclusively homosexual relations for a fairly extensive period of time; from which it would follow that such
behavior is natural, for them, at any rate, in this sense of the word natural.
If those who say that homosexual behavior is unnatural are using the term unnatural in the second sense, it
is difficult to see why they should be fussing over it Certainly nothing is intrinsically wrong with going
against nature (if that is how it should be put) in this sense. That which is artificial is often far better than
what is natural. Artificial homes seem, at any rate, to be more suited to human habitation and more
conducive to longer life and better health than caves and other natural shelters. There are distinct
advantages to the use of such unnatural (i.e., artificial) amenities as clothes, furniture, and books. Although
we may dream of an idyllic return to nature in our more wistful moments, we would soon discover, as
Thoreau did in his attempt to es- cape from the artificiality of civilization, that needles and thread, knives
and matches, ploughs and nails, and countless other products of human artifice are essential to human life.
We would discover, as Plato pointed out in the Republic, that no man can be truly self-sufficient. Some of
the by-products of industry are less than desirable; but neither industry itself, nor the products of industry,
are intrinsically evil, even though both are unnatural in this sense of the word.
Interference with nature is not evil in itself. Nature, as some writers have put it, must be tamed. In some
respects man must look upon it as an enemy to be conquered. if nature were left to its, own devices, without
the intervention of human artifice, men would be consumed with disease, they would be plagued by insects,
they would be chained to the places where they were born with no means of swift communication or
transport, and they would suffer the discomforts and the torments of wind and weather and flood and fire
with no practical means of combating any of them. Interfering with nature, doing battle with nature, using
human will and reason and skill to thwart what might otherwise follow from the conditions that prevail in
the world, is a peculiarly human enterprise, one that can hardly be condemned merely because it does what
is not natural.
Homosexual behavior can hardly be considered to be unnatural in this sense. There is nothing “artificial”
about such behavior. On the contrary, it is quite natural, in this sense, to those
who engage in it. And even if it were not, even if it were quite artificial, this is not in itself a ground for
condemning it.
It would seem, then, that those who condemn homosexuality as an unnatural form of behavior must mean
something else by the word unnatural, something not covered by either of the preceding definitions. A third
possibility is this:
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3 Anything Uncommon or Abnormal is Unnatural
If this what is meant by those who condemn homosexuality on the ground that it is unnatural, it is quite
obvious that their condemnation cannot be accepted without further argument For the fact that a given form
of behavior is uncommon provides no justification for condemning it. Playing viola in a string quartet is no
doubt an uncommon form of human behavior, I do not know what percentage of the human race engages in
such behavior, or what percentage of his life any given violist devotes to such behavior, but I suspect that
the number of such people must be very small indeed, and that the total number of manhours spent in such
activity would justify our calling that form of activity un- common, abnormal (in the sense that it is
statistically not the kind of thing six people are ordinarily inclined to do), and therefore unnatural, in this
sense of the word. Yet there is no reason to suppose ft such uncommon, abnormal behavior is, by virtue of
its uncommonness, deserving of condemnation or ethically or morally wrong. On the contrary, many forms
of behavior are praised precisely because they are so uncommon. Great artists, poets, musicians, and
scientists are “abnormal” in this sense; but clearly the world is better off for having them, and it would be
absurd to condemn them on their activities for their failure to be com- mon and normal. If homosexual
behavior is wrong, then, it must be for some reason other than its “un- naturalness” in this sense of the word
4 Any Use of an Organ or an Instrument That Is Contrary to
Its Principal Purpose or Function Is Unnatural
Every organ and every instrument-perhaps even every creature-has a function to perform, one for which it
is particularly designed. Any use of those instruments and organs that is consonant with their purposes is
natural and proper, but any use that is inconsistent with their principal func- dons is unnatural and improper,
and to that ex- tent, evil or harmful. Human teeth, for example, are admirably designed for their principal
functions-biting and chewing the kinds of food suitable for human consumption. But they are not
particularly well suited for prying the caps from beer bottles. If they are used for the latter purpose, which is
not natural to them, they are liable to crack or break under the strain. The abuse of one’s teeth leads to their
destruction and to a con- sequent deterioration in one’s overall health. if they are used only for their proper
function, how- ever, they may continue to serve well for many years. Similarly, a given drug may have a
proper function. If used in the furtherance of that end, it can preserve life and restore health. But if it is
abused, and employed for purposes for which it was never intended, it may cause serious harm and even
death. The natural uses of things are good and proper, but their unnatural uses are bad and harmful.
What we must do, then, is to find the proper use, or the true purpose, of each organ in our bodies. Once we
have discovered ft, we will know what constitutes the natural use of each organ, and what constitutes an
unnatural, abusive, and potentially harmful employment of the various parts of our bodies. if we are
rational, we will be careful to confine our behavior to our proper functions and to refrain from unnatural
behavior. According to those philosophers that follow this fine of reason- ing, the way to discover the
“proper” use of any organ is to determine what it is peculiarly suited to do. The eye is suited for seeing, the
ear for hearing, the nerves for transmitting impulses from one part of the body to another, and so on.
What are the sex organs peculiarly suited to do? Obviously, they are peculiarly suited to enable men and
women to reproduce their own kind. No other organ in the body is capable of fulfilling that function. It
follows, according to those who follow the natural-law line, that the “proper” or “natural” function of the
sex organs is reproduction, and that strictly speaking, any use of those organs for other purposes is
unnatural, abusive, potentially harmful, and therefore wrong. The sex organs have been given to us in order
to enable us to maintain the continued existence of mankind on this earth. All perversions-including
masturbation, homosexual behavior, and heterosexual intercourse that deliberately frustrates the design of
the sexual organs-are unnatural and bad. As Pope Pius XI once said, “Private individuals have no other
power over the members of their bodies than that which pertains to their natural ends.”
But the problem is not so easily resolved Is it true that every organ has one and only one proper function? A
hammer my have been designed to pound nails, and it may perform that particular job beg. But it is not
sinful to employ a hammer to crack nuts ff I have no other more suitable toot immediately available. The
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hammer, being a relatively versatile tool, may be employed in a number of ways. It has no one “proper” or
“natural” function. A woman’s eyes are well adapted to seeing, it is true. But they seem also to be well
adapted to flirting. Is a woman’s use of her eyes for the latter purpose sinful merely because she is not using
them, at that moment, for their “primary” purpose of seeing? Our sexual organs are uniquely adapted for
procreation, but that is obviously not the only function for which they are adapted. Human beings may- and
do,-use those organs for a great many other purposes, and it is difficult to see why any one use should be
considered to be the only proper one. The sex organs, for one thing, seem to be particularly well adapted to
give their owners and others intense sensations of pleasure. Unless one believes that pleasure itself is bad,
there seems to be little reason to believe that the use of the sex organs for the production of pleasure in
oneself or in others is evil. In view of the peculiar design of these organs, with their great concentration of
nerve endings, it would seem that they were designed (if they were designed) with that very goal in mind,
and that their use for such purposes would be no more un- natural dm their use for the purpose of
procreation.
Nor should we overlook the fact that human sex organs may be and are used to express, in the deepest and
most intimate way open to man, the love of one person for another. Even the most ardent opponents of
“unfruitful” intercourse admit that sex does serve this function. They have accordingly conceded that a man
and his wife may have intercourse even though she is pregnant, or past the age of child bearing, or in the
infertile period of her menstrual cycle.
Human beings are remarkably complex and adaptable creatures. Neither they nor their organs can properly
be compared to hammers or to other took. The analogy quickly breaks down. The generalization that a
given organ or instrument has one and only one proper function does not hold up, even with regard to the
simplest manufactured tools, for, as we have seen, a tool may be used for more dm one purpose-less
effectively than one especially designed for a given work perhaps, but Aproperly” and certainly not sinfully.
A woman may use her eyes not only to see and to flirt but also to earn money-if she is, for example, an
actress or a model. Though neither of the latter functions seems to have been a part of the original “design:’
if one may speak sensibly of design in this context, of the eye, it is difficult to see why such a use of the
eyes of a woman should be considered sinful, perverse, or unnatural. Her sex organs have the unique
capacity of producing ova and nurturing human embryos, under the right conditions; but why should any
other use of these organs, including their use to bring pleasure to their owner or to someone else, or to
manifest love to another person or even, perhaps, to earn money, be regarded as perverse, sinful, or
unnatural? Similarly, a man’s sexual organs possess the unique capacity of causing the generation of another
human being, but if a man chooses to use them for pleasure, or for the expression of love, or for some other
purpose-so long as he does not interfere with the rights of some other person-the fact that his sex organs do
have their unique capabilities does not constitute a convincing justification for condemning their other uses
as being perverse, sinful, unnatural, or animal. If a man “perverts” himself by wiggling his ears for the
entertainment of his neighbors instead of using them exclusively for their “natural” function of hearing, no
one thinks of consigning him to prison. If he abuses his teeth by using them to pull staples from memos-a
function for which teeth were clearly not designed-he is not accused of being immoral, degraded, and
degenerate. The fact that people are condemned for using their sex organs for their own pleasure or profit,
or for that of others, may be more revealing about the prejudices and taboos of our society than it is about
our perception of the true nature or purpose or “end” (whatever that might be) of our bodies.
To sum up, then, the proposition that any use of an organ that is contrary to its principal purpose or function
is unnatural assumes that organs have a principal purpose or function, but this may be denied on the ground
that the purpose or function of a given organ may vary according to the needs or desires of its owner. It may
be denied on the ground dm a given organ may have more dm one principal purpose or function, and any
attempt to call one use or another the only natural one seems to be arbitrary, if not questionbegging. Also,
the proposition suggests that what is unnatural is evil or depraved. This goes beyond the pure description of
things, and enters into the problem of the evaluation of human behavior, which leads to the fifth meaning of
“natural.”
5 That Which Is Natural is Good, and Whatever is Unnatural is Bad
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When one condemns homosexuality or masturbation or the use of contraceptives on the ground that it is
unnatural, one implies that whatever is unnatural is bad, wrongful, or perverse. But as we have seen, in
some sense of the word, the unnatural (i.e., the artificial) is often very good, whereas that which is natural
(i.e., that which has not been subjected to human artifice or improvement) may be very bad indeed. Of
course, interference with nature may be bad. Ecologists have made us more aware than we have ever been
of the dangers of unplanned and uninformed interference with nature. But Ns is not to say ft all interference
with nature is bad. Every time a man cuts down a tree to make room for a home for himself, or catches a
fish to feed himself or his family, he is interfering with nature. If men did not interfere with nature, they
would have no homes, they could eat no fish, and, in fact they could not survive. What, then, can be meant
by those who say that whatever is natural is good and whatever is unnatural is bad? Clearly they cannot
have intended merely to reduce the word natural to a synonym of good, right, and proper, and unnatural to a
synonym of evil, wrong, improper, corrupt, and depraved. If that were all they had intended to do, there
would be very little to discuss as to whether a given form of behavior might be proper even though it is not
in strict conformity with someone’s views of what is natural; for good and natural being synonyms, it would
follow inevitably that whatever is good must be natural, and vice versa, by definition. This is certainly not
what the opponents of homosexuality have been saying when they claim that homosexuality, being
unnatural, is evil. For if it were, their claim would be quite empty. They would be saying merely that
homosexuality, being evil, is evil-a redundancy that could as easily be reduced to the simpler assertion that
homosexuality is evil. This assertion, however, is not an argument. Those who oppose homosexuality and
other sexual “perversions@ on the ground that they are “unnatural” are saying that there is some objectively
identifiable quality in such behavior that is unnatural; and that that quality, once it has been identified by
some kind of scientific observation, can be seen to be detrimental to those who engage in such behavior, or
to those around them; and that because of the harm (physical, mental, moral, or spiritual) that results from
engaging in any behavior possessing the attribute of unnaturalness, such behavior must be considered to be
wrongful, and should be discouraged by society. “Unnaturalness@ and “wrongfulness” are not synonyms,
then, but different concepts. The problem with which we are wrestling is that we are unable to find a
meaning for unnatural that enables us to arrive at the conclusion that homosexuality is unnatural or that if
homosexuality is unnatural, it is therefore wrongful behavior. We have examined four common meanings of
natural and unnatural, and have seen that none of them performs the task that it must perform if the
advocates of this argument are to prevail. Without some more satisfactory explanation of the connection
between the wrongfulness of homosexuality and its alleged unnaturalness, the argument must be rejected.
In the spring of 1945, the Allies finally captured land so close to
Japan that they could start a bombing campaign against the Japanese home islands. Many of the bombs were incendiary, designed
to spread fires that the Japanese cities were not constructed to withstand. Hundreds of thousands of civilians perished in those infernos.
On August 6 and August 9 of 1945, the United States dropped
atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, killing tens of thousands of people instantly and leaving many more to die horrible
deaths. Hiroshima and Nagasaki were chosen mostly for a pragmatic reason: few other Japanese cities were still standing.
John Rawls was an infantryman in the Pacific during World
War II, and fifty years after the bombings, he wrote this essay
about the conduct of war. According to Rawls, the Americans’
actions violated the rights of Japanese civilians. President Harry
Truman, who ordered the atomic bombings, acted like a politician
but not like a statesman.
John Rawls (1921–2002) taught for many years at Harvard
University. He will long be remembered as the author of A Theory
of Justice (1971), the most influential work in political philosophy
of the twentieth century.
Chapter 41
Fifty Years after Hiroshima
John Rawls
John Rawls, “Fifty Years after Hiroshima” in Dissent (summer 1995). Copyright © 1995.
Used with permission.
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Rachels, J., & Rachels, S. (Eds.). (2019). The right thing to do : Readings in moral philosophy. Retrieved from
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466 Chapter 41
The fiftieth year since the bombing of Hiroshima is a time to reflect
about what one should think of it. Is it really a great wrong, as many
now think, and many also thought then, or is it perhaps justified after
all? I believe that both the fire-bombing of Japanese cities beginning
in the spring of 1945 and the later atomic bombing of Hiroshima on
August 6 were very great wrongs, and rightly seen as such. In order to
support this opinion, I set out what I think to be the principles governing the conduct of war—jus in bello—of democratic peoples. These
peoples have different ends of war than nondemocratic, especially
totalitarian, states, such as Germany and Japan, which sought the domination and exploitation of subjected peoples, and in Germany’s case,
their enslavement if not extermination.
Although I cannot properly justify them here, I begin by setting out
six principles and assumptions in support of these judgments. I hope
they seem not unreasonable; and certainly they are familiar, as they are
closely related to much traditional thought on this subject.
1. The aim of a just war waged by a decent democratic society is a
just and lasting peace between peoples, especially with its present
enemy.
2. A decent democratic society is fighting against a state that is not
democratic. This follows from the fact that democratic peoples do
not wage war against each other; and since we are concerned with
the rules of war as they apply to such peoples, we assume the society fought against is nondemocratic and that its expansionist aims
threatened the security and free institutions of democratic regimes
and caused the war.
3. In the conduct of war, a democratic society must carefully distinguish three groups: the state’s leaders and officials, its soldiers,
and its civilian population. The reason for these distinctions rests
on the principle of responsibility: since the state fought against is
not democratic, the civilian members of the society cannot be those
who organized and brought on the war. This was done by its leaders
and officials assisted by other elites who control and staff the state
apparatus. They are responsible, they willed the war, and for doing
that, they are criminals. But civilians, often kept in ignorance and
swayed by state propaganda, are not. And this is so even if some
civilians knew better and were enthusiastic for the war. In a nation’s
conduct of war many such marginal cases may exist, but they are
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Fifty Years after Hiroshima 467
irrelevant. As for soldiers, they, just as civilians, and leaving aside
the upper ranks of an officer class, are not responsible for the war,
but are conscripted or in other ways forced into it, their patriotism
often cruelly and cynically exploited. The grounds on which they
may be attacked directly are not that they are responsible for the
war but that a democratic people cannot defend itself in any other
way, and defend itself it must do. About this there is no choice.
4. A decent democratic society must respect the human rights of the
members of the other side, both civilians and soldiers, for two reasons. One is because they simply have these rights by the law of
peoples. The other reason is to teach enemy soldiers and civilians
the content of those rights by the example of how they hold in their
own case. In this way their significance is best brought home to
them. They are assigned a certain status, the status of the members
of some human society who possess rights as human persons. In
the case of human rights in war the aspect of status as applied to
civilians is given a strict interpretation. This means, as I understand
it here, that they can never be attacked directly except in times of
extreme crisis, the nature of which I discuss below.
5. Continuing with the thought of teaching the content of human
rights, the next principle is that just peoples by their actions and
proclamations are to foreshadow during war the kind of peace they
aim for and the kind of relations they seek between nations. By
doing so, they show in an open and public way the nature of their
aims and the kind of people they are. These last duties fall largely
on the leaders and officials of the governments of democratic
peoples, since they are in the best position to speak for the whole
people and to act as the principle applies. Although all the preceding principles also specify duties of statesmanship, this is especially
true of 4 and 5. The way a war is fought and the actions ending it
endure in the historical memory of peoples and may set the stage
for future war. This duty of statesmanship must always be held in
view.
6. Finally, we note the place of practical means-end reasoning in
judging the appropriateness of an action or policy for achieving the
aim of war or for not causing more harm than good. This mode of
thought—whether carried on by (classical) utilitarian reasoning,
or by cost-benefit analysis, or by weighing national interests, or in
other ways—must always be framed within and strictly limited by
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468 Chapter 41
the preceding principles. The norms of the conduct of war set up
certain lines that bound just action. War plans and strategies, and
the conduct of battles, must lie within their limits. (The only exception, I repeat, is in times of extreme crisis.)
In connection with the fourth and fifth principles of the conduct of war,
I have said that they are binding especially on the leaders of nations.
They are in the most effective position to represent their people’s aims
and obligations, and sometimes they become statesmen. But who is a
statesman? There is no office of statesman, as there is of president, or
chancellor, or prime minister. The statesman is an ideal, like the ideal
of the truthful or virtuous individual. Statesmen are presidents or prime
ministers who become statesmen through their exemplary performance
and leadership in their office in difficult and trying times and manifest
strength, wisdom, and courage. They guide their people through turbulent and dangerous periods for which they are esteemed always, as one
of their great statesmen.
The ideal of the statesman is suggested by the saying: the politician
looks to the next election, the statesman to the next generation. It is the
task of the student of philosophy to look to the permanent conditions
and the real interests of a just and good democratic society. It is the
task of the statesman, however, to discern these conditions and interests in practice; the statesman sees deeper and further than most others
and grasps what needs to be done. The statesman must get it right, or
nearly so, and hold fast to it. Washington and Lincoln were statesmen.
Bismarck was not. He did not see Germany’s real interests far enough
into the future, and his judgment and motives were often distorted by
his class interests and his wanting himself alone to be chancellor of Germany. Statesmen need not be selfless and may have their own interests
when they hold office, yet they must be selfless in their judgments and
assessments of society’s interests and not be swayed, especially in war
and crisis, by passions of revenge and retaliation against the enemy.
Above all, they are to hold fast to the aim of gaining a just peace, and
avoid the things that make achieving such a peace more difficult. Here
the proclamations of a nation should make clear (the statesman must see
to this) that the enemy people are to be granted an autonomous regime
of their own and a decent and full life once peace is securely reestablished. Whatever they may be told by their leaders, whatever reprisals
they may reasonably fear, they are not to be held as slaves or serfs after
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Fifty Years after Hiroshima 469
surrender, or denied in due course their full liberties; and they may well
achieve freedoms they did not enjoy before, as the Germans and the
Japanese eventually did. The statesman knows, if others do not, that all
descriptions of the enemy people (not their rulers) inconsistent with this
are impulsive and false.
Turning now to Hiroshima and the fire-bombing of Tokyo, we find
that neither falls under the exemption of extreme crisis. One aspect of
this is that since (let’s suppose) there are no absolute rights—rights
that must be respected in all circumstances—there are occasions when
civilians can be attacked directly by aerial bombing. Were there times
during the war when Britain could properly have bombed Hamburg and
Berlin? Yes, when Britain was alone and desperately facing Germany’s
superior might; moreover, this period would extend until Russia had
clearly beat off the first German assault in the summer and fall of 1941,
and would be able to fight Germany until the end. Here the cutoff point
might be placed differently, say the summer of 1942, and certainly by
Stalingrad. I shall not dwell on this, as the crucial matter is that under
no conditions could Germany be allowed to win the war, and this for
two basic reasons: first, the nature and history of constitutional democracy and its place in European culture; and second, the peculiar evil of
Nazism and the enormous and uncalculable moral and political evil it
represented for civilized society.
The peculiar evil of Nazism needs to be understood, since in some
circumstances a democratic people might better accept defeat if the
terms of peace offered by the adversary were reasonable and moderate,
did not subject them to humiliation, and looked forward to a workable
and decent political relationship. Yet characteristic of Hitler was that he
accepted no possibility at all of a political relationship with his enemies.
They were always to be cowed by terror and brutality, and ruled by
force. From the beginning the campaign against Russia, for example,
was a war of destruction against Slavic peoples, with the original inhabitants remaining, if at all, only as serfs. When Goebbels and others protested that the war could not be won that way, Hitler refused to listen.
Yet it is clear that while the extreme crisis exemption held for Britain
in the early stages of the war, it never held at any time for the United
States in its war with Japan. The principles of the conduct of war were
always applicable to it. Indeed, in the case of Hiroshima many involved
in higher reaches of the government recognized the questionable
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470 Chapter 41
character of the bombing and that limits were being crossed. Yet during the discussions among allied leaders in June and July 1945, the
weight of the practical means-end reasoning carried the day. Under
the continuing pressure of war, such moral doubts as there were failed
to gain an express and articulated view. As the war progressed, the
heavy fire-bombing of civilians in the capitals of Berlin and Tokyo and
elsewhere was increasingly accepted on the allied side. Although after
the outbreak of war Roosevelt had urged both sides not to commit the
inhuman barbarism of bombing civilians, by 1945 allied leaders came
to assume that Roosevelt would have used the bomb on Hiroshima. The
bombing grew out of what had happened before.
The practical means-end reasons to justify using the atomic bomb on
Hiroshima were the following:
The bomb was dropped to hasten the end of the war. It is clear that
Truman and most other allied leaders thought it would do that. Another
reason was that it would save lives where the lives counted are the lives
of American soldiers. The lives of Japanese, military or civilian, presumably counted for less. Here the calculations of least time and most
lives saved were mutually supporting. Moreover, dropping the bomb
would give the Emperor and the Japanese leaders a way to save face, an
important matter given Japanese samurai culture. Indeed, at the end a
few top Japanese leaders wanted to make a last sacrificial stand but were
overruled by others supported by the Emperor, who ordered surrender
on August 12, having received word from Washington that the Emperor
could stay provided it was understood that he had to comply with the
orders of the American military commander. The last reason I mention
is that the bomb was dropped to impress the Russians with American
power and make them more agreeable with our demands. This reason is
highly disputed but is urged by some critics and scholars as important.
The failure of these reasons to reflect the limits on the conduct of war
is evident, so I focus on a different matter: the failure of statesmanship
on the part of allied leaders and why it might have occurred. Truman
once described the Japanese as beasts and to be treated as such; yet how
foolish it sounds now to call the Germans or the Japanese barbarians and
beasts! Of the Nazis and Tojo militarists, yes, but they are not the German and the Japanese people. Churchill later granted that he carried the
bombing too far, led by passion and the intensity of the conflict. A duty
of statesmanship is not to allow such feelings, natural and inevitable as
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Fifty Years after Hiroshima 471
they may be, to alter the course a democratic people should best follow
in striving for peace. The statesman understands that relations with the
present enemy have special importance: for as I have said, war must be
openly and publicly conducted in ways that make a lasting and amicable
peace possible with a defeated enemy, and prepare its people for how
they may expect to be treated. Their present fears of being subjected to
acts of revenge and retaliation must be put to rest; present enemies must
be seen as associates in a shared and just future peace.
These remarks make it clear that, in my judgment, both Hiroshima and
the fire-bombing of Japanese cities were great evils that the duties of
statesmanship require political leaders to avoid in the absence of the
crisis exemption. I also believe this could have been done at little cost in
further casualties. An invasion was unnecessary at that date, as the war
was effectively over. However, whether that is true or not makes no difference. Without the crisis exemption, those bombings are great evils.
Yet it is clear that an articulate expression of the principles of just war
introduced at that time would not have altered the outcome. It was simply too late. A president or prime minister must have carefully considered these questions, preferably long before, or at least when they had
the time and leisure to think things out. Reflections on just war cannot
be heard in the daily round of the pressure of events near the end of the
hostilities; too many are anxious and impatient, and simply worn out.
Similarly, the justification of constitutional democracy and the basis
of the rights and duties it must respect should be part of the public
political culture and discussed in the many associations of civic society
as part of one’s education. It is not clearly heard in day-to-day ordinary
politics, but must be presupposed as the background, not the daily
subject of politics, except in special circumstances. In the same way,
there was not sufficient prior grasp of the fundamental importance of
the principles of just war for the expression of them to have blocked the
appeal of practical means-end reasoning in terms of a calculus of lives,
or of the least time to end the war, or of some other balancing of costs
and benefits. This practical reasoning justifies too much, too easily, and
provides a way for a dominant power to quiet any moral worries that
may arise. If the principles of war are put forward at that time, they easily become so many more considerations to be balanced in the scales.
Another failure of statesmanship was not to try to enter into negotiations with the Japanese before any drastic steps such as the fire-bombing
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472 Chapter 41
of cities or the bombing of Hiroshima were taken. A conscientious
attempt to do so was morally necessary. As a democratic people, we
owed that to the Japanese people—whether to their government is
another matter. There had been discussions in Japan for some time about
finding a way to end the war, and on June 26 the government had been
instructed by the Emperor to do so. It must surely have realized that with
the navy destroyed and the outer islands taken, the war was lost. True,
the Japanese were deluded by the hope that the Russians might prove to
be their allies, but negotiations are precisely to disabuse the other side
of delusions of that kind. A statesman is not free to consider that such
negotiations may lessen the desired shock value of subsequent attacks.
Truman was in many ways a good, at times a very good president.
But the way he ended the war showed he failed as a statesman. For him
it was an opportunity missed, and a loss to the country and its armed
forces as well. It is sometimes said that questioning the bombing of
Hiroshima is an insult to the American troops who fought the war. This
is hard to understand. We should be able to look back and consider our
faults after fifty years. We expect the Germans and the Japanese to do
that. . . . Why shouldn’t we? It can’t be that we think we waged the war
without moral error!
None of this alters Germany’s and Japan’s responsibility for the war
nor their behavior in conducting it. Emphatically to be repudiated are
two nihilist doctrines. One is expressed by Sherman’s remark, “War
is hell,” so anything goes to get it over with as soon as one can. The
other says that we are all guilty so we stand on a level and no one can
blame anyone else. These are both superficial and deny all reasonable
distinctions; they are invoked falsely to try to excuse our misconduct or
to plead that we cannot be condemned.
The moral emptiness of these nihilisms is manifest in the fact that
just and decent civilized societies—their institutions and laws, their
civil life and background culture and mores—all depend absolutely
on making significant moral and political distinctions in all situations.
Certainly war is a kind of hell, but why should that mean that all moral
distinctions cease to hold? And granted also that sometimes all or nearly
all may be to some degree guilty, that does not mean that all are equally
so. There is never a time when we are free from all moral and political
principles and restraints. These nihilisms are pretenses to be free of
those principles and restraints that always apply to us fully
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